

Faith and Welcoming

Do the religious feel differently about immigration and immigrants?

A report by students and staff at the University of Bristol

Wing Chan, Harry Drake, Lucy Moor, Tom Owton, Silvia Sim
and Siobhan McAndrew

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About the Authors

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Silvia Sim graduated from the University of Bristol in July 2017 with a degree in Sociology with Quantitative Research Methods. Her undergraduate

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SUMMARY

1. Immigration has been high on the public agenda in Britain, particularly since the accession of the A8 countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) to the European Union in 2004, heralding a rise in immigration. Many political scientists argue that public response to immigration helped drive the Brexit result of June 2016.

2. Extensive research in the social sciences has established that having a religious affiliation rather than no affiliation may be associated with anti-immigrant attitudes, in contexts as varied as the US, Britain and across Western Europe, when controlling for church attendance. However, church attendance has been found in many studies to predict warmer attitudes towards immigrants.

3. In this report we investigate this for Britain using a range of new data sources: the British Social Attitudes surveys (BSA), European Social Survey (ESS) and Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) in particular. All are high-quality studies which have been fielded face-to-face, to representative samples of the British public. When investigating the post-2016 Referendum landscape, we draw upon the BSA and also the British Election Study (BES) Online Panel 2014-2018.

4. We use of the following questions to capture attitudes to immigration:

- perception of whether immigration numbers should be increased or reduced (BSA, BES);
- perception of whether immigration is good for the economy (BSA, EMBES);

- perception of whether immigration is good for cultural life (BSA);
- attitudes towards accommodating asylum seekers (BSA, ESS and EMBES);
- perception of whether immigration is an issue of particular concern or worry (BSA).

5. We find consistently in these surveys that church attendance does indeed promote greater warmth towards immigrants and asylum seekers. We also find that having a religious affiliation rather than identifying as secular is associated with significantly less warmth, on the first (immigration numbers), third (immigrants' cultural contribution), and fifth (immigration as issue of concern) measures above, once church attendance has been taken into account.

6. For the ethnic minority sample represented in the EMBES, we do see some differences in attitudes by ethno-religious group, on agreement with the following statements:

- 'There is rarely any conflict between my ethnic culture and British customs'
- 'Immigrants increase crime rates'
- 'Immigrants generally are good for Britain's economy'
- 'Most asylum seekers who come to Britain should be sent home immediately'.

7. Differences are perhaps more driven by ethnicity or immigrant generation rather than religion, with Black Africans (Muslim and Christian) tending to show the warmest attitudes, and Indian Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs tending to show the coolest attitudes across these four measures.

8. Taking these different ethnic minority groups as a whole, regular attendance at a place of worship (at least monthly versus less often) is associated with being less likely to perceive immigrants as increasing crime and more likely to perceive immigration as good for the economy, as found in the EMBES sample (Figure 4.19). However, differences are slight (and not statistically significant) for the measure of attitudes towards asylum seekers. In the ethnic minority sample survey, regular attenders are not more tolerant than the secular in every case.

9. In the British population samples, we identify some differences by religious tradition. In our bivariate analysis, Anglicans appear to be more anti-immigration across virtually all measures than the unreligious, likely due to a ‘Christian nationalist’ effect motivated by cultural defence. In our multivariate analysis, distinguishing those of no religion (‘religious nones’), Christians, Jews, Muslims and members of other religions, Christians are more negative than religious nones in their support for increasing immigration numbers, and in perceptions of the cultural benefits of immigration. Muslims are more positive than religious nones in their support for increasing immigration numbers, and on perceptions of the economic benefits of immigration. Jewish respondents are more positive than religious nones in their perceptions of its cultural benefits. Regarding support for asylum seekers, attitudes tend to be more warm across the board, and here differences between religious groups are less perceptible. However, members of other religions (a group combining Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and others) are slightly less supportive than religious nones.

10. Effects are summarised in Table I below (also Tables 5.5 and 7.5 in the main report). Note that the numbers of Jewish respondents in the BSA sample and Muslims in the BES sample

are quite small which makes our analyses less powerful at detecting genuine differences between them and religious nones.

11. It is reasonable to ask whether the patterns found in 2010-2015 data sources also hold in the post-2016 Referendum period. We accordingly repeated our analyses for two measures of immigration attitudes: whether immigration is perceived as an issue of concern or worry, using the British Social Attitudes survey 2016, fielded just after the EU Referendum; and whether the respondent agreed that the UK should admit many more immigrants, using pre- and post-Referendum survey waves of the British Election Study Online Panel.

12. This confirmed that regular attendance was associated with being less likely to report immigration as an issue of concern, and more likely to report that the UK should admit more immigrants.

13. Religion is often seen as a source of division in British society. Our results demonstrate that for those who identify with a religion and who do not attend a place of worship regularly, attitudes to immigrants tend to be more hostile, perhaps because a religious identity is chosen to signal a particular ethnic or national heritage. But for those who practice what they preach, at least in terms of regular attendance, their attitudes are on average more welcoming than those of the unreligious and ‘religious in name only’ alike.

Outcome of interest, data source	Compared with non-attending 'religious nones'	More positive or likely, more negative, or no difference
<i>Support for increasing immigration numbers</i> BSA 2011, 2013 Tables A.1, A.2	Religious in name only	More negative
	Religious affiliation and frequent attendance	More positive
	Christian	More negative
	Jewish	No difference
	Muslim	More positive
	Other religion	No difference
<i>Perceive that migrants bring economic benefits</i> BSA 2011, 2013, 2015 Tables A.3, A.4	Religious in name only	No difference
	Religious affiliation and frequent attendance	More positive
	Christian	No difference
	Jewish	No difference
	Muslim	More positive
	Other religion	No difference
<i>Perceive that migrants bring cultural benefits</i> BSA 2011, 2013, 2015 Tables A.5, A.6	Religious in name only	More negative
	Religious affiliation and frequent attendance	More positive
	Christian	More negative
	Jewish	More positive
	Muslim	No difference
	Other religion	No difference
<i>Support for asylum seekers</i> BSA 2011, 2013 Tables A.7, A.8	Religious in name only	No difference
	Religious affiliation and frequent attendance	More positive
	Christian	No difference
	Jewish	No difference
	Muslim	No difference
	Other religion	More negative

Outcome of interest, data source	Compared with non-attending 'religious nones'	More positive or likely, more negative, or no difference
<i>Whether immigration is identified as an issue of concern or worry</i> BSA 2016 (post-Referendum) Tables A.9, A.10	Religious in name only	More likely
	Religious affiliation and frequent attendance	No difference
	Anglican	More likely
	Catholic	No difference
	Other Christian	No difference
	Other religion	No difference
	Attends at least weekly (vs never)	Less likely
	Other levels of attendance	No difference
<i>Whether agrees immigration numbers should be increased: pre-Referendum survey</i> BES Wave 8, May-June 2016 Tables A.11, A.12	Religious in name only	More negative
	Religious affiliation and frequent attendance	More positive
	Anglican	More negative
	Catholic	More negative
	Church of Scotland	More negative
	Methodist	No difference
	Baptist	No difference
	URC	More negative
	Other Christian	No difference
	Judaism	No difference
	Other non-Christian	No difference
	Islam	More negative
	Other	More negative
Attends at least once a year or more often (vs never)	More positive	
Attends less than once a year (vs never)	No difference	

Outcome of interest, data source	Compared with non-attending 'religious nones'	More positive or likely, more negative, or no difference
Whether agrees immigration numbers should be increased: post-Referendum survey BES Wave 11, April-May 2017 Tables A.11, A.12	Religious in name only	More negative
	Religious affiliation and frequent attendance	No difference
	Anglican	More negative
	Catholic	More negative
	Church of Scotland	More negative
	Methodist	More negative
	Baptist	More negative
	URC	No difference
	Other Christian	No difference
	Judaism	No difference
	Other non-Christian	No difference
	Islam	More negative
	Other	More negative
	Attends at least once a year or more often (vs never)	More positive
Attends less than once a year (vs never)	No difference	

Table 1: Summary of direction of effects of religiosity type and religious affiliation controlling for frequency of attendance. For post-Referendum analyses, additional summary of direction of effects for frequency of attendance, controlling for religious affiliation.

14. These findings raise the question of why these patterns arise. It may be that in places of worship, attenders absorb messages of welcoming and hospitality from religious leaders and from religious doctrines. It could also be that places of worship foster friendships with people of different nationalities and ethnic backgrounds. It could further be that people who tend to show more tolerant attitudes are also more likely to attend a place of worship. If so, we might well see similar effects for regular participants in secular organisations also show similar patterns. For further understanding of the motivators of tolerance, further research is very much needed, particularly into the phenomenon of cultural defence.

15. Our report focuses on how religion affects immigration attitudes, and the direction of religious effects, whether 'positive' or 'negative'. It is also important to highlight the levels of attitudes across the board, which demonstrate considerable coolness in the British population samples, particularly for our 2010-2015 data. Given the known link between attitudes to immigration and the motivators of voting in the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership (for example, as established in Goodwin and Milazzo 2017 – see Bibliography), it remains to be seen whether attitudes will change markedly for the longer-term in the post-Brexit environment.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Immigration has been high on the public agenda for the past several years and certainly since the accession of the A8 countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) to the European Union. It has been widely-argued that response to immigration was a major factor in determining the EU referendum result of 2016.

1.2 A number of scholars have analysed data on the relationship between religion and attitudes towards immigrants. Religion is seen as politically-important in the US, where it is thought that religion helps diverse people to get along in an immigrant nation.

1.3 By comparison, Britain is a highly secular society, and religion traditionally not as highly -salient. However, religion has been rising up the public agenda for a number of reasons.

1.4 On the one hand, British society demonstrates slow and steady secularisation as older, more religious generations die out and younger, less religious generations take their place (Voas and Crockett 2005).

1.5 Nevertheless, religion is increasing in public visibility. The political scientist Martin Steven has found that the political importance of issues relating to religious equalities and rights is increasing. Secularism as a governing principle is weaker in Britain than in continental Europe, and faith communities in Britain perceive that they

have an important voice and influence over public affairs. With the passing of the Equality Act in 2010, the right to be free from religious discrimination was reasserted and codified.

1.6 In this report, we focus on attitudes to immigration policy and immigrants in particular, using a range of sources to examine the relationships between religious affiliation and religious attendance and attitudes to immigration. This is to see whether religion is a force for coming together - or whether it encourages different perceptions of who 'gets to belong'.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 One of the most consistent findings in the social science of religion - from a number of studies of different countries - is that church attendance is associated with being more pro-immigration.

2.2 This is perhaps unsurprising. Most of the major religions incorporate some form of 'the golden rule': to do unto others as you would have them do unto you. One of the two most important commandments in Christianity is to 'love thy neighbour'. Similarly, *zakāt*, or charity, is one of the five main pillars of Islam. Major world religions work across national borders and foster community and fellowship among their adherents regardless of nationality.

2.3 Nevertheless, religiosity (the quality of being more or less religious in addition to having a religious identity) is often associated with a commitment to local community, and authoritarian or traditional values (Clements 2015). It is plausible that the highly-religious may dislike outsiders and feel cool towards cosmopolitan values, and also feel some social distance from members of other religions, often of immigrant background.

2.4 A number of scholars have investigated further. Eric McDaniel with co-authors Irfan Nooruddin and Allyson Shortle examined religious affiliation and attitudes to immigrants in the US. They found that Evangelical Christians are consistently more negative towards immigrants than Catholics, Mainline Protestants and Other Christians (a

group including Mormons). They also found that this difference was not down to evangelicals being more religious or socially-conservative, but to Evangelical Christians having a particular conception of what it means to be American and 'America's "ethnic myth"' (2011: 222).

2.5 Once they accounted for such Christian nationalism, the difference between Evangelicals and members of other groups disappeared. Moreover, they found that religious attendance - once Christian nationalism is accounted for - predicts greater warmth towards immigrants.

2.6 In a paper published in 2012, sociologist Benjamin Knoll also found that those who attend religious services are more likely to exhibit liberal attitudes toward immigration policy, especially for members of small groups with a history of persecution, such as Jews and Mormons. He suggests that these effects are as strong as those of ethnicity or race, and socioeconomic status – an important finding given the centrality of race in American social life.

2.7 Similar findings have been made for the UK. Political scientist Rob Ford examined 'social distance' in a paper published in 2008. Respondents to the 1983-1996 British Social Attitudes surveys were asked their attitudes towards having an Asian or Black employer or in-laws. Controlling for third factors, having an Anglican affiliation predicted lower tolerance than having no religious affiliation, while having a Catholic affiliation had no effect. However, religious practice predicted higher tolerance: those 'Anglican in name

only' were very different to those who actively practised.

2.8 Sociologist Ingrid Storm investigated the effects of religiosity on perceptions of immigration as a threat to national identity, using data from the 2008 British Social Attitudes survey. She found that Anglicans (although not Catholics) were more likely to see immigrants as a threat to national identity, as compared to those with no religion or those from other denominations or religions. However, more frequent church attendance was associated with being less likely to see immigrants as a threat to national identity: 'it is when religion is seen as heritage, tradition and family background [rather than active practice] that it becomes associated with ethnicity' (Storm 2011: 129).

2.9 Similar findings have been made for continental Europe, too. Bridges and Mateut, in a study of 21 European countries using the European Social Survey, found that 'individuals who are religious are less likely to oppose the arrival of immigrants' (2009: 11).

2.10 National and regional context also matters. A study by Berry and Kalin (1995) found that people of French origin in Anglo-Canada tended to be more tolerant than the majority, whereas in Quebec it was Anglophones who tended to be more tolerant, suggesting that being part of a minority or majority group matters for tolerance. The effects of affiliation and attendance also depend on whether the country is relatively religious or secular; or whether the majority is Protestant or Catholic: to be Catholic in a Protestant-

majority country, is associated with having a rather different worldview from Catholics in Catholic-majority countries.

