Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia

The recent Islamist outrages in France continued to dominate the news last week, being the most noted story for 74% of the 2,070 Britons interviewed online by Populus on 14-15 January 2015. However, the domestic research agenda has now broadened out to include the implications for the Jewish community.

Anti-Semitism (1)

The Campaign against Antisemitism (CAA), a grass-roots movement which started in August 2014, published its Annual Antisemitism Barometer, 2015 Full Report on 14 January 2015, summarizing the results of two surveys which it had commissioned in Britain, one among the public and the other among Jews. These new data led the CAA to conclude: ‘Whilst antisemitism in Britain is not yet at the levels seen in most of Europe, the results of our survey should be a wakeup call. Britain is at a tipping point: unless antisemitism is met with zero tolerance, it will continue to grow and British Jews may increasingly question their place in their own country.’ The report, the preparation of which was funded by the Anglo-Jewish Association and private donors, can be viewed at: 

http://antisemitism.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Annual-Antisemitism-Barometer-Report.pdf

The survey of the general public was undertaken by YouGov among 3,411 adults interviewed online in two separate polls, on 21-22 December 2014 and 5-6 January 2015 (i.e. just before the recent Islamist outrages in France, including an attack on a kosher supermarket during which four Jews were killed). Respondents were presented with a list of seven stereotypical statements deemed by the CAA to be anti-Semitic in nature, and it was found that 45% of Britons believed at least one of them to be definitely or probably true, including 51% of men and 39% of women, the regional range being from 30% in Scotland to 48% in northern England. One-quarter (26%) believed at least two statements were true, 17% at least three, and 11% at least four.  

If the last statistic is taken as some kind of approximation of hard-core prejudice against Jews in Britain, then the proportion is similar to that discovered by Clive Field in his ‘meta-analysis’ of polls on anti-Semitism published in Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung, Vol. 15, 2006, pp. 259-300.Also, more recently, according to The ADL Global 100: An Index of Anti-Semitism, released by the New York-based Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in May 2014, Britain has one of the lowest rates of anti-Semitism in the world – see BRIN’s coverage at: 

http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/2014/adl-index-of-anti-semitism/

Results for each of YouGov’s seven statements are tabulated below, showing highs and lows by demographic sub-groups.

% saying definitely or probably true

All

High

Low

Jews chase money more than other British people

25

39 (UKIP)

18 (LibDem; 18-24)

Jews’ loyalty to Israel makes them less loyal to Britain than other British people

20

28 (UKIP)

15 (women; Scotland; no religion)

Jews think they are better than other people

17

27 (UKIP)

11 (women)

Jews have too much influence in the media

17

29 (non-Christian)

11 (women)

Jews talk about the Holocaust too much in order to get sympathy

13

23 (non-Christian)

10 (women; Scotland)

In business Jews are not as honest as most people

11

17 (UKIP)

7 (Scotland; no religion)

I would be unhappy if a family member married a Jew

10

22 (non-Christian)

7 (LibDem)

The full data tables are at: 

https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/jqf80l3ea6/CampaignAgainstAntisemitismResults_MergedFile_W.pdf

For its second survey, the CAA claims to have polled ‘a representative sample of the British Jewish community’, with the assistance of various Jewish agencies. In practice, informants appear to have constituted a self-selecting sample, who responded to an online questionnaire between 23 December 2014 and 11 January 2015, and which they accessed via a weblink distributed via social media and email lists. So, although electronic identifiers enabled duplicate or non-UK responses to be filtered out, and although the British data were weighted to reflect the regional distribution of Jews in the census (it is unclear why other census demographics of Jews were not deployed), the results should still be treated with some caution and may not be representative. As we have noted previously, it is genuinely very difficult to achieve proper cross-sections of minority religious populations. 

In particular, those with a special angst about anti-Semitism and/or who felt particularly protective of Israel may have been more predisposed to reply to the CAA enquiry than other Jews. We may note that social scientist Keith Kahn-Harris is quoted in The Jewish Chronicle as having already dismissed the CAA survey as ‘methodologically invalid. There can be no confidence in its representativeness’. The equally respected Institute for Jewish Policy Research has issued a press release in which it criticizes the CAA study for being ‘littered with flaws’ and ‘rather irresponsible’. The release can be read online at: 

http://www.jpr.org.uk/newsevents/article.1012

With this significant caveat in mind, we should note, for the record, that, of the 2,230 British Jews who replied to the CAA: 

  • 84% agreed that boycotts of businesses selling Israeli products constituted intimidation (11% disagreeing)
  • 82% agreed that media bias against Israel fuelled persecution of Jews in Britain (11% disagreeing)
  • 77% reported that they had witnessed anti-Semitism disguised as a political comment about Israel (13% disagreeing)
  • 69% agreed that the Jewish community had to protect itself because the State does not protect it enough (18% disagreeing)
  • 63% argued that the authorities let too much anti-Semitism go unpunished (19% disagreeing)
  • 58% were concerned that Jews may not have a long-term future in Europe (28% disagreeing)
  • 56% had witnessed or experienced more anti-Semitism in the past two years than previously (26% disagreeing)
  • 56% concurred that the recent rise in anti-Semitism in Britain had echoes of the 1930s (27% disagreeing)
  • 45% were concerned that Jews may not have a long-term future in Britain (37% disagreeing)
  • 45% agreed that their family was threatened by Islamic extremism in Britain (37% disagreeing)
  • 37% avoided showing any visible signs of Judaism when they went out (42% disagreeing)
  • 27% often avoided mentioning their Judaism when they were with new people (57% disagreeing)
  • 25% claimed to have considered leaving Britain in the past two years due to anti-Semitism (63% disagreeing) 

Anti-Semitism (2)

To be fair to the CAA, it had settled upon its own survey of Jews only after approaching ‘major polling organisations’ who ‘advised that they did not have enough Jewish panellists on their databases to conduct an effective or valid survey of the Jewish community’. The CAA will doubtless have been as surprised as everyone else to have read the announcement by The Jewish Chronicle, on the same day as CAA’s Annual Antisemitism Barometer was published, that the newspaper had been working with Survation over several months to develop ‘an extensive targeted database of thousands of Jews across the UK who can be randomly contacted for polling’, each poll to have a sample of around 1,000 Jews.  

Survation has published the following description of its methodology: ‘SAMPLING METHOD: Respondents were sampled based on a modelled probability of residents identifying themselves as Jewish. This was done using a range of demographic indicators selected by Survation in consultation with Jewish community leaders and academics. Respondents were asked to confirm whether they were Jewish before completing the survey, this includes both secular and non-practicing Jews. Only those who identified themselves as Jewish were asked to complete the survey.’  

