Stephen Bullivant on contemporary Catholicism

Posted on June 28, 2016 by Siobhan McAndrew

It was a great pleasure to see the launch of Stephen Bullivant’s report, ‘Contemporary Catholicism in England and Wales‘, at the House of Commons on 24 May 2016. I first heard of Stephen’s interest in a data-driven approach to the question of Catholic vitality in 2013, when the British Academy issued a call for currently practising academics to expand their skillset by learning quantitative methods. Stephen was successful both in being awarded a British Academy Quantitative Skills Acquisition Award and also in thereafter becoming a quantitatively-proficient sociologist with quite alarming ease.

It’s wonderful to see Stephen’s progress as a quantitative sociologist, having begun his academic life in philosophy and theology, and a tribute both to the BA scheme and his own commitment to enriching both conceptual and empirical frameworks for understanding contemporary religiosity. He visited the BRIN team at Manchester, and attended some classes and pointers, but ultimately needed little formal training. So it’s very encouraging to see the resulting contributions to both academic and public debate in this fashion.

Having read the report with great interest, we next need to probe further the drivers of change in contemporary Catholicism. The report presents an array of estimates of the Catholic community in Britain, and one of the clearest findings is that, while those raised Catholic are more likely to ‘stick’ than those raised Anglican, a very large proportion of those raised Catholic still leave the faith. So, why has lapsation occurred?

CC-Bullivant-Figure-3

 

 

 

 

 

A good deal of work shows that the drift away from religion in Western societies is generational in nature: those born in the 1930s who stayed religious tended to see that about half their children born in the 1950s and 60s retained religion, and in turn they saw about half their children retain religion. We also have witnessed fairly high rates of immigration from quite religious societies, which has provided a countervailing trend. And there are some people whose families have been secular for generations. So in that regard, many people in Britain have a religious background, with links to faith communities via parents and grandparents; a significant but small minority is highly religious; and another significant minority is highly secular.

But what of the Catholic community in particular? For some separate research Stephen and I are hoping to take forward, the Nuffield Foundation funded some work to digitise and re-analyse a random sample survey of young people in the 1950s, where young Catholics, mostly Irish but sometimes Polish, Italian, or Afro-Caribbean, were well-represented. This was large enough to allow detailed analysis of religiosity and lapsation among a critical social generation.

From this we have found that for young English people as a whole, attending church less often over the course of their adolescence was predicted by:

  • Being in work rather than in school;
  • Being married; and
  • Having more to do on a Sunday.

We also see that those who reported no religious affiliation were more likely to be members of political associations, which suggests that some exchanged religious identities for political identities.

Among Catholics, however, of those who attended church less often in their later teens and early 20s than they had in childhood, very little predicted lapsation except not being a member of a social club or other association. Perhaps lapsation can be understood by the rise of the consumer society, and personal independence, through work or marriage. Some of it therefore may be down to value shifts, from values stressing conformity to those stressing personal choice.

Catholics were, however, less likely to drop their attendance compared with Anglicans and others, backing up Stephen’s finding that religious retention is relatively good. We don’t know why there is this difference yet. My suspicion is that doctrine is not the major factor – and that it is that it is something to do with the family and community environment, and moral socialisation in the family rather than the appeal of church services themselves, or doctrinal questions. Catholics were more recent immigrants in the 1950s and 60s, and there was community and parental pressure to attend.

We do see generational change in the young ethnic minority British too, in the present day – in the wider Christian, Hindu and Muslim communities. Those who are second generation British rather than first show slight shifts in communal practice such as mosque attendance, and clearer shifts in private prayer.

The strong showing which Stephen reports here of ethnic minority Catholics in terms of attendance is not a surprise – we know from a great deal of US work, and some British work, that religious communities are important for immigrants and people of immigrant origin because, as termed by Hirschman, they provide refuge, respect, and resources.

These are just some questions which we could probe further. Others relate to the importance of education for religiosity. The sociologist Sarah King-Hele analysed the BSA for 1983-2008 and distinguished different social generations, from those born in the 1910s to those born in the 1970s. She found as follows:

  • Most changes in attendance could be explained by generational change rather than the wider climate making those already practising less religious.
  • The average proportion of Catholic weekly attenders dropped from 57% among the 1910s cohort to just 16% among the 1970s cohort in the 2000s. So for Catholics of my generation weekly attendance is an aberration.
  • Higher levels of weekly attendance is linked to having children in the household of primary school age, and being married.
  • Levels of strong belief in God among Catholics declined (47%-35%) in Britain over the 1983-2008 period. However, most explanatory variables didn’t really predict anything – apart from having primary school aged children, which predicted stronger belief
  • Education strongly predicts attendance, which raises the question of class. Further analysis of the BSA could perhaps identify whether Catholicism in Britain has become more middle-class since 1983. The shift of some social and moral communities from having a working class to middle class basis is a change found elsewhere in society.

All in all, Bullivant’s paper is of great interest and his longer-term research programme extremely promising. There has been a great deal of scholarly interest in British Islam, and the experience of people of visible ethnic minority background. We can learn a lot, however, about earlier waves of immigration and how religion – including Catholicism – worked to help people become established as British citizens. To paraphrase the American moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt, religion both binds and blinds. Our task as social scientists is to understand the drivers and consequences of both.

 

 

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The European Social Survey: Religion in Britain

Posted on June 7, 2016 by Ben Clements

This BRIN post looks at religious data pertaining to Britain from  the European Social Survey (ESS), a cross-national survey which has so far involved seven waves conducted every two years since 2002. In each wave, the UK adult population has been sampled. The most recent survey wave was conducted in 2014 – the UK country dataset has recently been released and can be downloaded (along with accompanying documentation) from the ESS website: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/.

The religious data presented here are based on analysis of the 2002 and 2014 surveys, in order to provide an over-time comparison. While each of the samples covers the UK, the small proportion of cases resident in Norther Ireland have been omitted, so that the focus it on those in living in Britain.

Four religious indicators are used here: affiliation; attendance, prayer, and personal religiosity. The analysis first examines each religious indicator in turn before looking at how different measures of religious engagement (attendance, prayer and religiosity) are associated with belonging to a particular faith or denomination. For attendance and prayer, the full set of response options provided in the ESS surveys have been collapsed into more parsimonious sets of categories. Question wordings are given underneath each table. All tables present the results from analysis of weighted data.

 

Religious indicators

Table 1 presents the data on religion affiliation from the 2002 and 2014 surveys. Over time, the total proportion professing some form of Christian affiliation has been broadly stable (2002: 43%; 2014: 42%). However, as an identical set of response categories was not used for Christian traditions in both surveys, this limits the observations that can be made. The proportion claiming no religious affiliation is almost identical over time (2002: 52%; 2014: 53%). The proportion recorded in 2014 is a little higher than that recorded in the 2014 British Social Attitudes survey. There has been an increase in the proportion belonging to some other religion (from 5% to 7%).

 

Table 1: Religious affiliation

2002 (%)   2014 (%)
TOTAL CHRISTIAN 43 TOTAL CHRISTIAN 42
   Protestant 33     Anglican 24
   Catholic 8     Catholic 10
   Other Christian 2     Other Christian 8
OTHER RELIGION 5 OTHER RELIGION 7
NO RELIGION 52 NO RELIGION 53

Source: Author’s analysis of ESS 2002 and 2014.

Questions: ‘Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?’ and ‘Which one?’

Note:  Some of the categories included under ‘CHRISTIAN’ are not equivalent between the 2002 and 2014 surveys.

 

Table 2 is based on responses to a question only asked of those who said they had no religious affiliation. It gauges whether they have ever belonged to a religious faith or denomination. In both surveys around three-in-ten indicate that they have (though it is slightly higher in 2014). In both years, then, a large majority of those with no current affiliation also stated that they have never had an affiliation in the past.

 

 

Table 2: Ever belonged to a particular religion or denomination (only asked of those with no affiliation)

2002 (%) 2014 (%)
Yes 28 32
No 72 69

Source: Author’s analysis of ESS 2002 and 2014.

Question: ‘Have you ever considered yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?’

 

Table 3 presents data for the first of three measures of religious engagement – attendance at religious services (beyond going on special occasions). The picture is one of continuity over time – just under a fifth report that they attend services on a frequent basis (that is, once a month or more often); around three-in-ten attend less often; and about half said that they never attend services.

 

Table 3: Religious attendance

  2002 (%) 2014 (%)
Once a month or more 18 19
Less than once a month 32 30
Never 51 51

Source: Author’s analysis of ESS 2002 and 2014.

Question: ‘Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?’