2.11 In a very new paper, Storm (2017) analysed cross-European data from 2002-2014 to find that religion affects immigration attitudes differently across different countries. Nevertheless, across Europe, those belonging to majority denominations are more likely to be concerned about immigration.

2.12 Accordingly, the scholarly literature appears to show that religious affiliation and church attendance work *differently* in terms of their effects on attitudes towards members of ethnic outgroups, and towards immigrants and immigration. Religious affiliation without practice appears associated with lower openness and tolerance. Active practice, however, is associated with warmth. We decided to investigate further, using a range of sources.

3. OUR SOURCES

3.1 We used the following large-scale, high-quality social surveys to examine the association between religious affiliation and attitudes to immigration:

- The British Social Attitudes Surveys, particularly the 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2016 waves.
- The European Social Survey sample for Britain, particularly Wave 7 (2014) which included a range of questions on attitudes to immigration.
- The Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010. This was a rare and high-quality study of people sampling from the Black Caribbean, Black African, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, members of which tend to be more religious than the White British, and which allows us to investigate the attitudes of those of immigrant heritage.
- The British Election Study Online Panel Survey, Waves 6 and 7 (May 2015 and April-May 2016) for a study of the effects of religious context.
- The British Election Study Online Panel Survey, Waves 8 and 11 (May-June 2016, and April-May 2017) to compare pre- and post-EU Referendum immigration attitudes. The BES Online Panel Survey is part of the larger British Election Study managed by the Universities of Oxford, Nottingham and Manchester; the online panel survey

is fielded by the polling company YouGov.

3.2 We scoped these surveys to identify measures of attitudes towards immigration, immigrants and asylum seekers. We also identified measures of religious affiliation, which are more or less fine-grained depending on the survey in question. We then examined the association between attitudes and religious affiliation, and attitudes and religious attendance. We also examined the differences between those who have an affiliation but who are not active, and those who are.

3.3 We examined how far these effects on attitudes are really down to religious affiliation and practice rather than being driven by age, education and ethnicity, since older people tend to be more religious, the more educated tend to be more likely to attend church, and because almost half of the most religious ten percent in Britain are of ethnic minority background. We did so using multiple regression analysis (see section 5). We also investigated whether any associations between religion and attitudes to immigration depend on local religious context (section 6). Finally, we validated our findings by testing whether they still hold for the post-Referendum period (section 7).

4. OUR FINDINGS: BIVARIATE ANALYSIS

4.1 Religious affiliation and immigration attitudes

4.1.1 We began with a broad question fielded on the British Social Attitudes survey in 2011 and 2013, combining these samples. Respondents were asked:

Should the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays be increased?

	Percentage of respondents (%)
Increased a lot	1.7
Increased a little	2.3
Remain the same	17.8
Reduced a little	23.0
Reduced a lot	53.6
Other	1.7
	N = 6,555

Table 4.1: Attitudes to immigration. Survey weights applied. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013.

4.1.2 The most common response by some distance was ‘reduced a lot’. Figure 4.1 below breaks down responses by religious affiliation. If we score respondents from 1-5 depending on their response, where 1 equates to ‘increased a lot’ and 5 ‘reduced a lot’, we can see that the average varies markedly across faith communities.

4.1.3 Sikhs appear to demonstrate the highest score and the strongest sense that immigration should be reduced a lot. ‘Other

Christians’ - a group of small, non-mainstream Christian denominations - have the lowest score on average with 3.8. However, some of these groups are quite small: those with fewer than 30 respondents are represented by transparent bars in Figure 4.1. In these cases, we are less confident that the scores reported are reliable. In most cases, however, the samples are large enough for us to be confident that there is real variation across faith communities, and what attitudes are on average for each.

4.1.4 To yield larger sample sizes, we collapse some of these smaller groups (Figure 4.2). Here, we look at percentages reporting that the number should be increased or stay the same (indicating relatively tolerant attitudes) by comparison with those who report that it should be reduced. Anglicans seem to be the group most against further immigration, followed by other Christians (a group made up primarily of nonconformists and the Church of Scotland), then those with no religion.




Figure 4.1: Attitudes to whether the number of immigrants to Britain should be reduced/increased by faith community. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013. N = 6555. Variation across groups highly statistically-significant ($p < 0.001$).




Figure 4.2: Attitudes to whether the number of immigrants to Britain should be reduced/increased by broad religious tradition. British Social Attitudes survey 2013. N = 3244. Differences across groups found to be highly statistically-significant ($p < 0.001$).

Non-denominational Christians follow, then other non-Christians (primarily Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jews) followed by Catholics and Muslims.

4.1.5 We can also investigate whether members of faith communities differ in terms of how they think immigrants benefit Britain. The British Social Attitudes survey included two measures to capture this, in 2011, 2013 and 2015:

On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is extremely bad and 10 is extremely good, would you say it is generally bad or good for Britain's economy that migrants come to Britain from other countries?

And on a scale of 0 to 10, would you say that Britain's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by migrants coming to live here from other countries?

4.1.6 Average scores by faith community (and none) are graphed below in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. Several faith communities appear warmer towards immigrants on these measures than those of no religion. Notably, members of the Anglican faith seem to be relatively cooler, as do a small number of other communities.




Figure 4.3: Attitudes to whether immigration benefits British economic life by religious affiliation. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013, 2015. N = 8571. Differences across groups found to be highly statistically-significant ($p < 0.001$)




Figure 4.4: Attitudes to whether immigration benefits British cultural life by religious affiliation. British Social Attitudes survey 2011, 2013, 2015. N = 8549. Differences across groups found to be highly statistically-significant ($p < 0.001$).

4.2 Church attendance and immigration attitudes

4.2.1 Our initial findings seem clear – religious affiliation does matter for immigration attitudes.

4.2.2 However, members of some religious groups tend to engage in religious practice more than others: groups are not equally ‘religious’ in terms of active practice. It is a norm, for example, for Muslim men committed to their faith to worship at the mosque every Friday in addition to daily prayers, and for Catholics there is a formal obligation to attend church once a week. By comparison, for evangelical Christians and Anglicans norms of attendance are different.

4.2.3 Moreover, it is thought that religiosity and strength of attachment does matter irrespective of denomination: what really counts for political attitudes is how religious somebody is, rather than their precise faith background. The American political scientists Robert Putnam and David Campbell have expressed it thus:

‘Which matters more, the flavor of a person’s religion or the intensity? Does a highly devout Catholic have more in common with, say, a lapsed Catholic or a devout Jew? The answer will vary, of course, but for some matters we will see that intensity actually matters more than flavor... [and] religiosity itself (as distinct from membership in a particular denomination or sect) turns out to be increasingly important’ (2010: 21).

This suggests that the apparent differences by religious affiliation may arise due to different rates of attendance and involvement across each group, rather than the affiliation itself.

4.2.4 Figure 4.5 provides some answers regarding the importance of religious attendance. Of those who attend weekly or more often, 64 per cent say that the number of immigrants should be reduced. Of those who never attend, 81 per cent the number should be reduced. This suggests that regular attendance at a place of worship encourages tolerance towards immigration and immigrants.




Figure 4.5: Attitudes to whether the number of immigrants to Britain should be reduced/increased by frequency of attendance at a place of worship. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013. N = 5364. Differences across groups found to be highly statistically-significant ($p < 0.001$).




Figure 4.6: Attitudes to whether the number of immigrants to Britain should be reduced/increased by frequency of attendance at a place of worship: Christian sample only. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013. N = 2992. Differences across groups found to be highly statistically-significant ($p < 0.001$).

4.2.5 Figure 4.5 above however combines in the ‘never attends’ group the highly-secular who are often found to be relatively educated and liberal, with those reporting a religious affiliation who do not attend. We accordingly provide a similar breakdown in Figure 4.6 for those reporting a Christian affiliation only, to clarify the effects of church attendance for those identifying as Christian. Even screening out the unreligious and non-Christians – both of which groups we might expect to be more pro-immigration – we see similar effects: more frequent attenders are less likely to say that numbers should be reduced and more likely to say that numbers should be increased or stay the same than non-attenders.

4.2.6 To further test whether Ford and Storm’s results bear out in terms of attitudes to immigrants, we classified our respondents into religious *type*, to take account of active practice as well as symbolic belonging, and to distinguish the religiously-active from the nominally-religious. We divided up the BSA sample as follows (2010-2015 waves merged):

	Percentage of respondents (%)
No religion	48.5
Has an affiliation, but attends less than monthly/never	34.3
Has an affiliation, attends at least monthly	17.2
N = 20,306	

Table 4.2. Religiosity type in Britain. British Social Attitudes surveys 2010-2015.

Active practice is a minority pursuit in Britain, although just over half of respondents reported a religious affiliation across these years. We then explored how attitudes to immigration rates, and the benefits immigrants bring to Britain’s economic and cultural life, vary by membership of each of these three groups: the religious nones, the nominally-religious, and those who attend regularly.

4.2.7 Figure 4.7 shows how attitudes to whether the number of immigrants should be increased or decreased varies by religious ‘type’. The rate responding that immigration should be reduced is highest for those who report an affiliation, but who never attend. It is lowest for those who attend church monthly or more often. The irreligious fall between the two.




Figure 4.7: Attitudes to whether the number of immigrants to Britain should be reduced/increased by religiosity type. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013. N = 6436. Differences across groups found to be highly statistically-significant ($p < 0.001$).




Figure 4.8: Attitudes to whether immigrants benefit Britain's economy by religiosity type. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013, 2015. N = 8626. Differences found to be highly statistically-significant ($p = 0.001$).




Figure 4.9: Attitudes to whether immigrants benefit Britain's cultural life by religiosity type. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013, 2015. N = 8603. Differences found to be highly statistically-significant ($p < 0.001$).

4.2.8 We see the same pattern in terms of average score on whether respondents see immigration as benefiting Britain's economic and cultural life (see Figures 4.8 and 4.9).

4.2.9 It might be thought that these results are confounded by ethnic status and having an immigrant heritage rather than religiosity itself - since ethnic minority respondents may be more likely to be religious, and less likely to be anti-immigration. We accordingly checked whether the differences still held by investigating White respondents and ethnic minority respondents separately (results available on request).

4.2.10 These further checks by ethnic majority/minority status show us that we can remain confident that the effects of active

religiosity are *not* purely driven by highly-religious ethnic minority respondents. Religiosity does appear to matter for immigration attitudes, in addition to attachment to any particular group.

4.3 Attitudes towards asylum seekers

4.3.1 These measures of immigration attitudes are arguably a little generalist, given that immigrants are themselves a very diverse group. It could be argued that members of religious communities have particular attitudes depending on whether particular immigrants are in clear need.

4.3.2 The British Social Attitudes survey and European Social Survey both include measures which help us to explore further.

The British Social Attitudes survey asked the following in both 2011 and 2013:

Should asylum seekers escaping persecution be able to stay in Britain?

4.3.4 Figure 4.10 summarises the percentage of each faith community which agrees (groups with fewer than 30 responses again represented by transparent columns). Most of the faith communities however score more highly than the unreligious category, where 46.9 per cent agreed or agreed strongly.

4.3.5 Patterns are very similar if we use European Social Survey data, where respondents were asked whether they agreed that:

the Government should be generous judging applications for refugee status

4.3.6 The ESS data for Britain suggest Muslims and Catholics tend to be more supportive of asylum seekers on this question, Protestants cooler than average, and nones about the same as the general population. Moreover, these differences are statistically-significant ($p < 0.001$).

4.3.7 Again, religiosity may have more of a pro-tolerance effect than affiliation alone.

Figure 4.12 shows the proportion agreeing that asylum seekers should be able to stay in Britain:

- those who attend a place of worship regularly are more likely to agree or agree strongly than those with no religion;
- those of no religion are in turn more likely to agree or agree strongly than those who report a religious affiliation but who attend less regularly.




Figure 4.10: Attitudes to whether asylum seekers should be able to stay in Britain: percentage agree or strongly agree. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013. N = 6502 (p < 0.001).




Figure 4.11: Attitudes to whether the British government should be generous in judging asylum applications: percentage agree, neither agree nor disagree, and disagree. European Social Survey 2014. N = 2213 (p < 0.001).




Figure 4.12: Attitudes to whether asylum seekers should be able to stay in Britain: percentage agree or strongly agree. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013. N = 6502 ($p < 0.001$).

4.3.8 The main caveat is that some differences which appear to be due to religious affiliation or practice may ultimately be driven by differences in age or education: Members of older generations tend to be more religious; and education and religion are also strongly associated – those who attend church regularly tend to be more educated and socially-advantaged.

4.3.9 More detailed analysis (see Section 5) is needed to confirm that frequent attendance at a place of worship does indeed have a pro-tolerance effect. At this stage we can further demonstrate the effect of attendance via two-way tables by contrasting responses for frequent attenders who are Christian or other than Christian in turn, and comparing their rates or levels of response to the unreligious and nominally-religious: see Tables 4.3-4.6.

	Agrees number of immigrants should be reduced Percentage of respondents (%)
No religion	78.1
Christian, attends less than monthly/never	84.4
Christian, attends at least monthly	71.9
Other than Christian, attends less than monthly/never	68.8
Other than Christian, attends at least monthly	58.7
N = 6436	

Table 4.3: Percentage agreeing number of immigrants to Britain should be reduced a little/a lot by no religion/Christian/other than Christian affiliation and level of attendance. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013.