‘DATA WEIGHTING: Data were weighted to the profile of all Jewish adults aged 18+ in the UK … by age and sex … Targets for the weighted data were derived from Office of National Statistics 2011 Census data.’ 

The Jewish Chronicle had originally planned to publicize this panel of adult UK Jews towards the end of January 2015 but rushed it forward in the light of recent events in France, and commissioned its first poll, with 555 respondents contacted by telephone on 12-14 January 2015. Topline results for the four questions (excluding don’t knows) are shown below, but data tables (with breaks by gender, age, and region) have also been posted at:      

http://survation.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Jewish-Topical-Issues-Poll-Final.pdf 

  • Thinking about personal safety, how safe or unsafe do you feel as a Jewish person in Britain? – very safe 17%, quite safe 58%, quite unsafe 19%, very unsafe 3%
  • Do you feel life in general is getting better or worse for Jewish people in Britain, or is it about the same? – better 9%, about the same 45%, slightly worse 34%, much worse 9%
  • Have last week’s events in Paris made you more concerned about your safety in Britain or have they made no difference? – much more concerned 32%, slightly more concerned 41%, made no difference 27%
  • Have last week’s events in Paris made you consider leaving Britain? – yes 11% (16% among under-35s), no 88%  

An article in The Jewish Chronicle about the survey is at: 

http://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/128162/jc-poll-reveals-88-cent-british-jews-have-not-considered-leaving-uk 

Anti-Semitism (3)

Further evidence that hard-core prejudice against Jews in Britain may not exceed 10% of the population came in a second YouGov poll for The Sunday Times on 15-16 January 2015, among 1,647 adults. Data tables are at:  

https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/wt26kxdn72/YG-Archive-Pol-Sunday-Times-results-160115.pdf

The survey revealed that, although 13% considered that, as regards other people, there was more prejudice against Jews than ten years ago (compared with 61% saying the level of prejudice was unchanged or lessened), the overwhelming majority of the public had a favourable personal view of Jews, with only a small minority (disproportionately located among UKIP voters) unfavourable. In particular: 

  • 10% disputed that British Jews are well integrated into British society, against 71% thinking they are and 18% uncertain
  • 8% denied that British Jews make a positive contribution to British society, with 73% believing that they do and 20% expressing no view
  • 7% admitted to having a negative opinion of Jewish people in Britain, 77% being positive, and 17% undecided 

Islamophobia (1)

The fall-out from the recent Islamist outrages in France has also negatively impacted Muslims in Britain, and matters are not helped by the fact that the population at large harbours an exaggerated notion as to how many Muslims there actually are in the country. According to the 2011 census, the proportion is just under 5%, yet only 9% of 1,782 adults interviewed by YouGov online on 12-13 January 2015 knew this, with the mean guess being 17%, more than three times the reality. Moreover, 26% of this national cross-section (and 54% of UKIP voters) also felt that ordinary Muslims needed to apologize when people claiming to be acting on behalf of Islam committed terrorist acts, with 63% considering that ordinary Muslims had nothing to apologize for, and 11% undecided. Data tables were published on 14 January 2015 at: 

https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/t92z3pag83/BuzzfeedResults_150113_Muslims_W.pdf

Islamophobia (2)

YouGov’s poll for The Sunday Times on 15-16 January 2015, published on 18 January, also probed Islamophobic attitudes, as well as reactions to the latest edition of the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, whose front page showed another cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed. The majority (53% overall, 68% of UKIP voters) agreed that this had been the right thing for the newspaper to do, and a plurality of the whole sample (43%) and majority of men, Liberal Democrats, and UKIP supporters still took this line even though it would make further terrorist attacks more likely. On British Muslims, there were some sharp divisions of opinion: 

  • 58% (and 84% of UKIP voters) contended that most British Muslim leaders could be doing a lot more to combat radicalization and terrorism, against 27% accepting they were doing all they reasonably could
  • 46% thought that all, most, or a majority of British Muslims shared British values and the identical proportion that only a minority, hardly any, or no British Muslims did so, peaking at 73% of UKIP voters
  • 42% believed that British Muslims were well integrated into British society but 50% said that they were not, including 79% of UKIP voters and 59% of over-60s
  • 41% assessed that British Muslims were usually friendly to non-Muslim Britons but 20% judged them usually unfriendly, with a high of 39% among UKIP supporters
  • 33% agreed with the suggestion of UKIP leader Nigel Farage that ghettoes had sprung up in Britain where Sharia law prevailed and from which the police and other legal authorities had withdrawn, a view shared by 75% of Farage’s own backers, with 41% denying the statement (63% of 18-24s)

 

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Welfare Reform and Other News

Welfare reform (1)

Recent attacks by church leaders from several denominations on the Coalition Government’s welfare and benefits reform programme seem to be giving the British public pause for thought, according to a YouGov poll for today’s edition of The Sunday Times, for which 2,141 adults were interviewed online on 20-21 February 2014. Asked whether they agreed with the church leaders’ criticisms, which branded the reforms as a ‘disgrace’ and leaving some people at risk of ‘destitution’, opinion was evenly divided, 42% agreeing and 42% disagreeing. Most negative about the Government’s policy were Labour voters (71%) and Scots (57%), while those more inclined to reject the views of the church leaders included Conservative supporters (77%) and residents of southern England outside London (50%). For the full results, see p. 9 of the data tables at:

http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/7ievwsmlza/YG-Archive-Pol-Sunday-Times-results-140221.pdf

This is not the first intervention about the current Government’s welfare reform programme on the part of church leaders. For BRIN’s previous coverage of public reaction to such intervention, see:

http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/2013/sunday-times-religion-poll-2/ [17 March 2013]

http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/2012/lords-spiritual/ [27 January 2012]

Welfare reform (2)

Meanwhile, opinion about the welfare system shows some signs of division along religious lines, according to a ComRes poll conducted online among a sample of 2,027 adult Britons aged 18 and over on 6-8 December 2013. Results were released on 19 February 2014 to coincide with the publication of the latest report from the think-tank Theos, The Future of Welfare, comprising 12 essays introduced and edited by Nick Spencer. The data tables for the survey can be found at:

http://www.comres.co.uk/polls/Theos___Perceptions_of_the_Welfare_State.pdf

Some of the key findings to emerge from the research include:

  • Non-Christians are most confident that the welfare state will survive in something like its present nature and scale in 30 years, 45% against 31% for Christians and 28% for people of no faith, the plurality view among the latter groups being that it will survive but in a diminished form.
  • Christians (75%) take a harder line than non-Christians (63%) or those without religion (60%) in believing that the receipt of welfare benefits should be dependent on prior financial contributions through the tax system, just 19% of Christians disagreeing.
  • Christians (63%) are also much more likely to disagree with the suggestion that everyone should receive benefits, irrespective of whether they have been paying taxes, this being 10% more than the religiously unaffiliated and 26% more than for non-Christians (51% of whom actually agree with the proposition).
  • A plurality among people of no faith (49%) do not think that the relatively wealthy should be entitled to some welfare benefits even if they have been paying taxes, whereas both Christians (58%) and non-Christians (53%) deem such entitlement to be perfectly appropriate (albeit 37% of each say not).
  • Paradoxically, all faith groups (ranging from 64% of those without religion to 70% of Christians) agree that welfare benefits should be a safety net for only the poorest in society.

