When it comes to religion, the sharp fall in the ‘Christian’ population has been the big story of the 2011 census. If the 2001 results posed one problem for religious statisticians – why was the Christian figure so high? – the latest findings are just as puzzling: why has it fallen so fast?
The surge of 2001
Ten years ago, the surprise was that far more people identified themselves as Christian on the census (nearly 72%) than in various national surveys (54% in the British Social Attitudes survey). In an article published in the Journal of Contemporary Religion, Steve Bruce and I argued that the difference in England and Wales arose because
- census forms are often completed by one individual on behalf of the entire household (although we offered evidence that this factor was less influential than had been thought);
- the census religion question immediately followed the one on ethnicity and seemed to be simply a supplementary question on the same topic;
- the wording of the question (“What is your religion?”) implies that a religious identity is expected;
- the form offered a single, undifferentiated ‘Christian’ category, and would frequently have been viewed as part of a system of cultural classification;
- and finally, anxiety about immigration and political Islam led many respondents to assert their identification with the country’s Christian heritage.
The fall in 2011
This time the issue is different. Analysis of the full set of British Social Attitudes datasets since the survey began in 1983 shows that religious affiliation is remarkably stable, on average, over the adult life course. Many individuals gain or lose a religious identity (or being little concerned about such matters, vacillate in what they report), but very little aggregate change is found within any given generation. The overall decline in religious identification is not the product of individuals defecting to no religion, but rather of elderly Christians being replaced in the population by young people who are – and remain – less religious.
That being so, it was natural to expect a similar stability in the census returns. Of course the Christian percentage was bound to drop somewhat both because of cohort replacement and as a result of growth in the Muslim and other minority populations, but there was little reason to think that people who called themselves ‘Christian’ in 2001 would not do so again in 2011.
In the event, the outcome has been very different. The total population of England and Wales has gone up by four million, but the number of self-described Christians has gone down by the same amount. The Christian percentage has fallen, according to the census, from 71.7% to 59.3% between 2001 and 2011. A decline of that magnitude can only occur if some people have decided that they don’t have a religion after all.
How many such people are there? We’ll have a much better idea when the cross-tabulations by age, ethnicity and so on are available in the spring. In due course it will even be possible to estimate the figure directly (and very accurately) using the Longitudinal Survey, which links records from successive censuses for a sample of the population. In the meantime, here is a conservative estimate based on the statistics currently available.
The relative decline in Christian affiliation is the product of three factors: replacement, dilution and defection. Old people who in overwhelming majority have a religious identity are replaced in the population by a new generation that does not. Even if there were no absolute losses, the Christian proportion would decline as the number of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and others rises. Once we account for these two factors, we can estimate the amount of drift into no religion.
Cohort replacement
We know from vital statistics that some 5,122,500 deaths were recorded in England and Wales between the two census dates. We could use life tables to distribute those deaths by age, but for present purposes we can be content with a more straightforward procedure: we will simply assume that the oldest people are those who died. Excluding about 97,200 non-Christians, 87% of the most elderly group called themselves Christian. Based on the trajectory of generational decline in the figures from 2001, only 56% of their replacements in the population will be Christian, even omitting people of other faiths. In a stationary population, we could thereby project that the absolute number of Christians would fall by one and a half million, and their share would drop from 72% to 69%.
Dilution from growth in other religions
As we know, however, the population is growing, and 42% of that growth has been in the non-Christian population. Once the additional Muslims, Hindus and so on are considered, there are still 2,320,000 more people in the country at the end than at the beginning of the period. The challenge is to decide what assumptions to make about their religious identities. A large proportion will be Africans and Eastern Europeans, large majorities of whom choose the Christian option. For the moment I propose simply to apply the 2001 value (with people of other faiths omitted, 76% were Christian) to the 2011 population boost. The net effect of growth is to dilute the Christian share to 67%. At the same time, however, the projected number of Christians is in excess of 37.5 million, slightly higher than in 2001.
Defection
As shown above, much of the change in the Christian share of the population is the result of natural causes: the death of elderly Christians and their replacement by young people who have no religion, and a continuing growth of non-Christian groups through immigration and natural increase. Using very generous assumptions about the amount of change produced by cohort replacement, and relatively conservative assumptions about growth through immigration, we have managed to explain about 40% of the fall in the Christian percentage of the population. Nevertheless the calculations would not have led us to expect a drop in the Christian headcount between 2001 and 2011.
I estimate that about 4,300,000 people in England and Wales were identified as Christian in 2001 and as having no religion in 2011. (To be more accurate, this value gives the net change: it is very likely that many people called themselves Christian in 2011 having not done so in 2001, and hence the actual number going the other way would be correspondingly larger.) This figure is 13% of the total number of 2001 Christians who were still alive in 2011.
The analysis underlines the remarkable amount of change that has occurred in the relatively short period between the last two censuses. Nearly a quarter of the people who called themselves Christian in 2001 no longer appear in that column, casualties of old age or disaffiliation. Many of them have been replaced via natural increase and immigration, but the situation is intriguingly fluid.
What happened to the Christians?
The 72% figure was never a good indication of the religious state of the nation, and likewise the 12.5 percentage point fall between 2001 and 2011 is unlikely to be evidence of a previously unnoticed shift towards secularity. The census findings are somewhat better aligned than before with national survey data, though for the reasons mentioned at the outset the Christian share is still on the high side. Why the proportion has dropped by so much, though, is a question that is likely to occupy us for some time to come.