	Agrees economic life enriched
	Average score on 0-10 scale
No religion	4.3
Christian, attends less than monthly/never	3.9
Christian, attends at least monthly	5.1
Other than Christian, attends less than monthly/never	5.2
Other than Christian, attends at least monthly	5.6
N = 8626	

Table 4.4: Attitudes to whether immigrants benefit Britain's economy by affiliation and level of attendance. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013, 2015.

	Agrees asylum seekers should be able to stay in Britain
	Percentage of respondents (%)
No religion	47.4
Christian, attends less than monthly/never	43.3
Christian, attends at least monthly	59.7
Other than Christian, attends less than monthly/never	47.3
Other than Christian, attends at least monthly	58.5
N = 6502	

Table 4.6: Percentage agreeing asylum seekers escaping persecution should be able to stay in Britain by affiliation and level of attendance. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013.

	Agrees cultural life enriched
	Average score on 0-10 scale
No religion	4.5
Christian, attends less than monthly/never	3.9
Christian, attends at least monthly	5.1
Other than Christian, attends less than monthly/never	5.7
Other than Christian, attends at least monthly	5.8
N = 8603	

Table 4.5: Attitudes to whether immigrants benefit British cultural life by affiliation and level of attendance. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013, 2015.

4.3.10 The breakdowns clarify that frequent attenders are the warmest on each of these measures of immigration attitudes. Nominal Christians are coolest. Those with a religious affiliation other than Christian appear relatively the warmest (except on the asylum question where frequent attenders appear similar to Christian attenders). Their frequency of attendance makes a much smaller difference compared with non-Christians who attend infrequently.

4.3.11 Why nominal Christians are quite so cool is an intriguing question. The sociologist Steve Bruce has described this as 'cultural defence'. He has written that one of religion's great roles is as 'guarantor of group identity... [r]eligion can provide resources for the defence of a national, local, ethnic, or status-group culture' (1999: 25).

He argues that religion has most power when associated with a national myth, when it has the status of a broad national church (rather than each faith community forming one denomination among many), and where the nation is ethnically homogeneous. For those who cleave to an exclusive conception of the nation, and who perceive it as under threat from diversity and secularity, a Christian identity may provide a psychological bulwark, one untethered by the requirements of active attendance.

4.4 Ethnic Minority Religious Identity

4.4.1 Religiosity and ethnicity are accordingly tightly intertwined; we now turn towards differences between ethno-religious minorities. Religion provides ‘refuge, respect and resources’ (Hirschman 2004) to immigrants and ethnic minority members, and it has been observed that immigrants may be more actively-religious in their new country to find security and community.

4.4.2 It can be difficult to analyse data further, because those born outside Britain form about 13.5 per cent of the population and those other than White only 12.3 per cent of our British Social Attitudes (2010-2015) sample, which unfortunately does not record country of birth.

4.4.3 Further, differences by affiliation and religiosity are hard to detect because rates are so much higher: virtually all people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi background in our survey are Muslim and highly religious, for example. We can however draw upon the

Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010, a major survey of the five largest ethnic minority groups in Britain, which provides a large sample size of those of Black Caribbean, Black African, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi background. Notably, the following questions were included:

Do you agree or disagree that:

‘There is rarely any conflict between my ethnic culture and British customs’

‘Immigrants increase crime rates’

‘Immigrants generally are good for Britain’s economy’

‘Most asylum seekers who come to Britain should be sent home immediately’

4.4.4 Figure 4.13 below demonstrates variation in agreeing that there is rarely any conflict between ethnic culture and British customs, with a high of 61 per cent of Black Caribbean Christians agreeing, compared with 41 per cent of Pakistani Muslims and 42 per cent of Bangladeshi Muslims. On the question of whether immigrants increase crime rates, Black African Muslims are most likely to disagree (65 percent), and Indian Muslims least likely to disagree (32 per cent), as presented in Figure 4.14.

4.4.5 On the question of whether immigrants are good for Britain’s economy, Black African Muslims are most likely to




Figure 4.13: Perceptions of cultural conflict by ethno-religious group. Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010. N = 870 (differences between groups are highly-significant; $p < 0.001$).




Figure 4.14: Perceptions of whether immigration affects crime by ethno-religious group. Source: Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010. N = 2423 (differences between groups are highly-significant; $p < 0.001$).




Figure 4.15: Perception of whether immigration is good for the economy by ethno-religious group. Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010. N = 2448 (differences between groups are highly-significant; $p < 0.001$).

agree (88 per cent), and Indian Muslims least likely to agree (55 per cent). Nevertheless, rates are above 50 per cent for all ethnic minority religious groups.

4.4.6 Regarding whether asylum seekers should be sent home immediately, Indian Hindus are the least likely to disagree (with 31 percent disagreeing), and Black African Christians most likely to disagree (with 78 percent disagreeing): see Figure 4.16 below.

4.4.7 That those of immigrant background may be cool towards new immigrants has been noted by Benjamin Knoll for Latinos in the US (Knoll 2012). More assimilated Latinos show more nativist attitudes towards immigrants, and greater church attendance does not alleviate

this. There may also be class and education effects, and immigration generation and 'length of British residency' effects operating in our sample.

4.4.8 Combining the ethno-religious minority groups and examining their attitudes by religious type, we see a mixed picture. For the measure of perceptions of conflict between the respondent's 'ethnic' culture and British culture, regular attenders are least likely to agree that there is rarely any conflict. Regular attenders are more likely than the less-regular religious to disagree that immigrants increase crime, although less likely than the secular ethnic minority respondents.




Figure 4.16: Attitudes towards asylum seekers by ethno-religious group. Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010. N = 2613 (differences between groups are highly-significant; $p < 0.001$).




Figure 4.17: Attitudes towards cultural conflict, immigrants and immigration, and asylum seekers by religious type. Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010. Differences between religious types are only significant for 'disagree immigrants increase crime' ($p < 0.05$) and 'agree immigration good for economy' ($p < 0.001$).

Regular attenders are the most likely to agree that immigration is good for the British economy. They are very slightly more likely than the irregularly-attending religious to disagree that asylum seekers should be sent home; both religious groups are less likely to disagree than the secular. These patterns suggest that regular religious attendance and distinct secularity have a different meaning (and different effects) for members of ethnic minorities in Britain than for the British population as a whole.

5. OUR FINDINGS: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

5.1 The apparent differences in immigration attitudes between the unreligious, those with a religious affiliation who do not attend a place of worship regularly, and those who have an affiliation and attend, may be partly or wholly down to socio-demographic differences between those groups. Accordingly, taking account of educational, age-related, ethnic and occupational differences may well diminish the apparent differences described above.

5.2 To check that our findings still hold when taking these differences into account, we conducted multiple regression analyses to examine the association between religious type membership and immigration attitudes, while controlling for such third variables. To probe further, we also examined the effect of faith community membership, frequency of attendance at a place of worship (monthly versus less often) and immigration attitudes, distinguishing respondents according to whether they were of no religious affiliation, Christian, Jewish, Muslim or another religious affiliation (remaining groups were too small for further differentiation to yield reliable results).¹ Our control variables included social generation, gender, marital status, country of residence, ethnic group membership, educational level achieved, and occupational class.

¹ We used a number of different specifications and found little clear difference among Christians. Because of our interest in nominal Christianity and Christian nationalism, we kept them as a single group

5.3 For the analyses in this section, using both the threefold religious typology and fivefold affiliation measure in turn, we found that **frequent attendance has consistent and strong effects on pro-immigration attitudes, across every measure of attitude.**

When comparing religious communities, when controlling for attendance we find that differences between these communities are somewhat smaller and more mixed depending on the measure in question. Jewish affiliation (compared with none) is predicted to have a positive effect on attitudes to the cultural benefit of immigration, but otherwise there are no significant differences between Jewish respondents and nones for the other measures of immigration attitudes once controlling for socio-demographic and religious attendance differences. Christians responded similarly to the unreligious on the items capturing perceptions of the economic benefits of immigration, and welcoming of asylum seekers. They are, however, more sceptical than the unreligious regarding increase of immigration numbers, and the cultural benefits of immigration (again, holding attendance constant across groups). Members of other religions appear no different to those of no religion for all measures except that of support for asylum seekers, where they are marginally more negative. Muslims are no different to those of no religion with regard to perceptions of

when analysing 2011/2013/2015 BSA data. With the post-Referendum datasets (see Section 7) we did disaggregate further.

the cultural benefits of immigration and whether asylum seekers should be admitted, but more positive regarding immigration numbers and the perceived economic benefits of immigration.

5.4 The detailed model results are available for further inspection in the Appendix. The religious differences are also summarised in Table 5.1 below.

Outcome of interest, data source, model results table	Compared with non-attending 'religious nones'	More positive, more negative, or no difference
<i>Support for increasing immigration numbers</i> BSA 2011, 2013 Tables A.1, A.2	Religious in name only	More negative
	Religious affiliation and frequent attendance	More positive
	Christian	More negative
	Jewish	No difference
	Muslim	More positive
<i>Perceive that migrants bring economic benefits</i> BSA 2011, 2013, 2015 Tables A.3, A.4	Religious in name only	No difference
	Religious affiliation and frequent attendance	More positive
	Christian	No difference
	Jewish	No difference
	Muslim	More positive
<i>Perceive that migrants bring cultural benefits</i> BSA 2011, 2013, 2015 Tables A.5, A.6	Religious in name only	More negative
	Religious affiliation and frequent attendance	More positive
	Christian	More negative
	Jewish	More positive
	Muslim	No difference
<i>Support for asylum seekers</i> BSA 2011, 2013 Tables A.7, A.8	Religious in name only	No difference
	Religious affiliation and frequent attendance	More positive
	Christian	No difference
	Jewish	No difference
	Muslim	No difference
	Other religion	More negative

Table 5.5: Summary of direction of effects of (a) religiosity type; and (b) religious affiliation on immigration attitudes, controlling for frequency of attendance.

Given the small sample sizes for Jews and Muslims, $\alpha = 0.1$ is taken as the significance level here; exact p -values are reported in the regression analysis tables in the Appendix.

5.5 But how large are the differences which have been identified in the analyses presented in the Appendix? To illustrate these graphically, we calculated the likelihood of giving a particular response to the questions on whether immigration numbers should be increased, and support for accommodating asylum seekers, in terms of these characteristics, focusing on differences by religious type. We also calculated the predicted score on the 0-10 scale for perceptions of the economic and cultural benefits of immigration, again in terms of these characteristics. For each

religious type, we treat them as otherwise identical, in being exactly like the average respondent included in the analysis in terms of third factors (average education level, average social class and so on).

5.6 The probabilities of giving each type of response to the question, ‘*should the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays be increased?*’ were as follows. Taking third factors into account, 56 per cent of those of no religious affiliation would argue that immigration numbers should be reduced a lot, compared with 59 per cent of those with a religious affiliation but who do not attend church, and 48 per cent of those who do have a religious affiliation and who attend church monthly. We also see that 16 per cent of those with no religious affiliation are predicted to agree that immigration numbers should ‘remain the same’, compared with 14 per cent of those ‘religious in name only’, and 20 per cent of the actively-religious. To aid with visualization, results are also graphed in Figure 5.1.

5.7 Turn to the question capturing economic attitudes to immigration, following regression analysis, results were predicted first by religious type and then faith community. The predicted score on the 0-10 scale is essentially the same for the unreligious and those ‘religious in name only’, once third factors have been taken into account. The actively-religious are predicted to score 4.7 on average, or 0.4 of a point higher than other respondents on the 0-10 scale, as presented in Figure 5.2.

Should the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays be increased?			
Predicted probability of providing each response by religious type (%)			
	No religion	Affiliation/attends less than monthly or never	Affiliation/attends monthly or more
Reduced a lot	55.9	58.6	48.3
Reduced a little	25.5	24.4	28.0
Remain same	15.8	14.4	19.8
Increase a little	1.6	1.4	2.1
Increase a lot	1.2	1.1	1.7
Total	99.9	100.0	99.9

Table 5.2: Predicted proportion of each religious type giving each level of response, **after controls added**. Calculated from authors’ models (see Appendix). British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013.




Figure 5.1: Predicted proportion of each religious type giving each level of response on the numbers question, taking socio-demographic controls into account. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013.




Figure 5.2: Predicted score for each religious type on whether immigration is perceived as good for the economy, taking socio-demographic controls into account. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013, 2015.




Figure 5.2: Predicted score for each religious type on whether immigration is perceived as good for Britain's cultural life, taking socio-demographic controls into account. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013, 2015.

5.8 Turning now to the question capturing whether respondents perceive immigration as good for Britain's cultural life: *do you think Britain's cultural life is undermined or enriched by migrants coming to live here?* (where 0 = wholly undermined, 10 = wholly enriched). The actively-religious score more highly than the unreligious and the nominally-religious, even taking socio-demographic controls into account. In this case, the unreligious score slightly higher than the nominally-religious. The actively-religious score considerably higher, however, than both.

5.9 Finally, respondents were asked whether they agreed that that asylum seekers who have suffered persecution in their own country should be able to stay in Britain. Response options ranged from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). We repeated our exercise as for the immigration numbers

question, running ordinal logistic models and then predicting the proportion choosing 'disagree strongly', 'disagree' and so on. Taking third factors into account, we found as reported in Table 5.3 below: the actively-religious are predicted to have the lowest percentage choosing 'disagree strongly', 'disagree' and 'neither agree nor disagree'; and the highest percentages choosing 'agree' and 'agree strongly'. They are followed by the religious nones, while those 'religious in name only' are predicted to show the strongest support for 'disagree strongly', 'disagree', and 'neither'. The results are also graphed in Figure 5.5 below.




Figure 5.4: Predicted proportion of each religious type giving each level of response on the asylum question, taking socio-demographic controls into account. British Social Attitudes surveys 2011, 2013.