Of course, such results do not establish any causal effect for religion in shaping views on welfare, and differences are likely to be attributable in the main to underlying demographics, especially of age and social class/wealth. For example, those of no religion will be found disproportionately among younger age cohorts who are, overall, perhaps more economically challenged than their parents’ generation. This may well explain why many of them feel unsympathetic to the relatively wealthy drawing down welfare benefits.

Seven deadly sins

Asked to nominate the worst of the seven ‘deadly sins’ in a recent YouGov poll, a plurality of Britons (43%) replied greed. This sin easily surpassed wrath (18%), sloth (11%), envy (7%), gluttony (5%), lust (3%), and pride (3%). However, when it came to confessing their own one or two worst vices, gluttony and sloth topped the list, at 25% each, followed by pride (19%), wrath (15%), envy (12%), greed (9%), and lust (8%). So, while greed is considered to be the worst sin, it is the one which people are much less likely to own up to themselves. Detailed figures are supposedly available through the link embedded in the YouGov blog post of 20 February 2014, but the link is broken (BRIN has reported it to YouGov), so only the blog is currently available at:

http://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/02/20/greed-deadliest-sin/

Ethnicity and generational change

The first of the 2014 issues of Ethnic and Racial Studies (Vol. 37, No. 1) comprises nine articles on the theme of generational change (between first and second generations) among ethnic minorities in Britain. Several of these essays explore the religious dimension, drawing especially upon the British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey (EMBES) in which a cross-section of 2,787 ethnic minority respondents was interviewed, face-to-face and by self-completion questionnaire, from 7 May to 31 August 2010. The contributions likely to be of most interest to BRIN readers are:

  • Lucinda Platt, ‘Is There Assimilation in Minority Groups’ National, Ethnic, and Religious Identity?’ (pp. 46-70). Platt’s principal finding is that there is generational decline on a range of measures of religiosity for all groups with the partial exception of Muslims. This confirms other evidence of a trend of generational assimilation towards majority and away from minority identity and, in a religious sense, could be said to constitute ‘secularization’. Notwithstanding, this is partially qualified by revelations that the second generation of Hindu immigrants prioritized their religious over their ethnic identity, and that perceptions of religious discrimination enhanced common cause among people of the same faith.
  • Raya Muttarak, ‘Generation, Ethnic, and Religious Diversity in Friendship Choice: Exploring Interethnic Close Ties in Britain’ (pp. 71-98). Muttarak uses pooled data from the 2007-08 and 2008-09 Citizenship Surveys, rather than EMBES. Interethnic friendship patterns are shown to vary significantly by ethnic group, religion, and generation. Ethnic groups sharing similar traits (such as region of origin, race, or religion) were more likely to nominate each other as close friends, although the effect weakened between the first and second generations. In particular, Indian Muslims had a substantially higher chance of having Pakistani close friends than fellow Indians of other religious persuasions. However, black Christians (Caribbean and African) had a higher likelihood of having white British close friends than did other blacks.
  • Siobhan McAndrew and David Voas, ‘Immigrant Generation, Religiosity, and Civic Engagement in Britain’ (pp. 99-119). Mainly using EMBES (other surveys are drawn upon), but analysing for an intermediate (1.5) as well as first and second generations, intergenerational secularization is found across ethnic minority groups, as measured by private religious practice (especially) and religious salience. At the same time, communal religious practice appeared robust to generational decline, apart from black Caribbeans. While immigrant religiosity failed to foster generalized social trust, it is revealed to promote greater civic integration and volunteering.
  • Sin Yi Cheung, ‘Ethno-Religious Minorities and Labour Market Integration: Generational Advancement or Decline?’ (pp. 140-60). EMBES is used to examine four labour market outcomes: economic activity, unemployment, access to salaried jobs, and self-employment. The second generation of immigrants showed little advancement in these outcomes relative to the first generation. Substantial ethno-religious ‘penalties’ persisted for all of the outcomes except self-employment, and there was a particularly strong ‘religious penalty’ among Muslim women.
  • Anthony Heath and Neli Demireva, ‘Has Multiculturalism Failed in Britain?’ (pp. 161-80). Analysis of EMBES, again incorporating a 1.5 generation, demonstrates that all ethno-religious groups have displayed major change across the generations in the direction of a British identity and a reduced social distance, which can co-exist with positive orientations toward their own ethnic culture (as reflected in in-group marriage and friendship). Only a small minority of respondents had taken a separatist position, rejecting a British identity and espousing ‘radical’ socio-political positions. No evidence was found that rates of intergenerational change had been slower among groups that had made successful claims for cultural recognition (such as Sikhs and Muslims). In contrast, lower levels of integration were associated with perceptions of individual or group discrimination.

For abstracts and access options for all these articles, go to:

http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rers20/37/1#.UwOlUjZFDX4

BMRB turns 80

The British Market Research Bureau (BMRB) is celebrating its eightieth birthday year, laying claim to ‘the longest continuous heritage of any social research company in Britain’. It was established in 1933 as the research arm of advertising agency J. Walter Thompson but quickly shifted emphasis away from commercially oriented research, winning its first contract with the Government in 1939. In 1987 it joined the WPP Group which bought out TNS in 2009, resulting in the creation of TNS BMRB as one of the three constituent companies in the Kantar Group, WPP’s insight, information, and consulting division. TNS Omnibus is a separate company which powers TNS BMRB’s Public Opinion Monitor. Compared to, say, the Gallup Poll (now effectively defunct in Britain), BMRB has not been a major player in religion-related survey research. However, you will find around 30 entries in the BRIN source database where BMRB was responsible for the fieldwork, including the 1963 Political Change in Britain study for David Butler and Donald Stokes, which was the forerunner of the British Election Studies.

 

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Muslim and Christian News

For a third week running, Muslims dominate the religious statistical news post-Woolwich, but we also find space for four short items on Christians.