 

Table 4 shows the responses to a question asking about prayer. It shows an increase over time in the proportion saying that they never pray, from 44% in 2002 to 50% in 2014, with small decreases in the proportions saying that either they pray at least once a week or less often.

 

Table 4: Prayer

  2002 (%) 2014 (%)
Once a week or more 31 29
Less often 25 22
Never 44 50

Source: Author’s analysis of ESS 2002 and 2014.

Question: ‘Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?’

 

Moving beyond measures of religious practice, Table 5 shows responses to a question asking respondents to self-assess how religious they are. They are asked to locate themselves on a scale running from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates not at all religious and 10 indicates very religious. In Table 5, respondents have been categorised as to whether they have a low (scored 0-3), medium (scored 4-6) or high (scored 7-10) level of religiosity, as well as showing the overall mean score for the full scale. There has been some degree of change over time: the proportion with a low level of religiosity has increased from 40% to 48%. The proportion with a medium or high levels of religiosity have both fallen over time. In 2014, just under half have a low level of religiosity, 30% have a medium level (down from 36%) and 21% report having a high level (down from 24%). The average value underscores this movement towards lower levels of religiosity, decreasing from 5.0 to 3.8.

 

Table 5: Self-assessed religiosity

  2002 (%) 2014 (%)
Low (0 to 3) 40 48
Medium (4-6) 36 30
High (7-10) 24 21
Mean score 5.0 3.8

Source: Author’s analysis of ESS 2002 and 2014.

Question: ‘Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?’

 

Religious engagement by affiliation

Table 6 takes the analysis of the religious data in the 2014 ESS survey a step further by looking at how the indicators of religious engagement are associated with the measure of religious affiliation. In other words, does religious engagement vary across different religious traditions? Table 6 provides a breakdown of attendance, prayer and self-assessed religiosity for Anglicans, Catholics, other Christians and those who belong to other religions. Data are not reported for those who do not have an affiliation.

A common finding across the three indicators of religious engagement is that Anglicans are less likely to be engaged. Anglicans are much less likely to say that they attend religious services on a regular basis (once a month or more); much less likely to report that they pray once a week or more; and are less likely to have a high level of personal religiosity.

Around a half of Catholics, other Christians and those affiliated to non-Christian religions say they attend services once a month or more. A clear majority in each group other than Anglicans also report praying once a week or more often. While 31% of Anglicans are categorised as having a high level of religiosity, this is considerable lower than the proportions for the other groups: Catholics: 47%; other Christians: 45%; other religion: 54%. Looked at another way, Anglicans’ mean score on the religiosity scale is 5.25; the average scores for the other groups are somewhat higher (highest at 6.53 for those belonging to other religions).

Finally, a summary measure of religious engagement was created based on the three indicators used already: attendance, prayer and self-assessed religiosity. Those respondents who met the following criteria of (i) attending services once a month or more, (ii) praying once a week or more and (iii) having a high level of religiosity were classed as having a high level of religious engagement. The proportion that is highly engaged – on this summary measure – within each affiliation category is shown in the bottom row of Table 6.

Within each religious group only a relatively small proportion can be identified as highly engaged on all three measures. The summary measure encapsulates what was found for each indicator when analysed in turn. That is, Anglicans somewhat stand apart from the other religious groups. Only 15% of Anglicans are classed as highly religiously engaged based on the summary measure, compared to around twice as many Catholics (33%), other Christians (31%) and those within non-Christian faiths (30%).

 

Table 6: Religious engagement by affiliation

Anglican (%) Catholic (%) Other Christian (%) Other religion (%)
Attendance
Once a month or more 25 47 48 49
Less than once a month 43 34 33 36
Never 33 20 19 15
Prayer
Once a week or more 38 61 55 68
Less often 32 22 23 21
Never 31 17 22 11
Religiosity
Low (0-3) 23 15 14 10
Medium (4-6) 46 38 41 36
High (7 to 10) 31 47 45 54
Mean score 5.3 6.0 6.2 6.5
         
Proportion with a high level of religious engagement* 15 33 31 30

*Based on a combined measure of: (i) attends once a month or more; (ii) prays more than once a week; and (iii) has a high level of self-assessed religiosity.

Source: Author’s analysis of ESS 2014.

 

Religious engagement by sociodemographic group

As a final step, Table 7 shows the incidence of different religious indicators across sociodemographic groups (based on sex, ethnicity and age). Specifically, within each group, Table 7 reports the proportion with a religious affiliation, the proportion attending services once a month or more, the proportion praying once a week or more, the proportion with a high level of religiosity, and the proportion categorised as highly religious engaged (based on the summary measure discussed already).

There are some consistent features in the data. Across all indicators, women are always more religious than men: that is, they are more likely to have some form of affiliation, more likely to practice their religion, and more likely to see themselves as being very religious.  Based on the combined measure of religious engagement, 13% of women are highly religiously engaged, as against a tenth of men.

Those who belong to a minority ethnic group are much more likely to be religiously engaged those who do not. With the exception of identifying with a religion, those who belong to a minority ethnic group are more than twice as likely to be religiously-engaged. Based on the summary measure (shown in the final column), 31% of those belonging to a minority ethnic group are classed as highly religiously engaged, compared to 9% of those who do not belong to a minority ethnic group.

In terms of the evidence across age groups, those aged 65 and over are most likely to be religiously-engaged, and this finding is consistent across indicators. Those in the youngest age group are consistently least likely to be religiously engaged. Based on the summary index, those aged 65 and older are twice as likely to be highly religiously engaged compared than those aged 15-29.

 

Table 7: Religious engagement by sociodemographic group

  Has a religious affiliation (%) Attends services: Once a month or more (%) Prays: Once a week or more (%) High level of religiosity (%) Religiosity: Mean score High level of religious engagement* (%)
Men 44 17 24 18 3.4 10
Women 50 21 33 24 4.1 13
Belongs to a minority ethnic group 67 38 56 45 5.4 31
Does not belong to a minority ethnic group 45 16 25 19 3.6 9
Aged 15-29 33 11 18 13 2.8 8
Aged 30-49 41 19 26 20 3.4 11
Aged 50-64 49 17 28 21 3.9 11
Aged 65+ 64 24 39 28 4.6 16

*Based on a combined measure of: (i) attends once a month or more; (ii) prays more than once a week; and (iii) has a high level of self-assessed religiosity.

Source: Author’s analysis of ESS 2014.

 

Summary

Across time, the picture is generally one of stability in terms of affiliation and attendance. There was some decline in self-assessed levels of religiosity; and a rise in the proportion who do not pray.

The examination of variation in levels of religious engagement across religious groups (defined by affiliation) and across sociodemographic groups tended to reaffirm the ‘conventional wisdom’ on which segments of wider society tend to be more (or less religious). Across faith traditions, Anglicans are least religiously engaged based on the measures used here, either separately or in combination. Sociodemographically, levels of religious engagement are higher amongst women, those aged 65 and older, and particularly so within those belonging to minority ethnic groups.

Posted in church attendance, Measuring religion, Research note, Survey news | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Counting Religion in Britain, May 2016

Posted on May 31, 2016 by Clive D. Field

Counting Religion in Britain, No. 8, May 2016 features 31 new sources. It can be read in full below. Alternatively, you can download the PDF version: No 8 May 2016

OPINION POLLS

Anti-Semitism (1): Attitudes of Jews toward the Labour Party

The recent row about anti-Semitism in the Labour Party seems to have further damaged its standing with the Jewish electorate. A majority (63%) of British Jews regard the Labour Party as anti-Semitic, and 66% assess its current leader, Jeremy Corbyn, as doing a bad job in addressing the issue. Whereas 15% of Jews voted Labour at the 2015 general election, and 32% of those who did not have considered voting Labour at some time in the past 10 years, only 7% would vote Labour now. The Jewish community remains overwhelmingly (67%) Conservative in its political allegiance, although it has only really been so since the Second World War. In part, this perhaps reflects the very low perception of anti-Semitism in that party (6%), a similar perception applying to the Liberal Democrats but not to UKIP (which 46% of Jews view as anti-Semitic). Notwithstanding the current publicity being given to anti-Semitism, 82% of Jews say they feel very or quite safe in Britain. Data derive from a survey of 1,008 members of Survation’s pre-recruited panel of self-identifying Jews in Britain, interviewed mainly by telephone on 3-4 May 2016.