Do you agree that asylum seekers should be able to stay in Britain?			
Predicted probability of providing each response by religious type (%)			
	No religion	Affiliation/attends less than monthly or never	Affiliation/attends monthly or more
Disagree strongly	7.4	7.8	5.1
Disagree	20.4	21.3	15.6
Neither	24.8	25.1	22.3
Agree	39.7	38.5	46.1
Agree strongly	7.7	7.3	10.9
Total	100	100	100

Table 5.3: Predicted proportion of each religious type giving each level of response. BSA 2011, 2013, 2015 and authors' analyses.

5.10 We calculate predicted probabilities and predicted scores to get a sense of the size of the gaps between the actively-religious, nominally-religious and unreligious. What the graphs and tables above illustrate is that, first, attitudes are overall quite cool. If we assume that each respondent is at the mean for each sample, then on the question regarding immigration numbers, 66 per cent of the warmest group (the actively-religious) support numbers reducing a little or a lot. On the question of the economic and cultural benefits of immigration, none of the three groups feature an average score above 5 out of 10. On the question of asylum seekers' being allowed to stay in Britain, 57 per cent of the actively-religious are predicted to agree or agree strongly, but only 45 per cent of the nominally-religious, and 47 per cent of the unreligious.

5.11 The estimated differences between each group also look quite slight, particularly for the questions on the economic and cultural benefits of immigration. Nevertheless, the detailed regression results available in the Appendix (and summary in Table 5.1) clarify that differences by religious type are meaningful in most cases, particularly the contrasts between the actively-religious with the unreligious and nominally-religious.

6. TAKING ACCOUNT OF RELIGIOUS CONTEXT

6.1 In this section, we ask whether the pro-tolerance effect of religiosity depends on the local environment. For this part of the analysis, we require a larger sample. We turned to the British Election Study Online Panel 2014-2018, a high-quality survey designed by the Universities of Oxford, Nottingham and Manchester, and fielded by the online survey firm YouGov. In Waves 6 (May 2015) and 7 (April-May 2016), respondents were asked:

Do you think immigration is good or bad for Britain's economy?

And do you think that immigration undermines or enriches Britain's cultural life?

Respondents chose a score of 1-7, where 7 = good and 1 = bad.

6.2 The analysis conducted here used multilevel modelling, a specific technique which can take account of the respondents answering the same two questions, and also their clustering in particular areas (in this case, the parliamentary constituency). The BES online survey panel has the usual flaws associated with online surveys in being less representative of the general public, but offers the advantage of a very large sample

size (N = 19090) allowing more detailed analysis.

We asked:

- Do different groups differentiate economic and cultural aspects of immigration?
- How does local context matter? Does the effect of religion on attitudes depend on how religious the local area is?
- And what can we say about religious groups as a whole – are they different from the unreligious in their immigration attitudes?

6.3 In our analysis, we controlled for the following demographic and social factors: gender, home ownership, age, marital status, whether they have a university degree, minority ethnic status, and income. We also took account of economic confidence: whether the respondent considered that 'it's a good time to buy', and a range of political variables: voting intention in the EU referendum, party political identification, self-rated left-right position, satisfaction with UK democracy, and interest in politics. This allows us to look at the separate effect of religious affiliation and practice.

6.4 What we found with this, different, dataset was again that religious affiliation (any versus none) promotes anti-immigration attitudes – even after taking third factors into account. Church attendance however promotes pro-immigrant attitudes.

6.5 In examining local context, we find that in an area which is more anti-immigrant on average, church attendance has a larger effect on immigration attitudes. Attending a place of worship has a smaller effect in areas which are less anti-immigration, however. This is perhaps because in places which are less cosmopolitan, religious attendance combats this 'in-group' feeling more strongly. In more 'open' communities, there may be other sources of moral community besides religion, so that the effects of church attendance are perhaps less distinct – for example, people who live in such places may get similar benefits from book clubs, sports clubs, environmental associations and so on. In other words, church attendance has a more pro-social effect where attitudes are more hostile.

7. DO THE SAME PATTERNS HOLD POST-BREXIT?

7.1 A reasonable question is whether the religious effects on immigration attitudes we see in data from 2010-2015 still hold in the post-Brexit period. It is entirely possible that ‘everything has been changed’ by the EU Referendum result of June 2016.

7.2 We accordingly examine the available measures of immigration attitudes in social surveys fielded after June 2016. In the 2016 British Social Attitudes survey, the questions posed in 2011, 2013 and 2015 were not available. However, respondents were asked:

Here is a list of things that some people may be concerned or worried about. Which, if any, of these would you say you are concerned or worried about at the moment?

... your physical health; your mental health; housing or your home; work or finding a job; money or debt; your family or partner; your friend(s); caring for your family, or another person; education (for yourself or your family); immigration; crime in your local area; something else (write in); no concerns or worries.

7.3 If the respondent indicated more than one area of concern, they were then asked which they were most concerned about. 32 per cent indicated that it was *one* area of concern (of 2938 respondents), and 9 per cent indicated that it was the *area of most concern* (of 2923 respondents). We then

broke down the percentage indicating immigration as an area of concern, and as the area of most concern, by religious affiliation and attendance (Table 7.1).

	Percentage reporting immigration as an area of concern (%)	Percentage reporting immigration as area of most concern (%)
Anglicans	42.9	11.2
Roman Catholics	32.9	10.1
Other Christian	32.4	10.6
Non-Christian	28.0	7.3
No Religion	28.3	8.0
Unweighted N	2929	2923
Attends a place of worship at least monthly	28.7	7.9
Attends a place of worship never/less frequently	32.2	9.3
Unweighted N	2938	2935
Reports Christian affiliation and attends a place of worship at least monthly	30.1	8.1
Reports Christian affiliation and attends a place of worship never/less frequently	39.6	12.0
Unweighted N	1306	1303

Table 7.1: Reported identification of immigration as an area of concern by religious affiliation and attendance. Survey weights applied. Source: British Social Attitudes survey 2016.

7.4 The table also reports percentages for Christians only, again to screen out the more liberal secular, and clarify that attendance has an effect for those of Christian affiliation (rather than frequent attenders being primarily non-Christian and often of immigrant background). Again, more frequently-attending Christians appear considerably less likely than less frequently-attending Christians to identify immigration as an area of concern, and as the area of most concern.

7.5 The differences by religious group and frequency of attendance here indicate that, even though this measure is a little different from the 2011-2015 measures, the breakdowns are as expected from our earlier analyses: Anglicans are more likely to choose immigration as an area of concern or of most concern, and the unreligious and non-Christians less likely. More frequent attendance at a place of worship is associated with being less likely to identify immigration as an area of concern (or of most concern).

7.6 Do these differences still hold once controlling for socio-demographic differences? As far as possible, we use the same controls as those used in Section 5, with slight modifications:

- Due to the way that religion is coded in the 2016 dataset, religious affiliation is coded as Anglican, Catholic, Other Christian, Non-Christian and No Religion rather than Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Other and No Religion

- To clarify the effects of attendance at a place of worship, we include individual controls for each level of attendance (weekly, monthly or fortnightly, at least annually, less often vs never).

7.7 Detailed results are available in Table A.10. To summarise, from data gathered over the late summer and early autumn of 2016:

- Anglicans were significantly more likely than those without a religious affiliation to identify immigration as an area of concern, controlling for socio-demographic factors including church attendance;
- Members of other religious groups were also more likely than those with no religious affiliation to identify immigration as an area of concern, but these differences were *not* statistically-significant;
- Those attending a place of worship at least weekly were significantly *less* likely than those never attending to report immigration as an area of concern;
- Those reporting less frequent attendance were, however, not significantly different to those who never attend in their likelihood of choosing immigration as an area of concern.

7.7 We can use the detailed results to calculate the likelihood of members of each religious group choosing immigration as an area of particular concern or worry, with




Figure 7.1: Predicted probability of choosing immigration as an area of concern or worry in 2016 by broad religious affiliation, taking socio-demographic controls into account. British Social Attitudes survey 2016.




Figure 7.2: Predicted probability of choosing immigration as an area of concern or worry in 2016 by frequency of attendance at a place of worship, taking socio-demographic controls into account. British Social Attitudes survey 2016.

socio-demographic controls and frequency of attendance held at their mean values (to allow us to capture the distinct effects of affiliation only). These results are graphed in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 above.

7.8 We can also repeat our analysis as before by collapsing the religious affiliations together, and using our previous threefold typology:

- those without a religious affiliation (52.6 per cent of respondents in the 2016 dataset)
- those with an affiliation but who do not attend a place of worship at least monthly (30.3 per cent)
- those who have an affiliation and who attend relatively frequently (17.1 per cent).

The proportions of each group reporting immigration as an area of concern is given in Table 7.2 below.

	Percentage reporting immigration as an area of concern (%)	Percentage reporting immigration as area of most concern (%)
No religion, does not attend	28.3	8.1
Has a religious affiliation, does not attend	39.0	11.5
Has a religious affiliation, attends at least monthly	28.8	8.1
Unweighted N	2915	2909


Table 7.2: Reported identification of immigration as an area of concern by religious type, before taking socio-demographic controls into account. Survey weights applied. British Social Attitudes survey 2016.

7.9 We can also examine whether these differences still hold after controlling for third variables such as gender, education and occupational status, as reported in Table A.9 (Appendix). Those who report a religious affiliation but who do not attend church at least monthly are significantly more likely than the unreligious to select immigration as an area of concern. But the religious who attend relatively frequently do not seem, in this dataset and with these measures, to be significantly different to the unreligious: in this case, the effects of frequent attendance and of religious identification appear to ‘cancel out’.

7.10 In Figure 7.3 below, we use the model results to predict the likelihood of identifying immigration as an area of concern for each of the three religious types, assuming the same characteristics for each group

in terms of third variables. With these held at their mean values, we predict that 30 per cent of non-adherents who do not attend church identify immigration as an area of concern; 38 per cent of those with a religious affiliation who do not attend a place of worship regularly identify immigration as an area of concern; and 32 per cent of those who report both a religious affiliation and who attend at least monthly.

7.11 These results demonstrate that affiliation and attendance effects on immigration attitudes are also be found in the post-Referendum period, albeit using slightly different measures of immigration attitudes, affiliation and attendance. Effects are summarised in Table 7.3 below. The 2017 BSA dataset will allow further such validation, in being likely to include the recurrent measures of immigration attitudes fielded in 2011, 2013 and 2015 analysed earlier.



Outcome of interest, data source, model results table	Compared with non-attending ‘religious nones’	More likely, less likely, or no difference
<i>Whether immigration is identified as an issue of concern or worry</i>	Religious in name only	No difference
	Religious affiliation and frequent attendance	Less likely
BSA 2016 (post-Referendum) Tables A.9, A.10	Anglican	More likely
	Roman Catholic	No difference
	Other Christian	No difference
	Other religion	No difference
	Attends at least weekly	Less likely
	Other levels of attendance	No difference

Table 7.3: Summary of religious effects on selecting immigration as an issue of concern or worry. British Social Attitudes survey 2016.

7.12 A final question can be raised over whether the relationship between religion and immigration attitudes have changed recently, and continue to hold after the Brexit result. The analysis of the 2016 BSA data is suggestive, but difficult to answer conclusively given that the 2015 and 2016 measures of immigration attitudes are different.

7.13 We can however turn to the British Election Study online panel. Our measure of immigration attitudes is drawn from the following question:

Some people think that the UK should allow many more immigrants to come to the UK to live and others think that the UK should allow many fewer immigrants. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

Respondents could choose a value between 0, representing ‘many fewer’, and 10, representing ‘many more’. This was fielded in every wave of the panel study from Wave 7; we use the Wave 8 and Wave 11 responses in this report, which provide good sample sizes while straddling the Referendum date. By combining the YouGov panel measure of religious affiliation with updated measures captured by the BES survey, we capture religious affiliation for 92

per cent of the BES online panel members.² Frequency of attendance at a place of worship (from never/the respondent is not religious, through less than annually, at least annually, at least twice a year, at least monthly, at least fortnightly and at least weekly) was only captured in Wave 6 of the survey, namely in May 2015. There are good theoretical reasons, however, to use a measure of attendance from an earlier period (not least because frequency of attendance tends to be quite stable) and so it was included in the analysis.

7.15 This yields a good-sized sample of 8960 respondents who provide a complete set of answers in both Waves 8 and 11. This nevertheless means that some religious groups are too small for reliable analysis, accordingly combined as follows:

- Free Presbyterian, Brethren, Orthodox Christian, Pentecostals and Evangelical Christians each featured small numbers and were combined into a single ‘other Christian’ group

- Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs were combined into a single ‘other non-Christian’ group.

Other groups were kept separate, including one categorized as ‘other’ which is likely to be quite diverse.

7.16 As a step in our exploratory analysis before proceeding to full regression analysis, we examined the proportions giving a score of 6 or higher on the 0-10 ‘many more immigrants’ scale by, first, religious affiliation, and secondly by frequency of attendance at a place of worship (note that this is for Wave 11 respondents only). Results are given in Table 7.4 below. The group with the smallest proportion giving a score of 6 or above is that of Church of England respondents with 10 per cent, and the group with the largest proportion giving a score of 6 or above are Muslims with 37 per cent. The ‘no religious affiliation’ group falls between the two with 22 per cent giving a score of 6 or higher. We see considerable variation across religious groups, but note again that differences in age, educational and ethnic profile might be largely responsible.