‘Hate preachers’

The brutal murder by two Islamists of Drummer Lee Rigby on the streets of Woolwich continues to inform public opinion towards Islam and Muslims. In a newly-released poll, by ComRes for the Sunday Mirror (conducted online on 29 and 30 May 2013), 84% of the 2,015 adult Britons interviewed agreed that the Government should take action to silence so-called ‘hate preachers’ who radicalize young Muslims, the proportion reaching 94% among over-65s and 95% with UKIP voters. Just 6% disagreed with the proposition, with 10% undecided. Detailed tables, published on 2 June, can be found at:

http://www.comres.co.uk/polls/Sunday_Mirror_Political_Poll_2_June_2013.pdf

Integration of Muslim migrants

Negative opinions about Muslims predate Rigby’s murder, of course. By way of illustration, migrants from Muslim countries were perceived by Britons as the least well integrated into British society of four migrant groups covered in two YouGov polls for YouGov@Cambridge, which were published on 3 June 2013, with online interviews of representative samples of adults aged 18 and over conducted on 7-8 and 16-17 May 2013. A summary table appears below, with full breaks by demographics available at:

http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/4opseuuz4d/YG-Archive-Cam-migrants-integration-results-080513.pdf

 

Well

integrated

Not well

integrated

Migrants from Eastern Europe

34

54

Children of migrants from Eastern Europe

42

32

Migrants from Muslim countries

21

71

Children of migrants from Muslim countries

38

53

Migrants from Pakistan

28

57

Children of migrants from Pakistan

46

40

Migrants from African countries

31

46

Children of migrants from African countries

43

33

The proportion feeling that migrants from Muslim countries were poorly integrated into British society was 71% overall, 14% more than in the case of migrants from Pakistan (which is a preponderantly Muslim nation), 17% more than for migrants from Eastern Europe, and 25% more than migrants from African countries. Migrants from Muslim countries were especially seen as poorly integrated by Conservative and UKIP voters, the over-40s, and Midlanders and Welsh.

Children of migrants from Muslim countries were assessed as better integrated into British society than their parents, by a margin of 17%. Even so, a majority of Britons (53%) said that this second generation, too, was poorly assimilated, rising to 89% for UKIP supporters, 62% of Midlanders/Welsh, and 58% of over-40s. By contrast, pluralities felt that children from the other three migrant groups were well integrated.

Britishness of Muslims

But what Britons as a whole feel about Muslims may be at variance with how Muslims regard themselves. This is suggested by a briefing paper by Stephen Jivraj, Who Feels British? The Relationship between Ethnicity, Religion, and National Identity in England, which was published on 6 June 2013 by the University of Manchester’s Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity. The paper is at:

http://www.ethnicity.ac.uk/census/CoDE-National-Identity-Census-Briefing.pdf

Using evidence from the 2011 census of population, which included a question on national identity for the first time, Jivraj found that:

  • Muslims are more likely than Christians to report British national identity only (57% compared to 15%), with Sikhs on 62% and Hindus on 54%
  • Muslims are less likely to report other (foreign) national identity only than Buddhists or Hindus (24% compared to 42% and 32% respectively)
  • Christians (65%) and Jews (54%) are more likely to report English only national identity than any other faith group, Hindus (9%) and Muslims (13%) registering the lowest figures

Islamophobic incidents

Lee Rigby’s murder has prompted a degree of backlash against Britain’s Muslim community, with a number of demonstrations organized by far-right groups, several attacks on mosques and Islamic centres, and various other Islamophobic incidents. The question is how extensive has that backlash been? Here a row has blown up between the right-leaning media and the Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) project, whose first annual statistics were covered by BRIN on 15 March 2013, and which performs a similar role for Islamophobia as the Community Security Trust does for anti-Semitism, with start-up funding for Tell MAMA provided by the Department for Communities and Local Government.

According to Tell MAMA, there have been 212 Islamophobic incidents reported to it between Rigby’s death on 22 May and last weekend. For two successive weeks running Andrew Gilligan in his column in the Sunday Telegraph has criticized the ‘spin’ being placed on the figures by Tell MAMA, especially its claims of a growing ‘cycle of violence’. In today’s article (‘Muslim Hate Monitor to Lose Backing’, p. 14), Gilligan reiterates that 57% of the incidents occurred online, mainly in the form of offensive posts to Twitter and Facebook; 16% of reports have yet to be verified; and that physical targeting of Muslims featured in just 8% of cases and attacks on property in 6%.

Gilligan’s original article can be found at:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10093568/The-truth-about-the-wave-of-attacks-on-Muslims-after-Woolwich-murder.html

Tell MAMA’s side of the story is set out in its blog at:

http://tellmamauk.org/news/

Fair Admissions Campaign

The Fair Admissions Campaign launched in London on 6 June 2013, with the objective of opening up all state-funded schools in England and Wales to all children, regardless of their parents’ religion. As part of the evidence base for its claim that the current system is discriminatory, the Campaign has published the results of a preliminary mapping of state schools against one socio-economic indicator, the eligibility of pupils for free school meals.

This found that ‘secondary schools without a religious character have on average 26 per cent more pupils eligible for free school meals than the first half of their post code and 30 per cent more pupils eligible than their local authority. In contrast, Roman Catholic secondary schools have 20 per cent fewer pupils in receipt of free school meals than the average for their postcode and 23 per cent fewer for the average for their local authority. Voluntary Aided Church of England secondary schools have eight per cent and 18 per cent fewer than the average for their post code and local authority respectively. Most Church schools were set up to serve children from poor families, so serving the better off in their community is a distortion to their original mission.’

For more details, see:

http://fairadmissions.org.uk/schools-map/

In a parallel development, on 3 June the Sutton Trust, which is dedicated to ‘improving social mobility through education’, published Selective Comprehensives: The Social Composition of Top Comprehensive Schools, focusing on the top 500 English comprehensive state secondary schools, based on their academic performance in 2012. These schools included a disproportionate number of faith schools (33% against 19% of all state-funded secondary schools) which scored relatively poorly on a measure of eligibility for and uptake of free school meals (8% compared with 12% for all faith schools and 17% for non-faith schools nationally). The report is at:

http://www.suttontrust.com/public/documents/1topcomprehensives.pdf

Singleness and the Church

Peter Brierley’s writes a monthly column on church statistics for the Church of England Newspaper. In his latest article (9 June 2013, p. 15) he focuses on ‘Being Single in Church’, picking up on the experiences of singles as recently reported in a survey of members of Christian Connection, a dating agency for Christian singles. Brierley compares the marital status of English churchgoers and population in 2012, the former data taken from a study of only seven evangelical congregations for the Langham International Partnership. He shows that adult ‘legally singles’ are far more numerous in society than in church, but this is because of the disproportionate concentration of cohabitees and single parents in the population; excluding these two categories, there were actually more ‘singles’ in church. Almost half of churchgoers aged 18-39 are single, and the great majority of these are women, who are therefore challenged to find a suitable marriage partner within the church. This is underlined by preliminary findings from Brierley’s London Church Census, 2012, five-sixths of those who joined the Church in the capital during the past decade being female. For those in their twenties 10,000 women joined between 2005 and 2012 against only 5,000 men.