The poll was commissioned by the Jewish Chronicle which published its own analysis of the results in its edition for 6 May 2016 at:

http://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/157746/labour-support-among-british-jews-collapses-85-cent

Full data tables, including breaks by demographics, are available at:

http://survation.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Full-Tables-JC-Poll-030516SPCH-1c0d0h8.pdf

Results for a question on the voting intentions of Jews in the forthcoming referendum on European Union membership were separately reported in the Jewish Chronicle for 13 May 2016, 49% being in the ‘remain’ camp, 34% in the ‘leave’ camp, and 17% undecided. These data tables are at:

http://survation.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Full-Tables-JC-EU-Poll-030516SPCH-1c0d0h8.pdf

Anti-Semitism (2): Attitudes of Labour Party members

A bare majority (52%) of 1,031 Labour Party members interviewed online by YouGov for The Times on 9-11 May 2016 acknowledged that the Party has a problem with anti-Semitism, 38% being in denial. Moreover, 47% thought it no worse a problem in the Labour Party than in any other political party, while 35% blamed the press and opponents of Party leader Jeremy Corbyn for exploiting the issue in order to attack him (a further 49% accused them of manufacturing the problem for the same reason). Likewise, although 59% approved of the suspension from the Party of Ken Livingstone, the former Mayor of London, only one-quarter judged the remarks leading to his suspension to be anti-Semitic and wanted him to be expelled from the Party. Data tables can be accessed via the link in the blog at:

https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/05/17/labour-members-increasingly-bullish-on-corbyn/

Anti-Semitism (3): Attitudes of the electorate

Asked about the extent of prejudice against Jews in the UK, 29% of 1,694 Britons replied that there is a great deal or a fair amount in an online poll by YouGov for Tim Bale on 2-3 May 2016. This was five points more than in a previous survey in December 2014. Not very much prejudice was reported by 43%, none at all by 5%, with the remaining 23% unable to say. Some anti-Semitism on the part of respondents themselves was in evidence, 7% agreeing with the long-standing trope that ‘Jews have too much influence in this country’, rising to 14 per cent among UKIP supporters and 10% for men and Scottish residents. A similar overall proportion (6%) acknowledged that they would be less likely to vote for a political party led by a Jew and also disagreed with the proposition that ‘a British Jew would make an equally acceptable Prime Minister as a member of any other faith’; the number was again double among UKIP voters. Almost one-third of the sample claimed to have Jewish friends, acquaintances, or work colleagues, which is a surprisingly high ratio, given that there are relatively few Jews in the country and that they are spatially concentrated.

Bale had an article about the survey in the online edition of the Daily Telegraph for 5 May 2016, which can be found at:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/05/labour-voters-dont-have-a-problem-with-jewish-people-but-london/

The full data tables are at:

http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/prmzmd3z1w/TimBaleResults_160503_Anti-Semitism_W.pdf

Perceptions of Islam

A significant degree of negativity toward both Islam and Muslims has again surfaced in a poll conducted by ComRes for Ahmadiyya Muslim Youth Association (UK) among a sample of 2,012 adult Britons interviewed online on 22-24 April 2016. Topline findings are tabulated below, in the order in which questions were asked, except for the omission of questions about understandings of the Caliphate (a central preoccupation of the sponsor), which are too complex to summarize here. It will be seen that a majority of respondents denied that Islam is compatible with British values, while a plurality disagreed it promoted peace in the UK and believed it is a negative force in the country. Only a minority acknowledged having a good grasp of Islamic traditions and beliefs, but there was little appetite to learn more or to see Islam taught more in schools. At the same time, there was acceptance that British Muslims are seriously and unfairly disadvantaged by misconceptions of Islam. The public’s long-standing desire for a separation of religion and politics was reaffirmed. Detailed computer tables, giving breaks by a range of demographics (including religious affiliation and possession of Muslim family, friends, or acquaintances), are available at:

http://www.comres.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Ahmadi-Muslims_Perceptions-of-the-Caliphate.pdf

% across

Agree

 Disagree

Don’t know
Islam promotes peace in UK

32

 46

22
Possess good understanding of Islamic traditions/beliefs

32

 57

10
Possess Muslim family/friends/acquaintances

41

 54

5
Get most of knowledge about Islam from media

55

 37

8
Islam is compatible with British values

28

 56

17
Islam promotes acts of violence in UK

33

 51

16
Islam is a violent religion

28

 57

14
Most people in UK have negative view of Islam

72

 15

13
Islam is a negative force in UK

43

 40

17
Would like to know more about Islamic traditions

36

 49

15
More should be taught about Islam in UK schools

38

 47

15
Misconceptions of Islam negatively impact quality of life of British Muslims

67

 18

15
Misconceptions of Islam negatively impact quality of life of all Britons

60

 24

16
Extremist views/actions conducted in Islam’s name by Muslim minority unfairly impact perceptions of Muslims

78

 12

11
No place in UK politics for religious influence of any kind

62

 23

15
UK Muslims do not have unifying figurehead

45

 17

38

Admiration for global religious figures

Of the three international religious leaders included in YouGov’s latest 30-nation ranking of most admired living figures, the Dalai Lama took a larger share of the vote than the Pope in 19 countries, including the United Kingdom, the Dalai Lama performing especially strongly in Australia, France, Germany, and Norway. The Pope out-performed the Dalai Lama in nine countries, most impressively in the Philippines, while in Argentina and New Zealand the two leaders were tied. Internationally, the Pope has fallen seven places since last year’s rankings, suggesting his influence may be on the wane. The veteran evangelist Billy Graham, mostly out of the limelight these days, predictably trailed the other two religious leaders, except in Egypt (where he came first of the three) and in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States (where he came second). In the United Kingdom, which Graham has missioned on several occasions, his percentage share of admiration was below the global mean, whereas for Pope Francis it was slightly above. Of course, in virtually all countries the lists were dominated by secular names. Statistics for religious figures alone are tabulated below. Topline results for all figures for all participating nations, together with an explanation of methodology, can be found at:

https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/05/07/wma-2016/

% share of admiration

Pope Francis

 Dalai Lama

Billy Graham
Global mean

3.0

 4.3

1.6
Argentina

7.0

 7.0

1.0
Australia

4.8

 11.4

2.1
Brazil

1.9

 8.4

2.0
Canada

7.8

 5.8

2.4
China

0.4

 NA

0.2
Denmark

1.7

 9.9

0.4
Egypt

0.7

 0.6

0.9
Finland

2.3

 7.0

0.8
France

7.7

 10.0

0.1
Germany

1.3

 10.0

0.3
Hong Kong

4.2

 2.6

0.7
India

2.2

 2.9

0.9
Indonesia

1.8

 2.8

0.8
Malaysia

1.4

 2.0

0.8
Mexico

3.7

 9.1

0.8
Morocco

0.2

 0.7

0.2
New Zealand

5.6

 5.6

2.7
Norway

7.7

 10.0

0.1
Pakistan

0.1

 0.4

0.0
Philippines

20.7

 2.8

1.7
Russia

1.1

 2.8

0.1
Saudi Arabia

0.6

 0.5

0.3
Singapore

3.4

 2.5

1.7
South Africa

2.0

 5.4

3.2
Spain

2.2

 7.4

0.4
Sweden

2.0

 8.7

0.3
Thailand

1.8

 4.5

0.2
United Arab Emirates

4.1

 2.0

0.9
United Kingdom

3.5

 4.1

1.1
United States

8.2

 3.7

5.2

Trust in religious leaders

In a separate YouGov study for YouGov@Cambridge, three-fifths of 1,742 Britons interviewed on 13-14 March 2016 said they had limited (32%) or no trust (28%) in religious leaders in general to tell the truth, peaking at 73% among those judging the current political system to be broken. Just 30% expressed a great deal or fair amount of trust in religious leaders, with marked contrasts between 18-24s (20%) and over-65s (43%) and between those thinking the political system works well (43%) and that it is broken (22%). Comparisons with a somewhat eclectic list of other groups are shown in the table, below. 

% degree of trust to tell truth

Great deal/fair amount

 Not much

Not at all

Friends

 89 7

0
Family members

89

 6

1
Academics

64

 22

5
People you meet in general

50

 36

6
UK military leaders

40

 32

17
Religious leaders

30

 32

28
Trade union leaders

24

 37

27
Journalists

18

 45

32
People who run large companies

17

 47

27
UK government ministers

15

 38

38
Senior European Union officials

13

 36

40
Senior US government officials

12

 38

38

The same survey explored several other matters of religious interest. Asked about the role of a ‘higher force’ (such as God, fate, or destiny) in their own lives, 5% assessed that everything which happened to them was caused by this force, 8% that most of what happened was so caused, and 22% that some of what happened was so caused. That made 35% according some role to a higher force against 38% denying it had any influence at all, the remaining 27% being undecided between the options on offer. Men (45%) and 18-24s (48%) were most likely to refute the intervention of a higher force in their lives. Membership of church or religious organizations during the past five years was reported by 8% of respondents overall, rising to 13% of over-65s and 14% of Scots. Given a list of possible conspiracy theories, the suggestion that official accounts of the Holocaust are a lie, with the number of Jews killed being exaggerated, was strenuously refuted – merely 2% agreed with the proposition (albeit 5% of UKIP voters).