² Religious affiliation is captured in some detail by YouGov, and set to update every 9 months or so, but respondents do not always complete surveys when they are sent to them. Precise dates of the updates are also not yet available. Updated measures are available for Waves 10-13, where we see a little shifting between categories. To have a single measure of religious affiliation for both Waves 8 and 11, we need to choose a single time point and/or measure of affiliation. For Waves 10-13, when more up-to-date measures of religious affiliation are available, religious affiliation is missing for more than half of the sample. This directs us instead to look at the longer-standing YouGov profile_religion variable for those for whom

religious affiliation was not updated in Waves 10-13. We accordingly proceeded as follows: first, religious affiliation was drawn from the profile_religion measure and which was the most up-to-date available at Wave 9. This provided a religious affiliation for 78 per cent of panel members. For those who did not have a religious affiliation recorded in profile_religion but who reported one in a later survey, we took affiliation as it was first reported: in Wave 10 if not available in profile_religion, Wave 11 if not available in either profile_religion or Wave 10, and so on up to Wave 13. By doing so, we capture religious affiliation for 92 per cent of panel members.

7.17 Similarly, we see variation by frequency of attendance at a place of worship, along similar lines as established earlier. Of those who never or practically never attend, or who report that they are not religious, 16 per cent gave a score of 6 or higher, indicating support for more immigration. Of those who attend less than once a year, 9 per cent gave a score of 6 or higher. For each level of attendance, the proportion increases until it reaches 23 per cent giving a score of 6 or higher for those attending weekly or more often.

7.18 To be clearer regarding the precise effects of religious affiliation and frequency of church attendance on support for allowing more immigrants, we again proceed to multiple regression analysis. Moreover, to test whether the relationship changed (in becoming weaker, or stronger) after the Referendum result, we examine the attitudes of a fixed set of respondents who answered at Wave 8 (May-June 2016) and Wave 11 (April-May 2017).

	Percentage of respondents giving a score of 6 or higher on 0-10 scale	Unweighted Base N
Religious affiliation		
None	21.6	13,206
Church of England	10.0	7,706
Roman Catholic	19.4	2,116
Church of Scotland	17.9	933
Methodist	12.7	648
Baptist	22.0	338
United Reformed Church	12.4	98
Other Christian	29.6	411
Judaism	28.3	229
Other non-Christian	26.6	259
Islam	36.7	199
Other	19.9	871
Total	18.4	27,014
Frequency of attendance at a place of worship		
Attends never or practically never/respondent reports that they are not religious	16.3	9,935
Attends less than once a year	9.2	841
Attends at least once a year	13.0	574
Attends at least twice a year	13.9	685
Attends at least once a month	22.3	333
Attends at least once a fortnight	22.7	280
Attends weekly or more often	23.0	1,030
Total	16.4	13,678
Religious Type		
Christian and attends at least monthly	22.8	1,321
Christian and attends less often	9.6	5,005
Other than Christian, attends at least monthly	22.4	268
Other than Christian, attends less often	20.7	511
No religion, never attends	19.5	6,269

Table 7.4: Support for allowing many more immigrants to come to the UK by religious affiliation and frequency of attendance at a place of worship. Proportion of each religious group and level of attendance giving a score of 6 or higher on 0-10 scale. Source: British Election Study Online Panel 2014-2018, Wave 11 respondents only (Wave 11 weights applied).

7.20 The numbers of each religious group responding to both Waves 8 and 11 who were included in the full regression analysis are given in Table A.13 (Appendix). Some proportions are a little different from those in society at large (Muslims in particular appear very much under-represented) but numbers in each category are otherwise reasonably large enough for analysis of how religious belonging and church attendance affects perception of immigration numbers.

7.21 After regression analysis (available in Table A.11), religious effects are summarised in Table 7.5 below and graphed in Figures 7.4 and 7.5, for both the pre-Referendum sample (Wave 8, May-June 2016) and the post-Referendum sample (Wave 11, April-May 2017).

7.22 Table A.11 tells us that having a religious affiliation tends to be associated with supporting lower immigration numbers than the unreligious, at least for Anglicans, Catholics, Church of Scotland adherents, 'other Christians', Muslims and 'others' in both waves, as well as Methodists (Wave 11 only). This is controlling for third variables including church attendance.

7.23 Those who report attending a place of worship as rarely as at least once a year or more often however support significantly higher numbers of immigrants than those who never attend.³

The direction of effects is summarized in Table 7.5 below.

7.24 Predicted scores on the 'agree UK should allow more immigrants' scale are graphed in Figure 7.4 below, for both Wave 8 and Wave 11. For most religious groups, including the unreligious, attitudes appear to have warmed very slightly between May-June 2016 and April-May 2017. The predicted scores are what we predict respondents to state on average if socio-demographic controls (including frequency of church attendance) are at their mean values, for each group in turn.

³ It is not surprising that the effects of church attendance appear clearer in this analysis of the BES than in BSA analysis. This is likely due to the much

greater sample size, which allows us to be more precise regarding small effects.

Significantly different from the unreligious, controlling for attendance?	May-June 2016 analysis	April-May 2017 analysis
Church of England	Yes: more negative	Yes: more negative
Roman Catholic	Yes: more negative	Yes: more negative
Church of Scotland	Yes: more negative	Yes: more negative
Methodist	Non-significant	Yes: more negative
Baptist	Non-significant	Non-significant
United Reformed Church	Yes: more negative	Non-significant
Other Christian	Yes: more negative	Yes: more negative
Judaism	Non-significant	Non-significant
Other non-Christian	Non-significant	Non-significant
Islam	Yes: more negative	Yes: more negative
Other	Yes: more negative	Yes: more negative

Significantly different from those who never attend a place of worship, controlling for affiliation?	May-June 2016 analysis	April-May 2017 analysis
Attends less than once a year	Non-significant	Non-significant
Attends at least once a year	Yes: more positive	Yes: more positive
Attends at least twice a year	Yes: more positive	Yes: more positive
Attends at least once a month	Yes: more positive	Yes: more positive
Attends at least once a fortnight	Yes: more positive	Yes: more positive
Attends weekly or more often	Yes: more positive	Yes: more positive

Table 7.5: Summary of effects of religious affiliation (compared with no religious affiliation) and frequency of attendance at a place of worship (compared with attending never) in Waves 8 and 11 of the British Election Study Online Panel. Wave 11 weights applied.




Figure 7.4: Predicted score on 0-10 scale of agreement that the UK should allow many more immigrants into the UK, for each religious affiliation group. British Election Study Online Panel 2014-2018.




Figure 7.5: Predicted score on 0-10 scale of agreement that the UK should allow many more immigrants into the UK, for each level of attendance at a place of worship. British Election Study Online Panel 2014-2018.

7.25 Similarly, the predicted scores on the ‘agree UK should allow more immigrants’ scale are graphed in Figure 7.5 above, by frequency of attendance at a place of worship. The difference between never attending and attending at least weekly is associated with being 0.8 of a point warmer on the 0-10 scale in May-June 2016, and 0.7 of a point warmer in April-May 2017. Moreover, effects look very similar both in the pre-referendum and post-referendum sample.

7.26 Finally, we repeat the analysis by using our threefold religious typology, dividing respondents again according to whether they are non-adherents, adherents who do not attend church at least monthly, and adherents who do report attending a place of worship at least monthly (detailed model results are provided in Table A.12 in the Appendix). In May-June 2016, the effect of being a regular attender compared with being unreligious was significant and positive, while that of being ‘religious in name only’ was significant and negative. By April-May 2017, the effect of being ‘religious in name only’ is still negative, but the differences between the unreligious and the actively-religious appear to have attenuated. Effects are also graphed in Figure 7.6, where we predict the scores on the ‘agree UK should allow more immigrants’ scale for each religious type in turn, again holding third variables at their mean values. This also illustrates that responses rose across the board between Wave 8 and Wave 11.

7.29 Why the gap between the unreligious and the actively-religious has dissipated is

not clear. It could be a random fluctuation, or it could be because unreligious became relatively more concerned about immigration during the Brexit campaign and following the result, so that they ‘caught up’ with the actively-religious. It remains to be seen whether the increased warmth towards immigrants suggested by this measure (or at least decreased chill) between May-June 2016 and April-May 2017 continues. Monthly data on what the British public perceives to be the ‘most important issue’ as collected by Ipsos MORI are also suggestive that this increasing positivity regarding immigration is indeed a clear, albeit recent trend (see Bibliography for further details of the Ipsos MORI ‘Most Important Issue’ series and its ‘Shifting Ground’ report).




Figure 7.6: Predicted score on 0-10 scale of agreement that more immigrants should be admitted to UK, May-June 2016 (Wave 8) and April-May 2017 (Wave 11) by religious type, taking socio-demographic controls into account. British Election Study Online Panel 2014-2018.

8. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Our research demonstrates across a range of surveys fielded between 2010 and 2017 that religious affiliation and frequent attendance at a place of worship affect attitudes towards immigration. Precise effects depend on how such attitudes are measured and the question wording used, as well as the sample sizes employed. Across the board, the actively religious are more supportive of increasing immigration numbers, more supportive of the economic and cultural benefits of immigration, and more supportive of accommodating asylum seekers than the unreligious and the religious in name only.

8.2 Controlling for attendance, having any religious affiliation is associated with lower support for increasing immigration numbers, and lower support for the proposition that migrants benefit cultural life. Having any religious affiliation compared with none has no significant effect on support for perceiving migrants as benefiting the economy, or for support for accommodating asylum seekers.

8.3 Some of the differences in the simple breakdowns by religiosity type turn out to be accounted for by factors such as education, ethnicity and occupation. Nevertheless, we still see clear effects of affiliation, between some faith communities, and particularly from regular attendance, where pro-tolerance effects are consistent.

8.4 Britain is a highly secular country. Nevertheless, religion continues to matter.

It offers a source of moral community of particular interest to members of ethnic minority groups, to those with more traditional values, and perhaps a ‘countercultural’ space to some of the young and relatively educated.

8.5 Drilling down into the effects of affiliation (and controlling for attendance), we see that Christians are more negative than the unreligious in terms of support for increasing immigration numbers, for perceptions of the economic benefits of migrants, and perceptions of the cultural benefits of migrants. In terms of support for asylum seekers, there is no significant difference between Christians and the unreligious.

8.6 Jewish respondents show more positive perceptions than the unreligious of migrants’ cultural benefits. Otherwise, differences between Jewish and nonreligious respondents are non-significant (although the coefficients for Jewish status are always positive, and Jewish respondents are also predicted to be the most supportive of increasing immigration numbers in the British Election Study 2016/2017 data). This may well be because the sample size for Jews is small and the analysis accordingly lacks statistical power in most cases (see Table A.13 in the Appendix). In the 2011/2013 British Social Attitudes data, Muslim respondents are more positive than religious nones regarding support for increasing immigrant numbers, and migrants’ economic benefits. We note that when controlling for mosque attendance they appear more negative than the unreligious in

the 2016/2017 BES samples, but this may be an unreliable result (there are only 35 Muslims in the sample). We also see that members of other (non-Christian) religions are more negative than religious nones regarding asylum seekers, but otherwise appear little different on remaining measures. It is highly plausible that small sample sizes make it difficult to identify how religious affiliation matters for religious minority groups, but the key finding remains that *attendance* does matter; and we also know that religious minority and ethnic minority group members are very often more religious than White British Christians in both belief and practice.

8.7 Part of the difference between those who are ‘religion in name only’ and the actively-religious may well be down to the sheer fact of being involved in a community of any sort, rather than the community being religious). Further analysis should test the comparative effects of secular and religious engagement on attitudes towards immigrants. Part of the difference may be down to the more pro-social being more likely to be involved in community life in the first place, rather than involvement driving pro-social attitudes. But it is quite possible - and plausible - that at least part if it is down to being involved in a religious and moralized community in particular, where messages of openness towards immigrants and refugees are often shared by religious personnel and fellow worshippers.

8.8 What remains of interest are those religious in name only: why are their attitudes more negative in some cases than

those of the secular, given that their rates of attendance are similar? Having a nominal religious identity may offer a source of meaning and imagined belonging. It has been suggested that a self-definition as Christian (although never actually practising) may serve as a signal that the respondent is *not* a member of a minority religion, and also perhaps that they are different to the types of people who identify as atheist or irreligious – implying a rejection of liberal and cosmopolitan values.

8.9 This identity appears to be associated with ‘cultural defence’: protection of cultural identity against newcomers. Indeed, on the measure of whether immigrants are seen to benefit British cultural life, we see the clearest effects of both affiliation and attendance.

8.11 The more negative effects of affiliation (absent attendance) may accordingly be a manifestation of ‘ethnic Christianity’. This may well offer those cleaving to a group identity one which provides a particular sense of meaning, community and link with the imagined past, while also avoiding the social contact, required commitment to community, and more tolerant worldview fostered by regular attendance at a place of worship.

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APPENDIX: REGRESSION TABLES

1. The results summarised above in Sections 5 and 7 drew on analyses of the relationship between religious affiliation and church attendance and attitudes to immigration, specifically regression analysis. Regression analysis offers the virtue of allowing us to estimate the effect of religious affiliation and attendance at a place of worship, taking important third factors such as age, gender, ethnicity, social class and education effects into account.

2. We uses three types of regression analysis here:

- binary and ordinal logistic regression analysis, where responses to questions can be treated as rankings. We report the predicted probability in percentage terms of giving different levels of response depending on the respondent’s socio-demographic and religious characteristics
- linear regression analysis, where responses to questions can be treated as numerical scales. We report the effect on the score of each socio-demographic and religious characteristic in terms of units on the scale.
- multivariate multiple regression analysis, where responses to questions can be treated as numerical scales, and where we are examining the effect of socio-demographic and religious characteristics in terms of units on

the scale for more than one scale at a time.