Methodist diaconate

A quantitative demographic and attitudinal profile of the Methodist Order of Deacons (a neighbourhood form of ministry complementing, and having equal status with, the much larger Order of Presbyters) is offered by Lewis Burton, ‘The Methodist Diaconate: Profiling a Distinctive Order of Ministry’, Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester, Vol. 89, 2012-13, No. 2, pp. 15-32. The article is largely based upon a questionnaire survey of Deacons undertaken in 2006 to parallel the same author’s 2004 study of Methodist Presbyters.

Dean of Studies and Research, Bible Society

The Bible Society is advertising for a Dean of Studies and Research in order to spearhead its engagement with the higher education sector and to contribute to the programme of Christian Research, which is part of the Society. The closing date for applications is 23 June 2013. Further particulars of the post are available at:

http://www.biblesociety.org.uk/about-bible-society/jobs/dean-of-studies-and-research/

 

 

Posted in News from religious organisations, Official data, Religion and Politics, Religion in public debate, Religion in the Press, Religious Census, Survey news | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Attitudes to Muslims

The year 2012 ended with the revelation that the Muslim community in England and Wales had grown by 75% between the 2001 and 2011 censuses of population. This basic demographic fact, combined with the increasingly prominent role and voice which Muslims have gained in national life and in the public square, seems bound to stimulate survey research measuring attitudes to them. And, indeed, the year 2013 starts with the publication of two sets of research findings on this very topic.  

Offending Islam

Violent demonstrations against the United States (US) took place in a number of Muslim countries last September, following the distribution on YouTube of the short anti-Islamic film Innocence of Muslims, which had been made in the US. In a poll conducted in the immediate aftermath of the furore, but only just released, 24% of Britons agreed that the makers of the film ought to have been prosecuted by the US authorities for committing a hate crime, with 40% opposed to such action, and 36% uncertain. Support for prosecution was strongest among the over-60s (31%), Londoners (30%), Liberal Democrat voters (29%), and Scots (28%).

Opinion was also split about the subsequent publication, in direct response to the anti-American protests, by the French magazine Charlie Hebdo of a cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad naked in front of a film director. One-third (33%) of Britons supported the magazine’s decision, as a defence of free expression, 35% criticized the publishers for causing unnecessary offence to Muslims, and 32% expressed no views. Charlie Hebdo’s greatest supporters were found among men (44%), Conservative voters (42%), and the 18-24s (41%); its greatest detractors among the over-60s (49%).

The potential tensions between free speech and religious sensibilities were explored in five more generic questions. Majorities of adults endorsed four of these statements about what should be legally allowed in Britain: saying a religion threatens world peace (60%), saying a particular religion is nonsense (59%), saying the founder of a particular religion never existed (56%), and producing visual images of the Prophet Muhammad (53%). The only statement to be approved by a plurality but not a majority of respondents was saying or printing insults about the founder of a particular religion; while 41% agreed that this should be allowed, 33% objected (14% to 18% more than to the other statements). The proportion of ‘don’t knows’ ranged from 22% to 31%, dependent upon the question.

Across all five statements, men, non-manual workers, Scots, and Conservative voters were consistently more likely to agree that the various activities should be lawful. The over-60s and Londoners were most prone to querying their legality. Since the explicit and implicit context of the entire survey was about causing offence to Muslims, the relatively pro-Islam stance of the over-60s is interesting since, on many other measures of attitudes to Islam and Muslims, this age cohort often holds the most negative views. Clearly, their position is tempered by a general sympathy for people of faith and by a sense that respect and tolerance should set appropriate limits on freedom of speech and expression; doubtless, there are also fears that mocking of Christianity might follow in the footsteps of lampooning Islam. The views of Londoners are readily explained by the fact that (as confirmed by the 2011 census) the capital is now the most diverse part of the country in terms of nationality, ethnicity, and religion, with a notable concentration of Muslims.     

Source: Online survey by YouGov among 1,710 Britons aged 18 and over on 30 September and 1 October 2012. Full results released on 7 January 2013 and available at:

http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/6xjwsgccth/YouGov-Results-121001-Muslim-protests.pdf

Integration of Muslims

Attitudes towards the integration of Muslims in British society are fairly evenly balanced, with 38% of adult Britons agreeing that Muslims want to ‘fit in’, 39% disagreeing, and 21% neutral. However, these results are not uniform across three sets of sociological, religious, and political-ideological independent variables, which have been newly investigated through two multinomial logistic regression models.

For sociological variables, no significant effects were discovered for ethnic group or age, and only a relatively weak influence for gender (women being more prone than men to take a neutral position). Yet education was significant: those with a degree-level qualification were more likely to offer a neutral response or to agree that Muslims want to fit in than disagree, compared to those with no qualifications.

Religious affiliation (denomination) had little impact overall, and frequency of attendance at religious services was not significant in terms of the fuller of the two models. But religious salience (measured by the importance attached to religion in daily life) did make a difference. Higher levels of religious salience increased the likelihood of respondents agreeing that Muslims wanted to fit in, thereby providing some support for the ‘solidarity of the religious’ thesis proposed by Joel Fetzer and Christopher Soper.

Several (but not all) of the political-ideological factors were found to have statistically significant effects. In particular, a socially authoritarian disposition was associated with negative perceptions of Muslim integration, as was anti-immigrant bias. Similarly, those with traditionalist or exclusivist views of the role of Christianity were less likely to think Muslims wanted to fit in. On the other hand, individuals who took a pro-religion line on the wearing of religious dress or the banning of religiously offensive material were more likely to give neutral responses or to agree about Muslim integration.