Data tables for the poll can be accessed via the link at:

https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/05/27/conspiracies/

Dying

Britons claim to feel far more comfortable about discussing religion with their family and friends (80%) than they do sex (50%), according to the latest poll by ComRes for the Dying Matters Coalition, for which 2,085 adults were interviewed online on 15-17 April 2016. There is also greater willingness to discuss religion than either dying (64%) or money (78%), albeit slightly more reticence than about politics (82%) or immigration (85%). Just 17% say they would feel uncomfortable talking about religion, and no more than 19% among any demographic sub-group (the Welsh being most reluctant). However, when it comes to factors potentially ensuring a ‘good death’, ‘having your religious/spiritual needs met’ is rated as the least important of the six options, with a mean score of 5.29 on a six-point scale, the list topped by ‘being pain free’ on 2.44. Addressing religious and spiritual needs is judged the single most important factor by only 5% of respondents overall, and no more than 6% in any sub-group. Data tables are available at:

http://www.comres.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/NCPC_Public-polling-2016_Data-tables.pdf

Places of worship and community

Places of worship are accorded a very low priority by the public in shaping a local community, according to a recent survey commissioned by TSB Bank, for which OnePoll surveyed 4,000 UK adults online between 20 January and 18 March 2016. Indeed, asked which of 22 facilities and services were most essential, a place of worship came in penultimate position, attracting just 12% support, marginally ahead of a youth club on 10%. The list was headed by a post office (74%) and a bank (73%). Even fewer, 9% of men and 8% of women, said that the existence of easily accessible places of worship was a factor they liked about their current home. Full data tables from the poll are not in the public domain, but headline findings appear in a report from TSB at:

http://www.tsb.co.uk/news-releases/tsb-home-reports.pdf

Brexit

This will be the last edition of Counting Religion in Britain before United Kingdom voters decide on 23 June 2016 whether they wish the country to remain a member of the European Union (EU) or not. So, it seems appropriate to review the latest evidence about referendum voting intentions by religion. It comes from Lord Ashcroft’s online survey of 5,009 adult Britons interviewed between 13 and 18 May 2016. Respondents were not asked how they proposed to answer the actual question on the referendum ballot paper but about their inclination to vote, on a feeling thermometer running from 0 to 100, where 0-49 denoted a leaning towards remaining in the EU, 51-100 a leaning towards leaving, and 50 represented undecided. As the table below indicates, a majority of voters (52%) inclined towards the leave position, 14 points more than opted to remain. However, among Christians the gap in favour of leaving widened to 22%. A plurality of both non-Christians (49%) and religious nones (48%) was also in favour of leaving, albeit the margin over the remainers was very small (3% and 6%, respectively). See, further, page 92 of the data tables at:

http://lordashcroftpolls.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Euro_Poll_May16.pdf

% across

Remain

 Undecided

Leave
All voters

38

 10

52
Christian

34

 9

56
Non-Christian

46

 5

49
No religion

42

 11

48

Voting intentions of Jews in the referendum, according to a different survey, are mentioned in the final paragraph of the first item in this edition, ‘Anti-Semitism (1)’, above. For Sikh views on the EU, see ‘British Sikh Report’, below.

FAITH ORGANIZATION STUDIES

English church census, 2016

Plans for another ecumenical census of church attendance in England, the first since 2005, have been abandoned, according to news reports in the Church Times and on the Churches Together in England website. The census was to have taken place in October, with a pilot scheduled for June. The plans had been devised by a steering group which has been meeting since autumn 2015 under the chairpersonship of the Bishop of Manchester, David Walker. But they had to be aborted after several major denominations, including most recently the Church of England itself, indicated their unwillingness to sign up to the administrative resource implications. News stories about the cancellation of the census can be found at:

https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2016/13-may/news/uk/church-census-2016-cancelled-after-c-of-e-drops-out

http://www.cte.org.uk/Articles/468006/Home/News/Latest_news_articles/Proposed_Church_Census.aspx

http://www.cte.org.uk/Groups/273292/Home/Resources/Proposed_2016_Church/Proposed_2016_Church.aspx

Sermons

The overwhelming majority (88%) of 1,800 UK churchgoers and church leaders interviewed online by Christian Research in early May disagreed with the suggestion that preaching a sermon in church is outdated. However, sermons in excess of half an hour in length appealed to only 10% of the sample, more so to men (14%) than women (6%) and to those aged 25-34 (19%) than over-65s (9%). In reality, 15% of sermons were reported as exceeding 30 minutes, the most common length (44%) being from 10 to 20 minutes. Regarding priorities for content, most emphasis (44%) was placed on biblical exposition, by men (49%) more than women (39%). Practical application was second in significance (40%), albeit preferred by more women (44%) than men (36%). Neither sex attached much importance to humour or anecdote in sermons. Four-fifths of worshippers did not mind whether the preacher was male or female, but one-fifth favoured a man in the pulpit. The research was commissioned by the Christian Resources Exhibition (CRE) in the run-up to CRE International at the ExCeL Centre in London on 17-20 May, which featured a Sermon of the Year competition. As with virtually all Christian Research polling via its Resonate panel, few data have entered the public domain, but CRE has a press release at:

https://www.creonline.co.uk/news/preachers-told-give-us-content-over-comedy-please/

Church Commissioners annual report

The Church Commissioners, who support the mission and ministry of the Church of England from the proceeds of a diverse investment of £7 billion, have published their annual report and financial statements for 2015, entitled Investing in the Church’s Growth. The overall return on this investment last year was in excess of 8%, not far short of the annual average of almost 10% over the past 30 years, and well ahead of inflation. The Commissioners’ total expenditure in 2015 was £218.5 million, amounting to 15% of all spending across the Church, with their biggest single outlay (56%) being on clergy pensions (for service prior to 1998). Media coverage has focused disproportionately on the fact that Google’s parent company, Alphabet Inc, is shown among the Commissioners’ 20 most valuable equity assets, despite frequent accusations against Google that it fails to pay its fair share of UK tax. The report is available for download at:

https://churchofengland.org/media/2492846/churchcommissionersar2015.pdf

Fresh Expressions of church in the Diocese of Sheffield

An analysis of 56 Fresh Expressions of church (fxC) started in the Diocese of Sheffield between 1992 and 2014 has been prepared by George Lings and published by the Church Army’s Research Unit. Nearly all (47) of these fxCs are still in existence, adding 13% to the average weekly attendance in the diocese’s parish churches. Of the 2,450 fxC attenders, 35% are existing Christians, 27% dechurched, and 39% non-churched. The report is available at:

http://www.sheffield.anglican.org/UserFiles/File///CARU_Research_report_19_Sheffield_Diocese.pdf

Church of Scotland statistics

Church of Scotland statistics for the year-ending 31 December 2015, which were reported to the General Assembly meeting in Edinburgh this month, revealed a continuing decline. There were 14,788 fewer members in 2015 than 2014, a decrease of 4%, this being the net figure of 6,330 admissions and 21,118 removals from the rolls. Half the removals were as a result of deaths, which were nine times as numerous as new members received on profession of faith. The Church conducted 21,235 funerals during the course of the year, equivalent to 37% of all deaths in Scotland. There were only 3,591 baptisms, a far cry from the peak of 51,767 in 1962. Indeed, media coverage of the General Assembly highlighted the intention to give serious consideration to online baptisms (for example, via Skype or over the phone), which are already popular in America, to stem the fall. The headline statistics can be found in Appendix X of the General Assembly’s Order of Proceedings at:

http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/32879/Order_of_Proceedings.pdf