David Voas is Professor of Population Studies at the Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex, and co-Director of British Religion in Numbers.
Surveyitis and Other News
Today’s digest of religious statistical news highlights a thought-provoking blog about ‘surveyitis’ by the Director of the AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society programme, as well as headline findings from two actual surveys, among evangelicals and adult learners.
A bad case of surveyitis
In our last post, on 4 December, we briefly anticipated the publication of Professor Linda Woodhead’s blog inspired by the recent Theos report, Post-Religious Britain? The Faith of the Faithless. This blog was published on The Guardian’s Comment is Free website on 5 December under the heading ‘Surveying Religious Belief Needs Social Science Not Hard Science’. In it Professor Woodhead provides some salutary advice on the difficulties of measuring public opinion in relation to religion, which she characterizes as an ever-changing and often also a vague and contested area. She particularly counsels against ‘surveyitis’, ‘a disease that afflicts people who stay indoors too long poring over data’, and whose ‘symptoms include credulity about the accuracy of survey responses and morbid attachment to outdated questions’, the latter ‘working with zombie categories’. She detects ‘a new outbreak of surveyitis’ occasioned by an upsurge of interest in ‘nones’, people who do not identify with or practice religion. She emphasizes ‘doubt, subtlety, uncertainty and cognitive modesty’, in contrast to the idea of ‘a fantasy rational man with clear and distinct ideas’ who ‘lurks behind many survey designs’. The blog can be read at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2012/dec/05/nones-on-the-run-religion
Evangelicals living the Christian life
Three-quarters (76%) of lay evangelicals have been Christians for more than twenty years, with an average of twenty-two years, ‘reflecting, perhaps, a lack of priority in evangelism’. Indeed, evangelism is only seen as the fourth most important (of six) key dimensions of church life. Stability is also suggested by the fact that two-fifths have never attended any other than their existing place of worship. Notwithstanding, the overwhelming majority of lay evangelicals consider that their faith has grown during the past year, the principal reasons for such growth being the fellowship and teaching (in services) of their church and house groups. The Bible is also deemed a significant influence, not just for faith development but in shaping attitudes to family and world; this is especially true of the over-40s. Prayer is widespread, 71% of these laity praying every day and a further 22% several times a week. However, they rather struggle with the concept of Christlikeness, which is typically expressed in terms of kindness, while 54% have a concern that ‘becoming more Christlike will increasingly alienate Christians from the culture around them’.
Source: Surveys undertaken by Brierley Consultancy in 2012 among 1,999 English evangelicals from three groups: a) churchgoers in seven congregations (three Anglican, one Baptist, three Independent); b) laity answering advertisements in Christian newspapers and magazines (and thus self-selecting); c) ministers from a range of denominations. The research was commissioned by the Langham Partnership (UK and Ireland), whose purpose is ‘to help churches grow in maturity or simple Christlikeness’, and which is running the ‘9-a-day: Becoming Like Jesus’ campaign in January-July 2013 ‘to encourage Christians in that transformative process’. A summary of the study (which BRIN found rather confusingly presented) appears in the 16-page pamphlet Living the Christian Life: Becoming Like Jesus (Tonbridge: ADBC Publishers, 2012). This can be obtained (for £2, inclusive of postage) from Brierley Consultancy, The Old Post Office, 1 Thorpe Avenue, Tonbridge, Kent, TN10 4PW, email peter@brierleyres.com. Also available for purchase from the same source are detailed reports of the research among laity in the seven participating congregations (Vol. 1) and the ministers (Vol. 2), priced £7.50 each. Cheques should be made payable to Peter Brierley.
Religion and belief in adult learning
Just over one-half (53%) of adult learners at further education colleges in England consider themselves to have a religion, a further 10% say that they have some form of non-religious belief (agnosticism, atheism, humanism, and spiritualism being most often mentioned), while 37% have neither. Students with religion are disproportionately to be found among the over-25s, women and ethnic minorities. Of those reporting a religion, 57% are Christian and 27% Muslim, and 53% claim actively to practise their religion. Within the learning environment 56% are fully or partially open about their religion or belief, typically through the expression of their opinions or the wearing (by 22%) of some form of religious dress or symbol. Although religion and/or belief are not widely seen as barriers to learning opportunities, 11% of adult learners with religious beliefs report that they have experienced bullying or harassment due to their religion and 4% due to their beliefs. This compares with 11% of those with non-religious beliefs who have been victims of bullying or harassment on account of their beliefs and 5% of those without any religion or belief. Fewer than one-third of victims have notified somebody in the learning environment about their experience of bullying or harassment. One-quarter of all adult learners state that they have had positive learning outcomes as a result of their religion or belief, rising to 35% of those with a religion.
Source: Survey of a self-selecting sample of 1,139 adult learners aged 19 and over (with 49% aged 19-29) attending further education colleges in England who completed an online questionnaire between 16 February and 11 May 2012. Women (63%) were overrepresented by 6% relative to the adult learning sector as a whole. The study was undertaken by Babcock Research on behalf of the Skills Funding Agency, with take-up of the survey being promoted by further education providers. It is reported in Donna James, Clare Lambley and Kay Turner, Religion and Belief in Adult Learning: Learner Views (Coventry: Skills Funding Agency, 2012), which is freely available at:
http://readingroom.skillsfundingagency.bis.gov.uk/sfa/Religion_and_Belief_report.pdf