Source: Ben Clements, ‘Explaining Public Attitudes towards the Integration of Muslims in British Society: The “Solidarity of the Religious”?’ Journal of Contemporary Religion, Vol. 28, No. 1, January 2013, pp. 49-65. The article is based on secondary analysis of one specific question (‘Do all Muslims living in Britain really want to fit in?’) posed to sub-samples A and B (n = 2,250) of the British Social Attitudes Survey of June-November 2008. Abstract and access options for the full text of the article can be found at:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13537903.2013.750836

 

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Western European Religion

There is no real consensus of public opinion in matters of religion, according to a new multinational poll from YouGov@Cambridge, published in connection with a symposium on the future of Europe, held at the British Academy on 15 March 2012.  

Fieldwork was conducted online among representative samples of around 1,500 adults in each of seven Western European nations (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) between 24 February and 6 March 2012. Topline data are at:

http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/6xufjlailj/Eurozone%20Crisis%20-%20Cross-Country%20Report_06-Mar-2012_F.pdf

The religion-related questions amounted to something of a pot-pourri, certainly in relation to the more systematic questions about membership of the European Union and the European economic crisis, but are nevertheless not without interest.

Of the seven countries Italy generally emerged as the most ‘religious’ nation and Sweden as the least. Britain’s position fluctuated, with one-quarter or more of its citizens sitting on the fence on religious issues and others holding seemingly inconsistent views.

The three matters on which an absolute majority of Britons agreed were all rather negative: that organized religion is in terminal decline, that Christians and the Church should not be permitted to have more influence over domestic politics, and that Muslims are poorly integrated into mainstream society. Here are the headlines:

  • 24% of Britons agreed that there are some things in life which only religion can explain (France 21%, Germany 24%, Italy 36%, Norway 22%, Sweden 18%, Denmark 18%), but 49% disagreed and 23% were undecided 
  • 30% of Britons believed in a personal God (France 22%, Germany 34%, Italy 55%, Norway 28%, Sweden 19%, Denmark 26%) and a further 10% in a higher spiritual power, with 21% disbelieving, 17% agnostic and 22% uncertain 
  • 39% of Britons felt that it is good for children to be brought up within a religion (France 46%, Germany 44%, Italy 59%, Norway 27%, Sweden 19%, Denmark 31%), more than who said the opposite (23%) or who expressed no opinion (34%) 
  • 55% of Britons agreed that organized religion is in terminal decline in their country (France 38%, Germany 26%, Italy 54%, Norway 33%, Sweden 49%, Denmark 33%), with only 13% disagreeing and 26% uncertain 
  • 35% of Britons contended that the decline of organized religion has made or would make the country a worse place (France 24%, Germany 20%, Italy 32%, Norway 22%, Sweden 17%, Denmark 15%), against 32% who disagreed and 27% who did not know 
  • 25% of Britons thought that some religions are better than others (France 20%, Germany 19%, Italy 21%, Norway 37%, Sweden 29%, Denmark 29%), compared with 39% who disagreed and 31% undecided 
  • 15% of Britons wanted Christians and the Church to have more influence over domestic politics (France 14%, Germany 13%, Italy 16%, Norway 11%, Sweden 9%, Denmark 5%), but 58% disagreed and 23% were neutral 
  • 19% of Britons thought that most Muslims were integrated with national customs and way of life (France 24%, Germany 12%, Italy 19%, Norway 14%, Sweden 18%, Denmark 19%), while 56% disagreed and 19% were unsure

 

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Muslim Integration

Concern among Britons about the integration of Muslim immigrants into British society has lessened somewhat over the past year but still remains at quite a high level, according to the fourth report on Transatlantic Trends: Immigration, published in Washington on 15 December 2011 and available at:

http://trends.gmfus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/TTI2011_Topline_final.pdf
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Muslim-Western Tensions – British Experiences

‘Muslim and Western publics continue to see relations between them as generally bad, with both sides holding negative stereotypes of the other.’ However, there has been ‘somewhat of a thaw in the U.S. and Europe compared with five years ago’.

This is according to the latest findings from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, released on 21 July. It was conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International between 21 March and 15 May 2011 among 23 publics, including Great Britain (where 1,000 adults aged 18 and over were interviewed by telephone).

The Muslim-related questions have been analysed by Pew for six Western publics (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Spain, and the USA), seven Muslim publics (Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, and Turkey) and for Israel.  

The present post mainly focuses on the British data, but the international results may be readily viewed in the report Muslim-Western Tensions Persist, which is available for download at:

http://pewglobal.org/files/2011/07/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Muslim-Western-Relations-FINAL-FOR-PRINT-July-21-2011.pdf

64% of Britons held a favourable opinion of Muslims. This represented a fall of seven points since 2005 (just before 7/7) but a 4% recovery from 2010. It was also, jointly with France, the best figure among the six Western nations, higher than Russia (62%), USA (57%), Germany (45%), and Spain (37%).

Nevertheless, 22% of Britons regarded Muslims unfavourably, which was far more than took the same view of Christians (6%) or Jews (7%). 83% were well-disposed to Christians and 76% to Jews, much the same as in 2004.

Moreover, only 39% of Britons assigned no negative traits to Muslims. Specifically, 43% described them as fanatical, 38% as arrogant, 32% as violent, 29% as selfish, 18% as immoral, and 16% as greedy. Similarly, 61% did not associate Muslims with respect for women, 45% with tolerance, 34% with generosity, and 22% with honesty.

52% in Britain saw most Muslims as wanting to remain distinct from mainstream society, rising to 59% for those without degree-level education. Apart from the USA (51%), other Western countries recorded even higher figures, as much as 72% in Germany. Just 28% of Britons thought Muslims wanted to adopt British customs, albeit an improvement on 19% in 2005 and 22% in 2006.

52% of British adults assessed relations between Muslims around the world and Westerners as being generally bad (nine points less than in 2006) and 40% as generally good. 48% of Americans also said bad, 58% of Spaniards, 61% of Germans, and 62% of French.

Of Britons who said relations were bad, 34% believed Muslims were mostly to blame for this state of affairs (compared with 25% in 2006), 26% Western people, and 24% both groups.

So-called ‘Islamic extremism’ seems to have soured relations. 70% in Britain were concerned about this and a mere 28% unconcerned. Notwithstanding, 70% represented a fall of 7% since the 2006 (post-7/7) survey and a return to 2005 (pre-7/7) levels. Russians (76%) and Germans (73%) were more concerned than Britons, Americans (69%), French (68%), and Spaniards (61%) somewhat less.

In similar vein, 52% in Britain claimed that some religions were more prone to violence than others, and three-quarters of these cited Islam as the single most violent religion (against 63% immediately before 7/7).

59% of Britons thought Muslim nations should be more economically prosperous than they were. This lack of prosperity was largely attributed to internal deficiencies in those nations: government corruption (51%), lack of democracy (46%), lack of education (36%), and Islamic fundamentalism (31%). No more than 15% were willing to allocate blame to US and Western policies.