Fellowship of Independent Evangelical Churches

The Fellowship of Independent Evangelical Churches (FIEC) has released a summary report on its 2014-15 ‘data survey’, which was initially prepared for consideration by its Leaders’ Conference in November 2015. The FIEC was founded in 1922 as an umbrella organization for non-denominational and unattached churches and missions. It currently represents 559 ‘church gatherings’ in Great Britain and is continuing to grow. The ‘data survey’ revealed that 39,000 individuals (31,000 adults and 8,000 young people under 18) attend FIEC churches on a typical Sunday morning, an increase of 10% since a similar survey in 2003. The number worshipping at least monthly (and thus considered to be regular attenders) is, at 46,000, almost one-fifth more. Church membership stood at 27,000 in 2014-15, equivalent to 59% of regular adult attenders compared with 64% in 2003. Most (54%) of FIEC churches have fewer than 35 members, the smaller the church, the more likely it is to be in numerical decline. The proportion of Sunday attendances in the morning has risen from 58% in 1989 to 70% today, while the number of churches holding evening services has fallen over the same period, from 93% to 77%. The ratio of young people in FIEC congregations has reduced from 32% to 20% since 1989, with 13% of churches having no young people in the pews and 53% reporting no baptisms in the past year. One in seven attenders is aged 75 or over. A further data survey is planned towards the end of 2016. The summary report for 2014-15 can be found at:

https://fiec.org.uk/docs/FIEC_How_are_we_looking.pdf

British Sikh Report

British Sikh Report, 2016 is the fourth annual edition of a survey overseen by a group of Sikh professionals, and conducted (mainly online) in late 2015 and early 2016 among a self-selecting (and thus potentially unrepresentative) sample of 1,416 adult Sikhs in the United Kingdom. Britain’s place in the world was a special theme of this year’s study. On membership of the European Union (EU), 57% of British Sikhs were in favour of remaining (mostly subject to reform of the EU, the survey being conducted before the British government’s agreement with the EU in February 2016), 12% wanted to leave the EU, with 31% undecided. However, 54% disagreed with allowing an unlimited number of EU migrants into the country, and 67% wanted their access to benefits to be limited. On immigration generally, although 59% agreed that migrants made a positive contribution to society, 67% feared that public services could not cope with the current level of net influx, and 53% that diversity and cohesion would be adversely affected by it. Only 32% supported Britain taking in more refugees (with 39% opposed), albeit 51% approved of greater help being given to refugees already in Europe. Other topics covered were ethno-religious self-identity, relevance of caste, observance of the Panj Kakkars, charitable giving and volunteering, attitudes to British military involvement in Syria and the retention of a nuclear deterrent, and demographics (including employment status and highest educational attainment). Gurbachan Singh Jandu contributes an article on ‘Britain’s Sikhs in 2016: A Community with Society in Mind’ (pp. 5-12). British Sikh Report, 2016 is available to download at:

http://www.britishsikhreport.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/British-Sikh-Report-2016.pdf

OFFICIAL STATISTICS

2021 census

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) has confirmed that it intends to include a question on religious affiliation in the 2021 population census of England and Wales, using the same wording as in 2011, to ensure continuity in reporting with both 2001 and 2011 results. A primary driver for so doing is to enable organizations to meet their duties under the Equality Act 2010, which defines religion as a protected characteristic. Following public consultation, ONS is declining to extend the question, noting: ‘While data users proposed that additional information about philosophical belief should also be collected, testing ahead of the 2011 Census demonstrated that including philosophical beliefs within the question changed how respondents thought about religion. This led to them providing answers on religious belief rather than affiliation. It is therefore not intended to expand the scope of the religion question to include this aspect of the protected characteristic.’ The statement appears in section 3.9 of The 2021 Census: Assessment of Initial User Requirements on Content for England and Wales – Response to Consultation, which is available (in English and Welsh) at:

https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/censustransformationprogramme/consultations/the2021censusinitialviewoncontentforenglandandwales

Scottish Surveys Core Questions, 2014

Scottish Surveys Core Questions combines into a single dataset the answers to identical questions asked of an aggregate 21,000 respondents in the annual Scottish Crime and Justice Survey, the Scottish Health Survey, and the Scottish Household Survey. The report and tables for 2014, the third year of the series, have just been published by the Scottish Government, with religion as one of the 19 core questions. Overall, 44% of the Scottish population had no religion, 52% was Christian (29% Church of Scotland, 15% Roman Catholic, 8% other denominations), and 3% non-Christian. Religious affiliation was used as a variable for analysing the incidence of general health, long-term limiting health conditions, smoking, mental wellbeing, unpaid care, local crime rates, and confidence in the police. The apparent statistical significance of some religious correlates was weakened when results were standardized by age, reflecting the disproportionately elderly profile of Church of Scotland affiliates and the younger profile of nones and Muslims. However, even after age standardization was applied, the greatest prevalence of smoking was still found among Catholics and nones. More details at:

http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2016/05/7615/downloads

ACADEMIC STUDIES

Protestant and Catholic differences

‘Protestant and Catholic Distinctions in Secularization’ are examined by Sarah Wilkins-Laflamme, with particular reference to the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, in Journal of Contemporary Religion, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2016, pp. 165-80. The underlying data derive from cross-sectional national surveys for the period 1985-2012, including 86,000 respondents to British Social Attitudes Surveys. In all three countries, there has been a steep decline in Protestant affiliation over time, but the remaining Protestants have generally seen heightened rates of religious practice (measured by attendance at religious services and prayer) when compared with remaining Catholics. With regard to orthodox religious beliefs, both remaining Protestants and remaining Catholics exhibit increasing levels of believing. For the incidence of religious behaviour and believing, Protestants now surpass Catholics in the United States and Canada and are said to be on track to do so in Britain. The societal implications of the ‘religious core’, at once diminished yet strengthened, are briefly assessed. Access options to the article, and to supplementary tables available online, are explained at:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13537903.2016.1152660

Catholic disaffiliation

British Social Attitudes (BSA) Surveys, in this case for 1991-2011 (and especially 2007-11), have also been mined by Stephen Bullivant in his study of ‘Catholic Disaffiliation in Britain: A Quantitative Overview’, Journal of Contemporary Religion, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2016, pp. 181-97. Disaffiliates are defined as those who were brought up as Catholics but no longer identify as such, either because they regard themselves as belonging to some other religion (switchers) or to none at all (leavers). A much smaller proportion of Catholics (38%) was found to have disaffiliated than was the case with other mainstream denominations, some of the lowest retention rates being among Baptists and Methodists, only 36% and 34% of whom (respectively) stayed loyal to their faith of upbringing. Nevertheless, Catholic disaffiliations increased over time, from 25% for pre-1945 cohorts to 40% for post-1945 cohorts (a possible Vatican II effect, Bullivant suggests), and dwarfed, in the ratio of ten to one, converts to Catholicism. Men raised as Catholics were one and a half times more likely than women to disaffiliate. Moreover, a large contingent of the overall 62% of Catholics retaining their cradle identity rarely or never practised their religion, while a significant minority were even atheists or agnostics. Access options to the article are explained at:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13537903.2016.1152664

A somewhat broader and more up-to-date account of results from this research, focusing on England and Wales and drawing upon BSA surveys for 2012-14, can be found in Bullivant’s Contemporary Catholicism in England and Wales: A Statistical Report Based on Recent British Social Attitudes Survey Data (Catholic Research Forum Reports, No. 1, London: Benedict XVI Centre for Religion and Society, St Mary’s University Twickenham, 2016, 18pp.). Its four chapters explore: religion in England and Wales; the Catholic population; retention and conversion; and church attendance. Catholic data are disaggregated by gender, age, and race/ethnicity. Extrapolating from BSA, Bullivant suggests that the Catholic community of England and Wales numbers (professedly) 3,800,000 against 6,200,000 brought up as Catholics. This report is freely available to download at:

http://www.stmarys.ac.uk/benedict-xvi/contemporary-catholicism.htm

Catholics and faith schools

‘Attitudes Towards Faith-Based Schooling amongst Roman Catholics in Britain’ are explored by Ben Clements in an online first article in British Journal of Religious Education. The underlying data derive from a survey of 1,062 adult Catholics in Britain by YouGov for the Westminster Faith Debates in 2013. Some support is found for the ‘solidarity of the religious’ thesis, with the more orthodox Catholics (in terms of their religious practice and beliefs) showing a greater propensity to endorse publicly-funded faith school provision for Christians and non-Christians alike. The effects of moral attitudes and socio-demographic variables (except for ethnicity) were weaker and less consistent. Access options to the article are explained at:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01416200.2015.1128393

Urban and rural Anglican dioceses

Owen Edwards has proposed a new model for defining rural, mixed, and urban Anglican dioceses in England and Wales, based upon 10 statistical factors, in comparison with an earlier (2001) model devised by David Lankshear. ‘Classifying “Rural” and “Urban” Dioceses of the Church of England and the Church in Wales: Introducing the Ten-Factor Model’ is published in Rural Theology, Vol. 14, No. 1, May 2016, pp. 53-65, and access options to the article are explained at:

http://tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14704994.2016.1154729