Survey item	Measurement	Analytic technique
Support for increasing immigration numbers (BSA)	1-5 scale: ‘reduced a lot’ (1), ‘reduced a little’ (2), ‘remain the same’ (3), ‘increased a little’ (4), ‘increased a lot’ (5)	Ranked data – ordinal logistic regression
Whether immigration benefits Britain’s economy (BSA)	0-10 scale, where 0 = ‘extremely bad’ and 10 = ‘extremely good’	Treated as continuous data – linear regression
Whether immigration benefits Britain’s cultural life (BSA)	0-10 scale, where 0 = ‘extremely bad’ and 10 = ‘extremely good’	Treated as continuous data – linear regression
Whether asylum seekers should be admitted (BSA)	1-5 scale, where 1 = ‘disagree strongly’ and 5 = ‘agree strongly’	Ranked data – ordinal logistic regression
Whether immigration is an issue of particular concern or worry (BSA)	0-1 scale, where 0 = ‘not identified’ and 1 = ‘identified as an issue’	Ranked data – binary logistic regression
Whether UK should admit more immigrants to UK (BES)	0-10 scale, where 0 = ‘many fewer’ and 10 = ‘many more’	Treated as continuous data. Responses for two survey waves analysed simultaneously – multivariate multiple regression

Summary of items subject to multiple regression analysis.

3. Where the question responses are treated as ranked, we reported the differences between religious types and faith communities in terms of predicted probabilities. Where the question responses are treated as 0-10 scales, we report the effects of religious differences in terms of differences in predicted scores in units on the 0-10 scale.

4. We categorised respondents in two ways:

- According to whether they are non-religious; or have a religious affiliation but attend a place of worship less frequently than once a month; or have a religious affiliation and attend relatively frequently (at least monthly);
- According to different measures of religious affiliation and by frequency of attendance at a place of worship.

See the main body of the report for further details.

Should the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays be increased? Higher score = stronger support for increase. Analysis by threefold religious type. 2011, 2013 data.

Variable	Log odds	p-value	Direction of effects	Interpretation
Female	-0.063	0.312	Non-significant	No gender effects
Pre-war	-0.094	0.301	Non-significant	
Generation X	0.215***	0.004	Positive	Some generational effects (Generation X and Y members more supportive than Boomers)
Generation Y	0.468***	<0.001	Positive	
Married/partnered	-0.070	0.259	Non-significant	No effect of partnership status
Scotland	0.379***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences between Scotland and England, and Wales and England
Wales	-0.263*	0.059	Negative	
Black	1.009***	<0.001	Positive	Some differences by ethno-racial group membership compared with Whites
Indian	0.615***	0.008	Positive	
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	0.083	0.779	Non-significant	
Chinese/Other Asian	0.051	0.827	Non-significant	
Mixed/Other	0.833***	<0.001	Positive	
Has affiliation, attends	0.284***	0.001	Positive	The actively-religious are more positive than the unreligious; the affiliated who do not attend are more negative
Has affiliation, does not attend	-0.146**	0.033	Negative	
Degree	1.304***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for the more educated groups compared with having no qualifications
Higher education below degree	0.482***	<0.001	Positive	
A-levels	0.602***	<0.001	Positive	
O-levels or equivalent	0.135	0.226	Non-significant	
CSE or equivalent	-0.046	0.767	Non-significant	
Foreign or other	1.461***	<0.001	Positive	
Managerial/Professional	0.137	0.124	Non-significant	Non-significant differences compared with having a routine occupation
Intermediate	0.013	0.898	Non-significant	
Small employers	-0.152	0.240	Non-significant	
Lower supervisory/technical	-0.184	0.139	Non-significant	
Threshold 1	0.812			
Threshold 2	2.053			
Threshold 3	4.128			
Threshold 4	4.989			
N	5642			
Pseudo R ²	0.065			
Wald χ^2 (df = 24)	617.74	< 0.001		

Table A.1: Attitudes to increasing immigration numbers by whether the respondent has a religious affiliation and attends a place of worship frequently, or affiliates but does not attend, compared with no religion. Base category: male, Baby Boom generation member, not married or partnered, English, White, has no religious affiliation, has no qualifications, has routine occupation. Results of ordinal regression analysis. Source: BSA 2011, 2013 and authors' analyses.

* Significant at 10 per cent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; *** significant at 1 per cent level.

Should the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays be increased? Analysis by religious affiliation and frequency of religious attendance. 2011, 2013 data.

Variable	Log odds	p-value	Direction of effects	Interpretation
Female	-0.060	0.334	Non-significant	No gender effects
Pre-war	-0.082	0.369	Non-significant	Some generational effects
Generation X	0.200***	0.008	Positive	
Generation Y	0.456***	<0.001	Positive	
Married/partnered	-0.073	0.238	Non-significant	No effect of partnership status
Scotland	0.386***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences between Scotland and England; and Wales and England (borderline)
Wales	-0.260*	0.063	Negative	
Black	0.980***	<0.001	Positive	Some differences by ethno-racial group membership compared with Whites: significant effects for Black respondents and Mixed/Other; at border of significance for Indian respondents; no differences for Pakistani/Bangladeshi respondents and Chinese/Other Asian
Indian	0.465*	0.076	Positive	
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	-0.492	0.192	Non-significant	
Chinese/Other Asian	-0.064	0.796	Non-significant	
Mixed/Other	0.748***	<0.001	Positive	No significant difference between members of other religions and unaffiliated
Christian	-0.161**	0.019	Negative	
Jewish	0.170	0.634	Non-significant	No significant difference between Jewish and unaffiliated
Muslim	0.480*	0.072	Positive	Muslims are more positive than the unaffiliated (borderline significance)
Other religion	-0.053	0.787	Non-significant	Church attenders are more positive than non-attenders
Attends church at least monthly	0.396***	<0.001	Positive	
Degree	1.315***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for the more educated groups compared with having no qualifications (no significant differences between respondents where highest level achieved is O-level/CSE and the unqualified)
Higher education below degree	0.490***	<0.001	Positive	
A-levels	0.606***	<0.001	Positive	
O-levels or equivalent	0.151	0.175	Non-significant	
CSE or equivalent	-0.049	0.755	Non-significant	Managerial and professional workers marginally more positive than those with a routine occupation, at border of significance. Non-significant differences otherwise
Foreign or other	1.466***	<0.001	Positive	
Managerial/Professional	0.148*	0.098	Positive	
Intermediate	0.019	0.852	Non-significant	
Small employers	-0.138	0.287	Non-significant	Non-significant differences otherwise
Lower supervisory/technical	-0.179	0.151	Non-significant	
Threshold 1	0.821			
Threshold 2	2.063			
Threshold 3	4.142			
Threshold 4	5.003			
N	5642			
Pseudo R ²	0.066			
Wald χ^2 (df = 24)	624.78	<0.001		

Table A.2: Attitudes to increasing immigration numbers by respondent's religious affiliation (broad definition) and whether they attend a place of worship frequently. Base category: male, Baby Boom generation member, not married or partnered, English, White, has no religious affiliation, does not attend a place of worship at least monthly, has no qualifications, has routine occupation. Results of ordinal regression analysis. Source: BSA 2011, 2013 and authors' analyses.

Would you say it is generally bad or good for Britain's economy that migrants come to Britain from other countries? Analysis by threefold religious type. 2011, 2013, 2015 data.

Variable	Coefficient	p-value	Direction of effects	Interpretation
Female	-0.392***	<0.001	Negative	Women feel less positive on average than men
Pre-war	0.068	0.452	Non-significant	Generation Y more positive than Baby Boomers, albeit at the borders of significance
Generation X	-0.045	0.568	Non-significant	
Generation Y	0.181**	0.050	Positive	
Married/partnered	-0.009	0.887	Non-significant	No effect of partnership status
Scotland	0.325***	0.002	Positive	Significant differences between Scotland and England, and Wales and England
Wales	-0.587***	<0.001	Negative	
Black	1.829***	<0.001	Positive	
Indian	0.880***	<0.001	Positive	
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	0.172	0.571	Non-significant	All groups more positive than Whites, except for the combined Pakistani/Bangladeshi group
Chinese/Other Asian	0.988***	0.001	Positive	
Mixed/Other	0.734***	0.002	Positive	
Has affiliation, attends	0.385***	<0.001	Positive	Affiliated who attend frequently significantly more positive than the unreligious. No significant difference between the affiliated who do not attend and the unreligious
Has affiliation, does not attend	-0.025	0.721	Non-significant	
Degree	2.156***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for the more educated groups compared with having no qualifications (except for CSE or equivalent group)
Higher education below degree	0.903***	<0.001	Positive	
A-levels	0.973***	<0.001	Positive	
O-levels or equivalent	0.332***	0.002	Positive	
CSE or equivalent	0.027	0.858	Non-significant	
Foreign or other	1.747***	<0.001	Positive	
Managerial/Professional	0.504***	<0.001	Positive	Managerial/professional and intermediate workers significantly more positive than routine workers. Small employers and lower supervisory/technical not significantly different than routine workers
Intermediate	0.231**	0.024	Positive	
Small employers	0.029	0.824	Non-significant	
Lower supervisory/technical	-0.109	0.378	Non-significant	
Constant	3.653***	<0.001		
N	7726			
R ²	0.186			
F (24, 7682)	66.02	<0.001		

Table A.3: Attitudes towards economic benefits of immigration by whether the respondent has a religious affiliation and attends a place of worship frequently, or affiliates but does not attend, compared with no religion. Base category: male, Baby Boom generation member, not married or partnered, English, White, has no religious affiliation, has no qualifications, has routine occupation. Results of linear regression analysis. Source: BSA 2011, 2013, 2015 and authors' analyses.

Would you say it is generally bad or good for Britain's economy that migrants come to Britain from other countries? Analysis by religious affiliation and frequency of religious attendance. 2011, 2013, 2015 data.

Variable	Coefficient	p-value	Direction of effects	Interpretation
Female	-0.389***	<0.001	Negative	Women feel less positive on average than men
Pre-war	0.079	0.387	Non-significant	Generation Y more positive than Baby Boomers, albeit at the borders of significance
Generation X	-0.059	0.456	Non-significant	
Generation Y	0.173*	0.061	Positive	
Married/partnered	-0.016	0.801	Non-significant	No effect of partnership status
Scotland	0.332***	0.002	Positive	Significant differences between Scotland and England, and Wales and England
Wales	-0.586***	<0.001	Negative	
Black	1.777***	<0.001	Positive	
Indian	0.781***	0.002	Positive	All groups more positive than Whites, except for the combined Pakistani/Bangladeshi group
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	-0.450	0.256	Non-significant	
Chinese/Other Asian	0.889***	0.002	Positive	
Mixed/Other	0.631***	0.007	Positive	
Christian	-0.047	0.514	Non-significant	No significant difference between Christians and unaffiliated, Jewish and unaffiliated, members of other religions and unaffiliated. Muslims significantly more positive
Jewish	0.502	0.292	Non-significant	
Muslim	0.629**	0.026	Positive	
Other religion	0.018	0.935	Non-significant	
Attends church at least monthly	0.401***	<0.001	Positive	Church attenders are more positive than non-attenders
Degree	2.161***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for the more educated groups compared with having no qualifications (except for CSE or equivalent group)
Higher education below degree	0.908***	<0.001	Positive	
A-levels	0.977***	<0.001	Positive	
O-levels or equivalent	0.344***	0.002	Positive	
CSE or equivalent	0.027	0.865	Non-significant	
Foreign or other	1.759***	<0.001	Positive	Managerial/professional and intermediate workers significantly more positive than routine workers. Small employers, lower supervisory/technical not significantly different
Managerial/Professional	0.509***	<0.001	Positive	
Intermediate	0.238**	0.020	Positive	
Small employers	0.036	0.782	Non-significant	
Lower supervisory/technical	-0.103	0.407	Non-significant	
Constant	3.650	<0.001		
N	7726			
R ²	0.187			
F (27, 7698)	59.14	<0.001		

Table A.4: Attitudes towards economic benefits of immigration by respondent's religious affiliation (broad definition) and whether they attend a place of worship frequently. Base category: male, Baby Boom generation member, not married or partnered, English, White, has no religious affiliation, has no qualifications, has routine occupation. Results of linear regression analysis. Source: BSA 2011, 2013, 2015 and authors' analyses.

Would you say that Britain's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by migrants coming to live here from other countries? Analysis by threefold religious type. 2011, 2013, 2015 data.

Variable	Coefficient	p-value	Direction of effects	Interpretation
Female	-0.144**	0.034	Negative	Women feel less positive on average than men
Pre-war	-0.045	0.630	Non-significant	Generation Y more positive than Baby Boomers; no other generational effects
Generation X	0.047	0.577	Non-significant	
Generation Y	0.261***	0.008	Positive	
Married/partnered	-0.179***	0.010	Negative	Partnered less positive than the unpartnered
Scotland	0.387***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences between Scotland and England, and Wales and England
Wales	-0.814***	<0.001	Negative	
Black	1.522***	<0.001	Positive	
Indian	1.153***	<0.001	Positive	
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	1.215***	<0.001	Positive	All groups more positive than Whites
Chinese/Other Asian	0.819***	0.001	Positive	
Mixed/Other	1.092***	<0.001	Positive	
Has affiliation, attends	0.173*	0.084	Positive	The affiliated who attend frequently are significantly more positive than the unreligious at the 10 per cent level of significance.
Has affiliation, does not attend	-0.242***	0.001	Negative	Religiously-affiliated who do not attend significantly more negative than the unreligious
Degree	2.254***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for the more educated groups compared with having no qualifications (except for CSE or equivalent group)
Higher education below degree	0.994***	<0.001	Positive	
A-levels	1.051***	<0.001	Positive	
O-levels or equivalent	0.302***	0.007	Positive	
CSE or equivalent	-0.021	0.895	Non-significant	
Foreign or other	1.591***	<0.001	Positive	
Managerial/Professional	0.516***	<0.001	Positive	Managerial/professional and intermediate workers significantly more positive than routine workers. Small employers not significantly different than routine workers. Lower supervisor/technical more negative than routine workers
Intermediate	0.309***	0.005	Positive	
Small employers	0.052	0.702	Non-significant	
Lower supervisory/technical	-0.258**	0.048	Negative	
Constant	3.574***	<0.001		
N	7713			
R ²	0.187			
F (24, 7688)	63.69			

Table A.5: Attitudes towards cultural benefits of immigration by whether the respondent has a religious affiliation and attends a place of worship frequently. Base category: male, Baby Boom generation member, not married or partnered, English, White, has no religious affiliation, has no qualifications, has routine occupation. Results of linear regression analysis. Source: BSA 2011, 2013, 2015 and authors' analyses.