Finally, a footnote on religion more generally. Professing Christians in the Western countries were asked whether they first considered themselves as citizens of their nation or as Christians. In Britain 63% of Christians placed their nationality first, exactly three times the proportion which put their Christian identity first. This reflected a shift since 2006, when the figures had been 59% and 24%. Americans were most likely to put Christianity (46%) above nationality, French the least (8%).

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Clive Field on Attitudes to Islam and Muslim Attitudes in Britain

Last week, the Institute for Social Change (where BRIN is based) hosted a seminar by Clive Field, who co-directs this resource and blogs here assiduously. The title was “Muslim Opinions and Opinions of Muslims: British Experiences”. Clive provided a historical overview of Islam in Britain, followed by a “survey of surveys”, and culminating in an exploratory analysis of a survey of British Muslims sponsored by Harvard and Manchester.

The growing salience of Islam shows up in the number and subjects covered by surveys. Before the late 1980s, Islam and Muslims did not feature per se in national surveys; where diversity was considered it was qua ethnicity and nationality rather than religion. Imposing a survey ‘quality threshold’, Clive found that 15 surveys on Islam and/or Muslims were carried out over 1988-2000, 7 of them in 1990. However, 154 surveys were conducted between 2001 and 2010.

Clive then surveyed the headline findings emerging from such surveys, arguing that

‘[t]here is extensive negativity towards Muslims but no absolute level of Islamophobia, nor are views necessarily consistent between questions’.

More specifically, 9/11 and 7/7 spurred negative perceptions of Muslims’ integration, loyalty and radicalism. Knowledge of Islam and Muslims has improved somewhat but is still limited, and appears mostly to derive from (negative) media coverage). While direct social contact has grown, over one-half of non-Muslim Britons have no Muslim friends, and negative attitudes correlate with lack of knowledge and social distance. Double standards appear prevalent: Muslims are heavily criticised for failing to integrate, and yet little effort is made to bridge the gulf between the Muslim and majority communities.

Looking at surveys of Muslims, the first was conducted by Harris in 1989. It is expensive to survey minority communities and particularly those which are linguistically diverse. This means that such surveys often make methodological compromises, particularly with regard to sample size, which is typically 500 (which limits further breakdown by age or other category). Nevertheless Clive found 39 surveys of adequate quality conducted between 2001 and 2010.

The headline findings from these indicate that Muslims are much more religious than non-Muslims in Britain, and stricter on most aspects of morality. The overwhelming majority are attached to Britain, but there appears to be some ambivalence regarding a perceived clash between British and Muslim values, and a sense that Islamophobia is growing in British society.

Clive then provided an overview of findings from the Harvard-Manchester survey of Muslims, funded by the John Templeton Foundation, and conducted over February-March 2009. It was designed to complement the 2008 British Social Attitudes survey where the number of Muslim respondents was too small for analysis of responses. Ipsos MORI ran the survey, providing a questionnaire in English, Sylheti and Punjabi and sampling output areas that had a population that was at least 10% Muslim.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face with 480 British Muslims aged over 18. 85% were South Asian, and 55% aged 18-34 (namely a young demographic profile). There were significant rates of non-response to sensitive questions (for example, on sexual morality), while complex questions such as the position of Sharia attracted a high rate of ‘don’t knows’.

Regarding the questions themselves, seven in eight reported that religion was extremely or very important in daily life, compared with 15% in the BSA 2008 survey. 82% reported that religion was very important to their sense of identity (BSA 16%) versus 55% for ethnicity (BSA 29%). Two-thirds reported that they were very or moderately spiritual (BSA 34%). 84% endorsed a literalist view of scripture (BSA 10%) and 44% creationism (BSA 14%).

Weekly attendance at services was claimed by 30% of those aged 18-34 and 50% of those aged 35 and over (BSA 10%). Praying at least several times a day was claimed by 45% of those aged 18-34 and 60% of those aged 35 and over (BSA 5%). Two-thirds reported that they read the Qur’an at least weekly, compared with 11% of the BSA sample reporting that they read the Bible or equivalent holy book. 71% reported that they observe Ramadan fully, and 17% mostly.

Headscarves worn (by the respondent if female or close female relative if the respondent was male) by 58% of those aged 18-34, and 77% of those aged 35 and over.

Regarding religion and personal morality, 75% reported that there are absolutely clear guidelines about what is good or evil (BSA 37%). 60% of those aged 18-34, and 78% of those aged 35 and over, reported that pre-marital sex was always wrong (BSA 8%). 58% of those aged 18-34 and 74% of those aged 35 and over regard homosexual acts as always wrong (BSA 30%). 45% of those aged 18-34 and 58% of those of 35 and over oppose legal recognition of same-sex relationships (BSA 26%).

Regarding the position of Muslims on religion in politics and society, 60% agree that religion is a private matter which should be kept out of public debates on socio-political issues (compared with 71% in the BSA). 54% disagree that it is proper for religious leaders to influence voting of individuals (BSA 73%). 45% report that religion is very or somewhat important in making decisions on politics (BSA 19%).

With regard to religious diversity, two-thirds acknowledge basic truths in many religions, compared with 74% of respondents to the 2008 BSA survey. 38% agree, while 32% disagree, that Britain is deeply divided along religious lines (compared with 52% and 16% in the BSA).

With regard to national identity, 58% reported that they “very strongly” belong to Britain and 29% “fairly strongly”. 57% support a greater role for Sharia courts. 22% of those aged 18-34 and 14% of those aged 35 and over reported experiencing Islamophobia during the two years before the survey period. However, 87% reported that they were broadly satisfied with their lives as a whole (BSA 83%). These findings are interesting and deserve further research (although the sample size will prohibit very detailed breakdowns). Clive also called for further, methodologically-enhanced survey research to build the evidence base, and provided some thoughts on prospects for integration and accommodation.

When discussion was opened to the floor, seminar participants were keen to probe how far negative attitudes among non-Muslims to Muslims were driven by generalised prejudice rather than something specific to Islam; how far they reflected antipathy to the tenets of Islam but not Muslims themselves; and how far they reflected antipathy to the highly religious and religiously-distinctive. The reliability of media-commissioned opinion polls seeking to create stories as well as reflect public attitudes was also discussed more deeply. It was a lively discussion, indicating appetite and scope for further research.

Clive has published on Islamophobia elsewhere:

C. Field (2007), ‘Islamophobia in contemporary Britain: the evidence of the opinion polls, 1988-2006’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 18: 447-77.

C. Field (forthcoming), ‘Young British Muslims since 9/11: a composite attitudinal profile’, Religion, State and Society.