Polarized Jews

Jews are likely to hold more divergent and stronger views than non-Jews across a wide variety of social issues. This is according to a comparison of a 1995 study of British Jewish opinion, undertaken by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, and British Social Attitudes (BSA) Surveys for 1993-94, both of which permitted respondents to choose between moderate or more extreme positions in answer to 14 identically-worded questions. No subsequent survey of the British Jewish community appears to have deliberately replicated BSA questions in this way. In all but one of the 14 cases, the Jewish sample exhibited a wider spread of attitudes than BSA interviewees, which was statistically significant in 11 instances. Competing non-religious (socio-demographic and language norm) explanations for the variance are considered and dismissed. This greater polarization of Jewish opinion conforms to Jewish folklore, religious narratives, and tropes of Jewish humour. An open access version of Stephen Miller, ‘Are Jews More Polarised in Their Social Attitudes than Non-Jews?  Empirical Evidence from the 1995 JPR Study’, Jewish Journal of Sociology, Vol. 57, Nos 1 and 2, 2015, pp. 70-6 is available at:

http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/12694/1/2%20Miller.pdf

Digital methodologies

Digital Methodologies in the Sociology of Religion are explored in a new book edited by Sariya Cheruvallil-Contractor and Suha Shakkour (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016, xxvi + 227pp., ISBN 978-1-4725-7115-1, £21.99, paperback). It comprises 15 fairly short chapters by 25 contributors (10 of them from the United Kingdom) which tease out the methodological lessons to be learned from online research which they have conducted, identifying key tips for future practitioners. There is also a useful bibliography of relevant primary and secondary literature (pp. 197-223). The empirical findings of the research are only incidentally reported. Digital methodologies employed, besides the fairly obvious use of online surveys, include Facebook, YouTube, videoconferencing, apps, crowdsourcing, and gaming. They can be helpful in targeting minority and otherwise hard-to-reach populations, particularly in non-Christian communities, which are the subject of several of these essays (for example, Jasjit Singh’s contribution on the religious engagement of young Sikhs). However, in statistical terms, digital research, although relatively inexpensive, often struggles to achieve representative samples and thus to generate scientifically robust data. This even applies to online surveys, which frequently rely upon self-selecting respondents. The book’s webpage can be found at:

http://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/digital-methodologies-in-the-sociology-of-religion-9781472571151/

Implicit religion and adolescents

Leslie Francis and Gemma Penny have examined the late Edward Bailey’s notion of the persistence of implicit religion among a sample of 8,619 adolescents aged 13-15 in England and Wales who participated in the Teenage Religion and Values Survey and who had no formal religious affiliation (nones) nor practice (never attended religious services). Implicit religion was operationalized as attachment to traditional Christian rites of passage (religious baptism, marriage, and funeral). Marriage in church was sought by 43%, a church funeral by 42%, and baptism of children by 21%. It was found that young people who remained attached to these rites displayed higher levels of psychological wellbeing than those who were not attached, suggesting, the authors contend, that implicit religion serves similar psychological functions as explicit religion. ‘Implicit Religion and Psychological Wellbeing: A Study among Adolescents without Formal Religious Affiliation or Practice’ is published in Implicit Religion, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2016, pp. 61-78, and access options are explained at:

https://journals.equinoxpub.com/index.php/IR/article/view/30009

Journalists and religion

The United Kingdom’s 64,000 professional journalists are not an especially religious lot, even less so than the population as a whole. This is according to a new report from the University of Oxford’s Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism: Neil Thurman, Alessio Cornia, and Jessica Kunert, Journalists in the UK. A random sample of journalists drawn from the Gorkana Media Database was invited to complete an online survey in December 2015, of whom 715 responded. The majority (61%) said that they had no religion, 74% that religious belief was of little (22%) or no importance (52%) to them, and 76% that religious considerations had little (28%) or no influence (48%) on their work. Moreover, as many as 45% expressed little (27%) or no trust (18%) in religious leaders, only 11% having a great deal or complete trust in them. The relatively low religiosity of journalists may be at least partially explained by the fact that they are disproportionately white and university-educated. The report is available at:

http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Journalists%20in%20the%20UK.pdf

George Whitefield’s voice

Christian history is full of examples of evangelists who have preached to large crowds in the open air without any amplification of their voice. Historians have often doubted whether these crowds were quite as large as estimated at the time and, in any case, whether the preacher would actually have been audible. Now matters have been put to the test in respect of George Whitefield, the great transatlantic preacher of the eighteenth century, who is said to have attracted as many as 80,000 people on a single occasion. Braxton Boren, a graduate in both physics and music technology, has used contemporary experimental and topographical data combined with modern simulation techniques to calculate the maximum intelligible range of Whitefield’s field preaching in Philadelphia and London. He concludes that, based on Whitefield’s vocal level, he could have reached a crowd of 50,000 under ideal acoustic conditions and still half as many even when noise levels were higher or crowd density lower. Braxton’s ‘Whitefield’s Voice’ is published in George Whitefield: Life, Context, and Legacy, edited by Geordan Hammond and David Ceri Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 167-89.

British Religion in Numbers

The annual update of the British Religion in Numbers (BRIN) source database has just taken place (it was deliberately delayed to allow the BRIN website to be migrated to a new platform, and, as part of that, for the database itself to be moved from MySQL to WordPress software). New entries have been created for 158 British religious statistical sources (disproportionately sample surveys), of which 121 date from 2015, 27 from 2014, and 10 from previous years. This brings the total of sources described in the database to 2,552. The 2015 sources include many important surveys, a very large number relating to Muslims, Islam, or Islamism (notably Islamic State), with a smaller cluster of polls exploring Jewish opinion and the attitudes of Britons toward Jews and anti-Semitism. Sources can be browsed at:

http://www.brin.ac.uk/source-list/

An advanced search facility is available at:

http://www.brin.ac.uk/search/

NEW DATASETS AT UK DATA SERVICE

SN 7894: What about YOUth? Survey, 2014

The ‘What about YOUth?’ survey was commissioned by the Health and Social Care Information Centre and conducted by Ipsos MORI through a combination of self-completion postal and online questionnaires between 23 September 2014 and 9 January 2015. It investigated the health and wellbeing of a random sample of 15-year-olds in England, which can be analysed by a raft of background variables, one of which was religious affiliation. The substantial size of the dataset (120,115 interviews, representing a response rate of 40%) makes it of particular interest. A catalogue description, with links to technical and other information, is available at:

https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=7894&type=Data%20catalogue

SN 7963: Scottish Household Survey, 2013 and SN 7964: Scottish Household Survey, 2014

The Scottish Household Survey, initiated in 1999, is undertaken on behalf of the Scottish Government by a polling consortium led by Ipsos MORI. Information is collected about the composition, characteristics, attitudes, and behaviour of private households and individuals in Scotland; and about the physical condition of their homes. For the 2013 survey (January 2013-February 2014) data were gathered on 10,650 households and 9,920 adults; for 2014 (January 2014-March 2015) on, respectively, 10,630 and 9,800. The specifically religious content of the questionnaire for both years covered: religion belonged to; experience of discrimination or harassment on religious, sectarian, or other grounds; and incidence of volunteering for religious and other groups. Catalogue descriptions for the datasets are available at:

https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=7963&type=Data%20catalogue

https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=7964&type=Data%20catalogue

SN 7972: British Election Study, 2015 – Face-to-Face Post-Election Survey

The series of British Election Studies originated in 1963, and the post-election survey for 2015 (there was also an internet panel) was based on face-to-face interviews with a probability sample of 2,987 British electors, 1,567 of whom also filled out a self-completion module. Fieldwork was conducted by GfK NOP between 8 May and 13 September 2015, with funding from the Economic and Social Research Council allocated to a research team at the Universities of Manchester, Oxford, and Nottingham. Respondents were asked whether they regarded themselves as belonging to any religion and, if so, how often they attended religious services other than for rites of passage. These are important background variables for analysing the answers to the recurrent and non-recurrent questions on political and related topics. A catalogue description for the dataset is available at:

https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=7972&type=Data%20catalogue

 

Please note: Counting Religion in Britain is © Clive D. Field, 2016

 

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Re-examining religious and paranormal beliefs in mid-1970s Britain

Posted on May 9, 2016 by Ben Clements

A recent YouGov survey shed interesting light on levels of religious beliefs and other forms of belief in contemporary Britain. This BRIN post takes a historical turn by analysing one of the few available surveys enabling assessment of religious and paranormal beliefs in Britain the post-war period. The analysis is based on a Gallup opinion poll undertaken in May 1975, based on a sample of adults aged 16 and older in Britain. The dataset and accompanying documentation for this survey were obtained from the United Kingdom Data Service. Taken as a whole, post-war Gallup polling in Britain provides an important resource for studying change and continuity in popular religion (for more information see Field, 2015a).