Would you say that Britain’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by migrants coming to live here from other countries? Analysis by religious affiliation and frequency of religious attendance. 2011, 2013, 2015 data.

Variable	Coefficient	p-value	Direction of effects	Interpretation
Female	-0.141**	0.039	Negative	Women feel less positive on average than men
Pre-war	-0.032	0.729	Non-significant	Generation Y more positive than Baby Boomers; no other generational effects
Generation X	0.036	0.666	Non-significant	
Generation Y	0.256**	0.010	Positive	
Married/partnered	-0.187***	0.007	Negative	Partnered less positive than the unpartnered
Scotland	0.396***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences between Scotland and England, and Wales and England
Wales	-0.812***	<0.001	Negative	
Black	1.475***	<0.001	Positive	
Indian	1.021***	<0.001	Positive	All groups more positive than Whites; Pakistanis/Bangladeshis at borders of significance
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	0.651*	0.088	Positive	
Chinese/Other Asian	0.721***	0.006	Positive	
Mixed/Other	0.989***	<0.001	Positive	
Christian	-0.276***	<0.001	Negative	
Jewish	0.932**	0.044	Positive	Christians more negative than the unaffiliated; Jewish more positive; Muslims and members of other religions show no significant difference compared with the unaffiliated
Muslim	0.349	0.251	Non-significant	
Other religion	-0.142	0.529	Non-significant	
Attends church at least monthly	0.410***	<0.001	Positive	Church attenders are more positive than non-attenders
Degree	2.255***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for the more educated groups compared with having no qualifications (except for CSE or equivalent group)
Higher education below degree	0.997***	<0.001	Positive	
A-levels	1.053***	<0.001	Positive	
O-levels or equivalent	0.314***	0.005	Positive	
CSE or equivalent	-0.027	0.861	Non-significant	
Foreign or other	1.602***	<0.001	Positive	Managerial/professional and intermediate workers significantly more positive than routine workers. Small employers not significantly different than routine workers. Lower supervisor/technical more negative than routine
Managerial/Professional	0.515***	<0.001	Positive	
Intermediate	0.312***	0.005	Positive	
Small employers	0.055	0.684	Non-significant	
Lower supervisory/technical	-0.254*	0.052	Negative	
Constant	3.574	<0.001		
N	7713			
R ²	0.189			
F (27, 7685)	57.18	<0.001		

Table A.6: Attitudes towards cultural benefits of immigration by respondent’s religious affiliation (broad definition) and whether they attend a place of worship frequently. Base category: male, Baby Boom generation member, not married or partnered, English, White, has no religious affiliation, does not attend a place of worship at least monthly, has no qualifications, has routine occupation. Results of linear regression analysis. Source: BSA 2011, 2013, 2015 and authors’ analyses.

Should asylum seekers escaping persecution be able to stay in Britain? Analysis by threefold religious type. 2011, 2013 data.

Variable	Log odds	p-value	Direction of effects	Interpretation
Female	0.054	0.349	Non-significant	No gender effects
Pre-war	-0.118	0.149	Non-significant	
Generation X	-0.139**	0.045	Negative	Negative Generation X effect
Generation Y	-0.083	0.337	Non-significant	
Married/partnered	-0.119**	0.042	Negative	Partnered less supportive than the unpartnered
Scotland	0.155	0.113	Non-significant	No significant difference between Scotland and England, and Wales and England
Wales	-0.113	0.346	Non-significant	
Black	1.073***	<0.001	Positive	Black and Mixed/Other respondents significantly more positive than Whites towards asylum seekers (Mixed/Other at border of significance).
Indian	-0.203	0.342	Non-significant	
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	-0.002	0.994	Non-significant	
Chinese/Other Asian	-0.473**	0.047	Negative	Chinese/Other Asian significantly less supportive. South Asians not significantly different than Whites
Mixed/Other	0.413**	0.047	Positive	
Has affiliation, attends	0.371***	<0.001	Positive	Church attenders are more positive than the unreligious; no significant difference between 'religious in name only' and unreligious
Has affiliation, does not attend	-0.102	0.115	Non-significant	
Degree	1.305***	<0.001	Positive	
Higher education below degree	0.503***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for the all groups compared with having no qualifications, except for those with CSE or equivalent
A-levels	0.637***	<0.001	Positive	
O-levels or equivalent	0.316***	0.001	Positive	
CSE or equivalent	0.097	0.476	Non-significant	
Foreign or other	1.212***	<0.001	Positive	
Managerial/Professional	0.350***	<0.001	Positive	Managerial/professional and intermediate workers significantly more positive than routine workers. Small employers and lower supervisory/technical not significantly different than routine workers
Intermediate	0.232***	0.009	Positive	
Small employers	0.133	0.244	Non-significant	
Lower supervisory/technical	-0.104	0.338	Non-significant	
Threshold 1	-1.891			
Threshold 2	-0.296			
Threshold 3	0.771			
Threshold 4	3.137			
N	5659			
Pseudo R ²	0.042			
Wald χ^2 (df = 24)	563.34	< 0.001		

Table A.7: Attitudes to accommodation of asylum seekers by whether the respondent has a religious affiliation and attends a place of worship frequently, or affiliates but does not attend, compared with no religion. Base category: male, Baby Boom generation member, not married or partnered, English, White, has no religious affiliation, has no qualifications, has routine occupation. Results of ordinal regression analysis. Source: BSA 2011, 2013 and authors' analyses.

Should asylum seekers escaping persecution be able to stay in Britain? Analysis by religious affiliation and frequency of religious attendance. 2011, 2013 data.

Variable	Log odds	p-value	Direction of effects	Interpretation
Female	0.053	0.363	Non-significant	No gender effects
Pre-war	-0.121	0.139	Non-significant	Negative Generation X effect
Generation X	-0.148**	0.034	Negative	
Generation Y	-0.083	0.338	Non-significant	
Married/partnered	-0.125**	0.033	Negative	Partnered less supportive than the unpartnered
Scotland	0.161	0.101	Non-significant	No significant difference between Scotland and England, and Wales and England
Wales	-0.106	0.375	Non-significant	
Black	1.083***	<0.001	Positive	Black respondents more positive than Whites; Mixed/Other also more positive (borderline significance). Chinese/Other Asian less supportive (borderline significance). South Asians not significantly different than Whites
Indian	-0.093	0.693	Non-significant	
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	-0.103	0.775	Non-significant	
Chinese/Other Asian	-0.447*	0.076	Negative	No significant difference between Christians and unaffiliated; Jewish and unaffiliated; Muslims and unaffiliated. Members of other religions less supportive (borderline significance)
Mixed/Other	0.400*	0.056	Positive	
Christian	-0.095	0.149	Non-significant	Church attenders are more positive than non-attenders
Jewish	0.308	0.288	Non-significant	
Muslim	0.009	0.972	Non-significant	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for the all groups compared with having no qualifications, except for those with CSE or equivalent
Other religion	-0.300*	0.084	Negative	
Attends church at least monthly	0.476***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for the all groups compared with having no qualifications, except for those with CSE or equivalent
Degree	1.305***	<0.001	Positive	
Higher education below degree	0.506***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for the all groups compared with having no qualifications, except for those with CSE or equivalent
A-levels	0.638***	<0.001	Positive	
O-levels or equivalent	0.322***	<0.001	Positive	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for the all groups compared with having no qualifications, except for those with CSE or equivalent
CSE or equivalent	0.105	0.441	Non-significant	
Foreign or other	1.222***	<0.001	Positive	Managerial/professional and intermediate workers significantly more positive than routine workers. Small employers and lower supervisory/technical not significantly different than routine workers
Managerial/Professional	0.354***	<0.001	Positive	
Intermediate	0.237***	0.007	Positive	
Small employers	0.130	0.257	Non-significant	Managerial/professional and intermediate workers significantly more positive than routine workers. Small employers and lower supervisory/technical not significantly different than routine workers
Lower supervisory/technical	-0.103	0.346	Non-significant	
Threshold 1	-1.891			
Threshold 2	-0.295			
Threshold 3	0.773			
Threshold 4	3.140			
N	5659			
Pseudo R ²	0.043			
Wald χ^2 (df = 27)	566.84	< 0.001		

Table A.8: Attitudes to accommodation of asylum seekers by respondent's religious affiliation (broad definition) and whether they attend a place of worship frequently. Base category: male, Baby Boom generation member, not married or partnered, English, White, has no religious affiliation, does not attend a place of worship at least monthly, has no qualifications, has routine occupation. Results of ordinal regression analysis. Source: BSA 2011, 2013 and authors' analyses.

Does the respondent perceive immigration to be an issue of concern or worry? Analysis by threefold religious type. 2016 data.

Variable	Coefficient	p-value	Direction of effects	Interpretation
Female	-0.228**	0.019	Negative	Women less likely to select immigration as an issue
Pre-war	0.063	0.635	Non-significant	Generations X and Y less likely to identify immigration as area of concern than Baby Boomers; Pre-war generation not significantly different
Generation X	-0.327***	0.008	Negative	
Generation Y	-0.427***	0.001	Negative	
Married/partnered	0.286***	0.004	Positive	Partnered more likely to identify immigration as area of concern than the unpartnered
Scotland	-0.849***	<0.001	Negative	Scottish and Welsh respondents significantly less likely to identify immigration as area of concern than English
Wales	-0.346*	0.098	Negative	
Black	-0.682*	0.078	Negative	Black respondents significantly less likely to select immigration as issue of concern, otherwise no significant difference between White respondents and other ethnic groups
Indian	0.102	0.807	Non-significant	
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	-0.200	0.716	Non-significant	
Chinese/Other Asian	-0.458	0.325	Non-significant	
Mixed/Other	-0.081	0.819	Non-significant	
Has religious affiliation, attends at least monthly	0.109	0.457	Non-significant	'Religious in name only' significantly more likely than non-adherents to identify immigration as an area of concern. Adherents who report attending at least monthly not significantly different
Has religious affiliation, does not attend	0.386***	<0.001	Positive	
Degree	-0.654***	<0.001	Negative	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for graduates (less concerned about immigration) and those with O-levels or equivalent (more concerned) compared with having no qualifications. Those with other qualifications not significantly different than the unqualified
Higher education below degree	0.014	0.941	Non-significant	
A-levels	-0.036	0.831	Non-significant	
O-levels or equivalent	0.392**	0.011	Positive	
CSE or equivalent	0.274	0.149	Non-significant	
Foreign or other	-0.401	0.233	Non-significant	
Managerial/Professional	-0.365***	0.007	Non-significant	Those in managerial/professional occupations significantly less likely than if in routine occupations to identify immigration as issue of concern. No significant differences between those with routine occupations and members of other occupational groups
Intermediate	-0.184	0.264	Non-significant	
Small employers	-0.026	0.879	Non-significant	
Lower supervisory/technical	-0.215	0.232	Non-significant	
Constant	-0.183	0.388		
N	2807			
Pseudo-R ²	0.062			
Likelihood ratio test: $\chi^2(24)$	164.76	(p < 0.001)		

Table A.9: Reporting that immigration is an area of concern (vs not choosing it as an area of concern) by whether respondent has an affiliation and attends a place of worship at least monthly, an affiliation but does not attend, versus neither, plus socio-demographic controls. Base category: male, Baby Boom generation member, not married or partnered, English, White, has no religious affiliation, has no qualifications, has routine occupation. Results of logistic regression analysis. Survey weights applied. British Social Attitudes Survey 2016.

Does the respondent perceive immigration to be an issue of concern or worry? Analysis by religious affiliation and frequency of religious attendance. 2016 data.