C. Field (forthcoming), ‘Revisiting Islamophobia in contemporary Britain: opinion poll findings for 2007-10’, Islamophobia in Western Europe and North America, ed. Marc Helbling, London: Routledge.

Accordingly, he is not planning to develop an academic article from this research but is happy for the slidepack to be available here at BRIN. For the full set of slides presented at the seminar, please visit this link: http://www.brin.ac.uk/figures/muslims-attitudes-and-attitudes-towards-muslims/

 
 

 

 

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Muslim Integration in Scotland

The British Council Scotland has recently released a report on Muslim Integration in Scotland, by Amy Homes, Chris McLean and Lorraine Murray, and based upon quantitative and qualitative research undertaken by Ipsos MORI Scotland. The report, commissioned under the auspices of the Council’s ‘Our Shared Europe’ programme, is available to download at:

http://www.britishcouncil.org/scotland-society-muslims-integration-in-scotland-report.pdf

The focus of the study was an examination of Muslim and non-Muslim perceptions of one another and of the extent of Muslim integration in Scotland. Potential barriers to integration were also explored and ways in which these may be overcome.

The quantitative phase of the research was a series of questions included in the Ipsos MORI Scottish Public Opinion Monitor. Telephone interviews were undertaken with a representative sample of 1,006 Scots aged 18 and over between 18 and 21 February 2010. As there are relatively few Muslims in Scotland, such a random survey is essentially of non-Muslims. Findings from this phase appear on pp. 2-7, 18-27 of the report.

The qualitative phase comprised seven focus groups, three of Muslims and four of non-Muslims, in Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee between 9 and 23 March 2010. Muslim groups were composed of Muslims born in Scotland and those born elsewhere but who had lived in Scotland for varying periods of time. Non-Muslim groups were made up of non-Muslims who were white Scottish and Christian or had no religion. Findings from this phase appear on pp. 8-9, 29-41 of the report.

The quantitative research is naturally of principal interest to BRIN. Key findings include the following:

  • 66% of Scots held a favourable opinion of Muslims and 21% an unfavourable one. However, this favourability rating was lower than for all other religious groups, with 85% for Christians, 80% for Jews, 77% for Buddhists, 75% for Hindus, 72% for Sikhs and 71% for atheists.
  • 46% of Scots considered that Muslims living in Scotland were loyal to the country and 33% not. This was a higher loyalty score than for Britain, France and Germany, as recorded in the Gallup Coexist Study of 2008. 
  • 48% of Scots agreed and 41% disagreed that Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more Muslims came to live there. This compared with 50% and 31% respectively in the 2006-07 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey.
  • 59% of Scots agreed and 28% disagreed that most Muslims in Scotland were integrated into everyday Scottish life.
  • 66% agreed and 24% disagreed that the attempted bombing at Glasgow airport in 2007 had made people in Scotland less tolerant of Muslims.
  • Whereas 80% of Scots agreed that Christianity was compatible with life in Scotland, only 42% said the same in relation to Islam (and 37% disagreed).
  • On almost all questions, those living in the least deprived areas of Scotland, people under 55, readers of broadsheet newspapers and Liberal Democrat voters had the most positive views of Muslims and Muslim integration.

So, Islamophobia is clearly becoming something of a problem in Scotland. On the whole, however, as Clive Field’s analyses of British public opinion polls conducted between 2001 and 2010 have shown, it is perhaps still less of a challenge there than in England and Wales.

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More Perceptions of Islam

Islamophobia certainly appears to be a hot topic in 2010. Ten opinion polls have already been undertaken between January and July to gauge the attitudes of adult Britons towards Islam and Muslims.

Now The Guardian of 3 August has noted another, carried out on behalf of the London-based Islamic Education and Research Academy (iERA). iERA was established in 2009 as a global organization committed to presenting Islam to the wider society (a process known in Islamic theology as dawah).

The iERA investigation was conducted among a random sample of 500 English-speaking non-Muslims aged 16 and over interviewed face-to-face on the street in Britain by DJS Research in November 2009. Fieldwork seems to have occurred disproportionately in major British cities. 

The full report on the survey is entitled Perceptions on Islam & Muslims: A Study of the UK Population, with Hamza Andreas Tzortzis as the senior researcher. It can be downloaded (albeit not in a very printer-friendly form) from:   

http://www.iera.org.uk/downloads/iERA_NonMuslimPerceptionsOnIslam_and_Muslims_ResearchReport.pdf

The enquiry covers similar ground, but in rather more detail, as the YouGov poll for the Exploring Islam Foundation which we have already featured on the British Religion in Numbers website (on 8 June).

However, as iERA notes on page 5, the results of the two investigations differ in various ways. iERA attributes this to the methodological inferiority of YouGov’s approach, not least the fact that it uses a panel (deemed by iERA to constitute a self-selecting sample), obtained a low response rate and employed only closed questions.

80% of the iERA sample had no or very little knowledge of Islam, with 17% having basic knowledge and 3% a lot. 40% did not know who Allah is, 36% did not know who the Prophet Mohammed was, and just 20% had come into contact with the Koran (compared with 95% for the Bible).

Only 14% had been taught or actively sought information about Islam, in contrast to the 84% who had not. 76% had never spoken to a Muslim about Islam and 71% had never seen or heard any dawah material. Even when exposed to such material, attitudes were more likely to remain unchanged or to worsen than to improve. 77% had no desire to learn more about Islam.

27% of respondents entertained negative perceptions of Muslims, with 55% neutral and 18% positive. Around three-quarters thought that the contribution of Islam and Muslims to Britain was either non-existent or negative; and disagreed or were neutral when asked whether Muslims positively engaged with society.

For one-third Muslims were seen as the major cause of community tension, 32% being convinced they preached hatred. 24% viewed them as terrorists, with one-fifth denying they were law-abiding and peaceful. 30% were antipathetic to Sharia law and 59% agreed that Islam oppresses women.

The commentary (pages 30-39) records the more significant breaks by demographic sub-groups, although too much significance should not be attached to these disaggregations on account of the relatively small size of the overall sample. In particular, the report inclines to make more than is advisable of replies from those aged 21-24 (of whom there cannot have been more than about 45 interviewed).

The conclusion (page 10) is: ‘The general population has displayed a negative perception concerning religion, Islam and Muslims. The dawah has had limited reach and it has not improved perceptions about Islam. There has also been a consistent trend of apparent neutrality; we believe this indicates apathy and indifference coupled with genuine ignorance about religion and specifically Islam.’ Nineteen recommendations are advanced (pages 39-45) to improve this situation.

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