This survey dataset is particularly useful because it allows analysis of the relationship between religious and paranormal beliefs in the British public, and the nature of the association between them. For example, was the relationship between religious and paranormal beliefs tending towards a mutually-exclusive one, in which the holding of the former tended to preclude affirmation of the latter? On the other hand, did individuals subscribe to a mixture of religious or paranormal beliefs and – perhaps – were those who held religious beliefs more likely – than those who did not – to believe in paranormal phenomena? Analysis of this survey can hopefully tell us something about the incidence, patterning and overlap of the two types of belief in mid-1970s Britain.

First, Table 1 shows the distribution of responses for religious and paranormal beliefs, based on the distinction between ‘traditional religious’ and ‘non-traditional religious beliefs’ set out in Gill et al. (1998) and Gill (2003).[i] Field uses a distinction between ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ beliefs in his recent book on religious change in Britain during the ‘long 1950s’, with the former set of beliefs coming within the ‘framework of traditional Christianity’ (2015b: 74). For each belief, Table 1 shows the proportions responding ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’. The survey asked about five religious beliefs and eleven paranormal beliefs.

The most prevalent religious belief was in God (71%), followed by believing in heaven (50%). Three other religious beliefs were subscribed to by varying minorities (around a third for life after death, and one fifth for belief in the devil and in hell). Overall, expressed belief in paranormal phenomena varied markedly in British society in the mid-1970s, highest at 51% for being able to forecast (and 48% for thought transference) and lowest at 12% for black magic (and 13% for exchanging messages with the dead). The proportions saying they did not know also varied across the different belief items – highest at 22% for life after death (religious beliefs) and 20% for reincarnation (paranormal beliefs).

 

Table 1: Overall profile of religious and paranormal beliefs

  Yes

(%)

 No

(%)

 Don’t know (%)
Traditional religious beliefs
God 71 17 12
Heaven 50 36 14
Life after death 35 43 22
Devil 20 72 9
Hell 19 72 9
Classic paranormal beliefs
Being able to forecast 51 36 13
Thought transference 48 37 15
Faith healing 43 42 15
Hypnotism 41 48 10
Horoscopes 28 66 7
Reincarnation 23 58 20
UFOs 20 66 14
Lucky charms 20 75 5
Ghosts 18 72 10
Black magic 13 79 8
Exchanging messages 12 77 11

Source: Author’s analysis of Gallup opinion poll, May 1975.

Note: Percentages rounded and sum across the rows. Distinction amongst types of belief based on that used in Gill et al. (1998) and Gill (2003).

 

Beliefs and sociodemographic groups

The next step in the analysis is to move beyond profiling overall levels of belief and to look at levels of belief across different social groups. Table 2 reports the proportion within each sociodemographic group saying they believe in each religious belief.  Tables 3(a) and 3(b) do the same for the set of paranormal beliefs.

The more notable areas of difference for religious belief concern sex, age group and religious affiliation. Religious beliefs, in mid-1970s Britain, were always more common amongst women than men (82% and 60%, respectively, expressed belief in God; 59% and 39%, respectively, expressed belief in heaven). Some beliefs were generally more common amongst older, as compared to younger, age groups (God and heaven). Based on religious affiliation, unsurprisingly religious beliefs were much more likely to be subscribed to amongst those with some form of denominational allegiance  (highest amongst Catholics). Those with no religious affiliation exhibited some level of religious belief (a quarter said they believed in God and nearly a fifth believed in in life after death). There are somewhat variant results for levels of belief based on social grade, and the marked difference in belief in God and heaven based on age completed education needs to factor in the tendency for who finished at an earlier age being drawn from the older generations in society.

 

Table 2: Religious beliefs by socio-demographic group (percent saying ‘yes’)

God Heaven Hell Devil Life after death
Overall 71 50 19 20 35
Men 60 39 15 16 26
Women 82 59 23 23 44
Aged 16-24 66 41 21 21 33
Aged 25-34 60 43 16 19 31
Aged 35-44 69 47 18 20 30
Aged 45-54 74 49 17 16 33
Aged 55-64 81 58 20 23 37
Aged 65+ 83 65 23 20 46
*Education: 14 or under 80 59 19 18 38
Education: 15 66 43 17 18 30
Education: 16 71 51 20 23 31
Education: 17 66 48 26 26 44
Education: 18 or over 60 35 22 20 42
Social grade: AB 67 48 27 27 38
Social grade: C1 66 45 17 18 35
Social grade: C2 71 48 19 18 34
Social grade: DE 77 56 19 20 36
Church of England 76 52 17 16 34
Church of Scotland 80 57 10 10 40
Nonconformist 84 57 23 20 56
Catholic 87 78 43 44 40
Other religion 67 50 35 36 38
No religion 22 7 6 9 18

Source: Author’s analysis of Gallup opinion poll, May  1975.

*Refers to the age at which a respondent completed their full-time education.

Belief in paranormal phenomena also varied across social groups in Britain in the mid-1970s, as shown in Tables 3(a) and 3(b). As with religious beliefs, women were more likely than men to hold paranormal beliefs (most marked in relation to horoscopes; the exception being belief in UFOs).The patterns of age groups show that younger people were more predisposed to express belief in some paranormal phenomena, and the oldest age group (65 and over) were least likely to do so for some of these beliefs. These age-related differences are particularly evident for belief in black magic, ghosts, hypnotism and UFOs, with younger people expressing higher levels of belief than older people. On the other hand, belief in faith healing tended to be higher amongst older age groups.

Based on religious belonging, there is no consistent pattern for those with no affiliation to be clearly more likely to profess belief in the paranormal. For many beliefs, they are eclipsed by those belonging to particular Christian denominations (or affiliated with some other religious group). As with religious beliefs, there were no consistent differences for social grade. Paranormal belief did tend to be higher amongst those who completed their education later on.

 

Table 3(a): Paranormal beliefs by sociodemographic group (percent saying ‘yes’)

Reincarnation Hypnotism Black magic Horoscopes Thought Transference
Overall 23 41 13 28 48
Men 19 40 12 15 43
Women 26 42 14 39 52
Aged 16-24 25 50 23 31 48
Aged 25-34 20 54 17 26 53
Aged 35-44 16 48 11 23 44
Aged 45-54 21 40 12 31 50
Aged 55-64 26 33 9 28 52
Aged 65+ 27 20 6 27 40
*Education: 14 or under 25 28 7 30 45
Education: 15 17 42 12 24 39
Education: 16 21 52 16 29 55
Education: 17 34 62 30 22 50
Education: 18 or over 25 59 23 28 65
Social grade: AB 25 54 17 20 59
Social grade: C1 22 48 15 22 58
Social grade: C2 22 43 13 25 44
Social grade: DE 23 31 11 38 40
Church of England 24 42 13 29 49
Church of Scotland 25 35 7 42 35
Nonconformist 25 35 9 29 57
Catholic 24 35 10 21 46
Other religion 29 47 21 35 55
No religion 9 48 17 17 39

Source: Author’s analysis of Gallup opinion poll, May 1975.

*Refers to the age at which a respondent completed their full-time education.

 

Table 3(b): Paranormal beliefs by sociodemographic group (percent saying ‘yes’)

Ghosts UFOs Faith healing Being able to forecast Lucky charms Exchanging messages
Overall 18 20 43 51 20 12
Men 16 24 38 45 14 11
Women 20 16 47 56 26 13
Aged 16-24 28 28 38 57 25 15
Aged 25-34 22 24 38 58 18 12
Aged 35-44 14 20 35 49 13 7
Aged 45-54 23 22 51 44 25 16
Aged 55-64 12 12 51 52 23 10
Aged 65+ 7 10 45 45 16 10
*Education: 14 or under 12 13 46 46 23 13
Education: 15 18 20 38 52 18 10
Education: 16 19 25 39 55 17 9
Education 17 26 26 38 58 12 12
Education: 18 or over 33 31 50 58 19 20
Social grade: AB 16 23 44 50 16 12
Social grade: C1 22 23 50 57 14 13
Social grade: C2 19 20 38 49 19 10
Social grade: DE 15 17 42 49 27 13
Church of England 20 21 47 54 24 12
Church of Scotland 10 8 33 40 12 8
Nonconformist 16 13 49 56 11 9
Catholic 18 21 29 50 20 11
Other religion 21 26 53 59 26 22
No religion 15 22 32 34 7 10

Source: Author’s analysis of Gallup opinion poll, May 1975.

*Refers to the age at which a respondent completed their full-time education.