Variable	Coefficient	p-value	Direction of effects	Interpretation
Female	-0.111	0.303	Non-significant	No significant gender effects
Pre-war	0.068	0.628	Non-significant	Generations X and Y less likely to identify immigration as area of concern than Baby Boomers; Pre-war generation not significantly different
Generation X	-0.309**	0.026	Negative	
Generation Y	-0.352**	0.024	Negative	
Married/partnered	0.317***	0.004	Positive	Partnered more likely to identify immigration as area of concern than the unpartnered
Scotland	-0.858***	<0.001	Negative	Scottish respondents significantly less likely to identify immigration as area of concern than English; Welsh not significantly different
Wales	-0.301	0.187	Non-significant	
Black	-0.629	0.109	Non-significant	No significant difference between White respondents and other ethnic groups at least in this dataset for this measure of immigration concern
Indian	-0.041	0.933	Non-significant	
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	-0.384	0.544	Non-significant	
Chinese/Other Asian	-0.487	0.339	Non-significant	
Mixed/Other	0.160	0.653	Non-significant	
Anglican	0.350**	0.015	Positive	Anglicans more likely to identify immigration as area of concern than the unaffiliated. Members of other religious groups not significantly different
Catholic	0.287	0.138	Non-significant	
Other Christian	0.201	0.192	Non-significant	
Other Religion	0.501	0.146	Non-significant	
Attends church at least weekly	-0.425**	0.023	Negative	Weekly church attenders less likely to identify immigration as area of concern than non-attenders. Less frequent attenders not significantly different from non-attenders
Attends church fortnightly/monthly	-0.205	0.322	Non-significant	
Attends church at least annually	-0.144	0.391	Non-significant	
Attends church less often	-0.291	0.201	Non-significant	
Attendance varies too much to say	-0.090	0.811	Non-significant	
Degree	-0.612***	0.002	Negative	Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for graduates (less concerned about immigration) and those with O-levels, CSEs or equivalent (more concerned) compared with having no qualifications. Those with other qualifications not significantly different than the unqualified
Higher education below degree	-0.131	0.511	Non-significant	
A-levels	-0.117	0.529	Non-significant	
O-levels or equivalent	0.376**	0.025	Positive	
CSE or equivalent	0.376*	0.073	Positive	
Foreign or other	-0.387	0.265	Non-significant	No significant differences between those with routine occupations and members of other occupational groups
Managerial/Professional	-0.228	0.128	Non-significant	
Intermediate	-0.196	0.282	Non-significant	
Small employers	-0.170	0.363	Non-significant	
Lower supervisory/technical	-0.140	0.484	Non-significant	
Constant	-0.276	0.243		
N	2256			

Pseudo-R ²	0.055
Likelihood ratio test:	117.97 ($p < 0.001$)
$\chi^2(32)$	

Table A.10: Reporting that immigration is an area of concern (vs not choosing it as an area of concern) by respondent's religious affiliation (broad definition) and frequency of attendance at a place of worship. Base category: male, Baby Boom generation member, not married or partnered, English, White, has no religious affiliation, never attends a place of worship, has no qualifications, has routine occupation. Results of logistic regression analysis. Survey weights applied. British Social Attitudes Survey 2016.

Respondent's self-placement on 0-10 scale of agreement that the UK should allow many more immigrants to come to the UK, by religious affiliation and frequency of attendance at a place of worship. 2016 and 2017 data.

Variable	Immigration Attitudes Wave 8 May-June 2016 Coefficient	p-value	Direction of effects	Immigration Attitudes Wave 11 April-May 2017 Coefficient	p-value	Direction of effects	Interpretation
Female	-0.127**	0.020	Negative	-0.114**	0.035	Negative	<i>Women give a lower score on average</i>
Pre-war Generation X	-0.154*	0.093	Negative	-0.156*	0.087	Negative	<i>Pre-war more restrictive than Boomers; Generation X not significantly different</i>
Generation Y	0.784***	<0.001	Positive	0.752***	<0.001	Positive	<i>Generation Y members support more permissive immigration policies on average</i>
Married/partnered	-0.069	0.218	Non-significant	-0.081	0.145	Non-significant	<i>Partnered not significantly different to unpartnered</i>
Scotland	0.779***	<0.001	Positive	0.900***	<0.001	Positive	<i>Scottish and Welsh respondents score significantly higher on agreement scale than English</i>
Wales	0.379***	<0.001	Positive	0.335***	0.001	Positive	
Black	0.582***	0.005	Positive	0.496**	0.017	Positive	<i>Black and Pakistani/Bangladeshi respondents significantly more supportive of higher immigration numbers than White respondents</i>
Indian	-0.495	0.126	Non-significant	-0.336	0.293	Non-significant	<i>Indian respondents are not significantly different from Whites in both waves</i>
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	2.172***	<0.001	Positive	2.243***	<0.001	Positive	<i>Indian respondents are not significantly different from Whites in both waves</i>
Chinese/Other Asian	0.216	0.456	Non-significant	0.643**	0.025	Positive	
Mixed/Other	0.380**	0.035	Positive	0.222	0.211	Non-significant	<i>Whites in both. Chinese/Other Asian significantly more supportive in Wave 11; Mixed/Other significantly more supportive in Wave 8 only</i>
Anglican	-0.766***	<0.001	Negative	-0.746***	<0.001	Negative	<i>Anglicans, Catholics, Church of Scotland adherents, Other Christians, Muslims, and adherents of 'other religions' more negative on average in both waves than those without a religious affiliation with regard to immigration numbers</i>
Roman Catholic	-0.480***	<0.001	Negative	-0.352***	0.001	Negative	
Church of Scotland	-0.772***	<0.001	Negative	-0.538***	0.001	Negative	
Methodist	-0.228	0.167	Non-significant	-0.540***	0.001	Negative	
Baptist	0.165	0.489	Non-significant	-0.148	0.530	Non-significant	
United Reformed Church	-0.900*	0.054	Negative	-0.486	0.293	Non-significant	
Other Christian	-0.769**	0.040	Negative	-0.878**	0.018	Negative	<i>URC members more negative in Wave 8</i>

Judaism	0.444	0.133	Non-significant	0.455	0.120	Non-significant	<i>only; Methodists significantly more negative in Wave 11 only. No significant difference between Baptists and non-adherents, and 'other non-Christian' and Jews and non-adherents in both waves.</i>
Other Non-Christian	0.383	0.232	Non-significant	0.026	0.934	Non-significant	
Islam	-0.920**	0.019	Negative	-1.170***	0.003	Negative	
Other Religion	-0.369**	0.014	Negative	-0.458***	0.002	Negative	
Attends less than once a year	0.185	0.101	Non-significant	0.067	0.551	Non-significant	<i>Those attending church at least once a year or more often significantly more supportive of higher immigration numbers than those who never attend across both waves. Those attending less than annually not significantly different from non-attenders.</i>
Attends at least once a year	0.366***	0.007	Positive	0.282**	0.037	Positive	
Attends at least twice a year	0.309**	0.019	Positive	0.244*	0.060	Positive	
Attends at least once a month	0.600***	<0.001	Positive	0.369**	0.027	Positive	
Attends at least once a fortnight	0.674***	0.001	Positive	0.744***	<0.001	Positive	
Attends weekly or more often	0.831***	<0.001	Positive	0.680***	<0.001	Positive	
GCSE G-D	0.027	0.850	Non-significant	0.089	0.528	Non-significant	
GCSE A*-C	0.202**	0.047	Positive	0.090	0.370	Non-significant	<i>Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for those with A-levels, Bachelors or postgraduate degrees compared with the unqualified. Those with GCSEs at grades D-G not significantly different from unqualified in either wave. Those with GCSEs at grades A*-C significantly more supportive of higher immigration numbers in Wave 8 but not Wave 11.</i>
A-level qualifications	0.973***	<0.001	Positive	0.807***	<0.001	Positive	
Undergraduate degree	1.753***	<0.001	Positive	1.587***	<0.001	Positive	
Postgraduate degree	2.652***	<0.001	Positive	2.331***	<0.001	Positive	
Employers in large organisations	0.525***	0.005	Positive	0.601***	0.001	Positive	
Higher professional	0.487***	<0.001	Positive	0.654***	<0.001	Positive	<i>Those in intermediate or professional occupations, or employers in both large and small organisations, significantly more supportive of higher immigration numbers than those in routine occupations in Wave 8. No significant differences between those in routine occupations, lower supervisory or semi-routine</i>
Lower professional/managerial	0.454***	<0.001	Positive	0.580***	<0.001	Positive	
Intermediate	0.263**	0.024	Positive	0.394***	0.001	Positive	
Employers in small organisations	0.252*	0.068	Positive	0.425***	0.002	Positive	
Lower supervisory	0.059	0.682	Non-significant	0.065	0.649	Non-significant	

occupations compared with routine in Wave 8. Similar patterns in Wave 11, except differences between those in semi-routine occupations compared with routine now clearer and more supportive of higher immigration numbers on average than routine

Semi-routine	0.162	0.211	Non-significant	0.296**	0.021	Positive
Constant	1.209***	<0.001		1.511***	<0.000	
F	52.876	<0.001		49.387	<0.001	
R ²	0.196			0.185		
N	8960			8960		

Table A.11: Level of agreement that UK should allow many more immigrants to come to UK by religious affiliation and frequency of attendance at a place of worship. Base category: male, Baby Boom generation member, not married or partnered, based in England, White, has no religious affiliation, never attends a place of worship/is not religious, has no qualifications, has routine occupation. Results of multivariate multiple regression analysis. Survey weights applied. British Election Study Online Panel 2014-2018. N = 8960.

Respondent's self-placement on 0-10 scale of agreement that the UK should allow many more immigrants to come to the UK, by religious type. 2016 and 2017 data.

Variable	Immigration Attitudes Wave 8 May-June 2016 Coefficient	p-value	Direction of effects	Immigration Attitudes Wave 11 April-May 2017 Coefficient	p-value	Direction of effects	Interpretation
Female	-0.129**	0.019	Negative	-0.115**	0.035	Negative	Women give a lower score on average
Pre-war	-0.148	0.111	Non-significant	-0.144	0.117	Non-significant	Pre-war and Generation X not significantly different to Baby Boomers; Generation Y members support more permissive immigration policies on average
Generation X	0.024	0.724	Non-significant	0.067	0.319	Non-significant	
Generation Y	0.821***	<0.001	Positive	0.775***	<0.001	Positive	Partnered not significantly different to unpartnered in Wave 8; small negative effect in Wave 11
Married/partnered	-0.080	0.159	Non-significant	-0.097*	0.085	Negative	
Scotland	0.768***	<0.001	Positive	0.943***	<0.001	Positive	Scottish and Welsh respondents score significantly higher on immigration agreement scale than English in both waves
Wales	0.407***	<0.001	Positive	0.349***	0.001	Positive	
Black	0.530**	0.015	Positive	0.409*	0.058	Positive	Black and Pakistani/Bangladeshi respondents significantly more supportive of higher immigration numbers than White respondents in both waves. Indian respondents are not significantly different from Whites in both. Chinese/Other Asian significantly more supportive in Wave 11; Mixed/Other significantly more supportive in Wave 8 only
Indian	-0.132	0.649	Non-significant	-0.137	0.633	Non-significant	
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	1.964***	<0.001	Positive	1.734***	<0.001	Positive	
Chinese/Other Asian	0.281	0.295	Non-significant	0.573**	0.031	Positive	
Mixed/Other	0.362**	0.048	Positive	0.188	0.298	Non-significant	
Has religious affiliation, attends at least monthly	0.226**	0.013	Positive	0.065	0.474	Non-significant	'Religious in name only' significantly more negative than unreligious in both Waves. Actively-religious significantly more positive in Wave 8; no significant difference between actively-religious and unreligious in Wave 11
Has religious affiliation, does not attend	-0.555***	<0.001	Negative	-0.540***	0.000	Negative	
GCSE G-D	0.043	0.765	Non-significant	0.084	0.559	Non-significant	

GCSE A*-C	0.231**	0.025	Positive	0.106	0.295	Non-significant	<i>Significant differences by highest educational qualifications achieved for those with A-levels, Bachelors or postgraduate degrees compared with the unqualified. Those with GCSEs at grades D-G not significantly different from unqualified in either wave. Those with GCSEs at grades A*-C significantly more supportive of higher immigration numbers in Wave 8 but not Wave 11. Those in intermediate or professional occupations, or employers in large organisations, significantly more supportive of higher immigration numbers than those in routine occupations (both waves). No significant differences between those in routine occupations, employers in small organisations, lower supervisory or semi-routine occupations compared with routine in Wave 8. In Wave 11, differences between employers in small organisations and those in semi-routine occupations compared with routine now clearer: members of both groups more supportive of higher immigration numbers on average</i>
A-level qualifications	0.993***	<0.001	Positive	0.830***	<0.001	Positive	
Undergraduate degree	1.804***	<0.001	Positive	1.638***	<0.001	Positive	
Postgraduate degree	2.697***	<0.001	Positive	2.400***	<0.001	Positive	
Employers in large organisations	0.544***	0.004	Positive	0.574***	0.002	Positive	
Higher professional	0.478***	<0.001	Positive	0.641***	<0.001	Positive	
Lower professional/managerial	0.458***	<0.001	Positive	0.577***	<0.001	Positive	
Intermediate	0.256**	0.030	Positive	0.387***	0.001	Positive	
Employers in small organisations	0.245*	0.078	Non-significant	0.430***	0.002	Positive	
Lower supervisory	0.030	0.834	Non-significant	0.032	0.824	Non-significant	
Semi-routine	0.150	0.253	Non-significant	0.298**	0.021	Positive	
Constant	1.342***	<0.001		1.635***	<0.001		
F	77.727	<0.001		72.884	<0.001		
R ²	0.188			0.178			
N	8781			8781			

Table A.12: Level of agreement that UK should allow many more immigrants to come to UK by religiosity type. Base category: male, Baby Boom generation member, not married or partnered, based in England, White, has no religious affiliation, has no qualifications, has routine occupation. Results of multivariate multiple regression analysis. Survey weights applied. British Election Study Online Panel 2014-2018.

	Percentage of respondents	Unweighted N
Religious affiliation		
None	46.4	4225
Church of England	31.2	2686
Roman Catholic	7.7	688
Church of Scotland	3.6	422
Methodist	2.8	252
Baptist	1.3	120
United Reformed Church	0.3	31
Other Christian	0.5	44
Judaism	0.8	85
Other non-Christian	1.0	58
Islam	0.8	35
Other	3.5	314
Frequency of attendance at a place of worship		
Attends never or practically never/respondent reports that they are not religious	73.4	6509
Attends less than once a year	6.2	560
Attends at least once a year	4.1	390
Attends at least twice a year	4.5	434
Attends at least once a month	2.7	233
Attends at least once a fortnight	2.0	177
Attends weekly or more often	7.3	657

Table A.13: Descriptive Statistics for British Election Study Online Panel respondents included in our Wave 8/11 analysis by religious affiliation and frequency of attendance at a place of worship. Wave 11 weights applied. Source: British Election Study Online Panel 2014-2018.



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