 

Table 4 sheds some light on the crossover of religious and paranormal beliefs amongst the British public in the mid-1970s by showing levels of paranormal belief based on responses to the religious belief questions. That is, we can compare levels of belief in the paranormal amongst those who did or who did not express belief in God, in heaven, and so on.The association between religious and paranormal beliefs

When individuals are grouped by belief in God, belief in the paranormal tended to be highest amongst those who expressed believed in God; not those who expressed disbelief in God. The same pattern is evident when individuals are grouped based on belief (or not) in heaven, in hell, in the devil and in life after death. In other words, there is no obvious basis for saying that religious and paranormal beliefs tended to be mutually exclusive belief systems amongst many individuals. In actual fact, those who held religious beliefs were more likely than those who did not to express belief in a range of paranormal phenomena. Of course, often significant proportions of those who did not subscribe to particular religious did affirm belief in paranormal phenomena, but usually they were outranked by those who did hold common religious beliefs.

 

Table 4: Paranormal beliefs by religious beliefs (percent saying ‘yes’)

  Hypnotism Black magic Horoscopes Thought transference Ghosts UFOs
God Yes 39 13 31 50 20 20
No 45 14 18 41 13 17
Heaven Yes 36 13 33 51 20 21
No 44 13 21 43 15 19
Hell Yes 45 22 36 61 32 29
No 39 10 25 45 14 18
Devil Yes 45 26 36 61 36 27
No 39 9 26 44 13 17
Life after death Yes 49 18 37 61 29 24
No 34 10 22 37 9 15
Faith healing Being able to forecast Lucky charms Exchanging messages Reincarnation
God Yes 48 52 23 14 29
No 28 50 12 5 8
Heaven Yes 50 55 26 15 36
No 32 47 14 8 9
Hell Yes 55 60 25 24 44
No 39 49 19 9 19
Devil Yes 56 61 28 26 39
No 39 48 19 8 19
Life after death Yes 58 63 25 22 43
No 31 44 18 7 10

Source: Author’s analysis of Gallup opinion poll, May 1975.

 

Table 5 looks at the association between these types of belief in reverse: that is, it shows levels of religious belief based on ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses to the questions on paranormal belief. So, for example, of those who expressed a belief in hypnotism, 68% expressed belief in God, compared to 75% of those who did not believe in hypnotism (and so on).

 

Table 5: Religious beliefs by paranormal beliefs (percent saying ‘yes’)

  God Heaven Hell Devil Life after death
Hypnotism Yes 68 44 21 22 42
No 75 55 17 16 29
Black magic Yes 68 48 32 38 48
No 72 50 16 16 33
Horoscopes Yes 79 60 25 25 47
No 68 46 16 17 30
Thought transference Yes 75 53 25 25 45
No 70 47 13 13 25
Ghosts Yes 79 55 34 39 56
No 71 49 15 15 30
UFOs Yes 72 54 28 27 43
No 73 51 17 18 35
Faith healing Yes 79 58 25 26 47
No 65 45 15 14 25
Being able to forecast Yes 73 53 23 23 43
No 73 50 15 16 28
Lucky charms Yes 83 64 24 28 44
No 68 47 18 17 33
Exchanging messages Yes 82 63 38 42 66
No 71 49 17 17 31
Reincarnation Yes 92 79 37 34 67
  No 64 39 13 15 23

Source: Author’s analysis of Gallup opinion poll, May 1975.

 

A belief typology

Given Tables 4-5 presented the finely-grained detail of how paranormal beliefs are associated with religious beliefs and vice versa, it is helpful to try and distil the essence of this messy and complex association between different types of belief. As a final step in profiling the nature of belief in the British population in mid-1970s, belief indices for religious and paranormal beliefs were computed (based on all of the different beliefs utilised above), in order to arrive at an overall typology of belief. This was undertaken based on the procedures and category labels set out in Rice (2003: 103-104).[ii] Producing two separate belief indices and then looking at the association between them produces a four-fold typology of belief (‘sceptics’; ‘classic paranormal believers’; ‘traditional religious believers’; ‘full believers’), and allows us, in broad terms, to see the proportions contained within each belief type. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 6 (for all individuals) and in Tables 7-8 (respectively, for women and men).

 

Table 6: Belief typology (ALL)

Tend not to believe in traditional religious phenomena Tend to believe in traditional religious phenomena

 
Tend not to believe in classic paranormal Sceptics: 52% Traditional religious believers: 24%
Tend to believe in classic paranormal phenomena Classic paranormal believers: 10% Full believers: 14%

Source: Author’s analysis of Gallup opinion poll, May 1975.

Note: Based on the analytical procedures set out in Rice (2003: 103-104), and using the same category labels.

 

We can say that in the mid-1970s – and probably rather surprisingly – about half (52%) could be categorised as ‘sceptics’ – that is, they tended not to believe in traditional religious beliefs and paranormal beliefs, on the basis of the typology constructed based on Rice’s procedures (2003). One in ten (10%) tended to believe in only paranormal phenomena, outranked by the larger share who were ‘traditional religious believers’ (24%). When the belief typology is reproduced for women and men separately, we can see that women were more likely to have ‘full believers’ and ‘traditional religious believers’, and less likely to have been ‘sceptics’. There was no difference in the proportion of ‘classic paranormal believers’ amongst women and men. Again, it should be noted that this typology is based on a single snapshot of popular beliefs from a one post-war survey – of course the results could well be different if varied sets of religious and paranormal beliefs were used; and a more nuanced typology could be applied to the data.

 

Table 7: Belief typology (WOMEN)

Tend not to believe in traditional religious phenomena Tend to believe in traditional religious phenomena

 
Tend not to believe in classic paranormal Sceptics: 42% Traditional religious believers: 30%
Tend to believe in classic paranormal phenomena Classic paranormal believers: 10% Full believers: 19%

Source: Author’s analysis of Gallup opinion poll, May 1975.

Note: Based on the analytical procedures set out in Rice (2003: 103-104), and using the same category labels.

 

Table 8: Belief typology (MEN)

Tend not to believe in traditional religious phenomena Tend to believe in traditional religious phenomena

 
Tend not to believe in classic paranormal Sceptics: 64% Traditional religious believers: 18%
Tend to believe in classic paranormal phenomena Classic paranormal believers: 10% Full believers: 9%

Source: Author’s analysis of Gallup opinion poll, May 1975.

Note: Based on the analytical procedures set out in Rice (2003: 103-104), and using the same category labels.

 

Summary

The empirical results reported above showed that, overall, religious and paranormal beliefs were subscribed to by varying segments of the adult population in mid-1970s Britain. In terms of belief across different social groups, women were consistently more likely affirm belief in both religious tenets and paranormal phenomena. The results for the belief typology showed that, in more general terms, women were more likely to have been ‘full believers’ and ‘traditional religious believers’ than men.

Of course, analysing a single survey from the mid-1970s (and no claims are made here that this period is – or is not – of particular note for studying religious change in general or beliefs in particular in post-war Britain) provides a very limited window into the incidence, patterning and overlap of religious and paranormal beliefs within the British public in the post-war period. However, given the coverage of both types of belief in the survey – generally not available in other survey datasets available to academic researchers, certainly those held at the UKDS – the modest empirical findings presented and discussed here may offer some nuggets of interest to sociologists of religion and social historians focusing on the British context, however time-bound the analysis may be. Replicating this exercise using a contemporary sample survey of the British adult population, with suitable coverage of both religious and paranormal beliefs, may shed some light on areas of change in popular belief across the intervening decades.

 

References and further reading

Clements, B. (2016), Surveying Christian Beliefs and Religious Debates in Post-War Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Field C. D. (2015a), Religion in Great Britain, 1939-99: A Compendium of Gallup Poll Data. BRIN Working Papers on Religious Statistics. Working Paper 2. February 2015. Available at: http://www.brin.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Religion-in-Great-Britain-1939-99-A-Compendium-of-Gallup-Poll-Data.pdf

Field, C. D. (2015b), Britain’s Last Religious Revival? Quantifying Belonging, Behaving, and Believing in the Long 1950s. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gill, R. (2003), The Empty Church Revisited. London: Ashgate.

Gill, R., Kirk Hadaway, C. and Marler, P. L. (1998), ‘Is Religious Belief Declining in Britain?’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37(3): 507-516.

Rice, T. W. (2003), ‘Believe It Or Not: Religious and Other Paranormal Beliefs in the United States’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42(1): 95-106.

Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited. Gallup Poll, May 1975. [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 1330, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-1330-1.

[i] For ‘non-traditional religious beliefs’ Gill et al (1998) noted that: ‘These items reflect a heterodox collection of ideas with decidedly cultic and “pre-Christian’ connotations. They are often disparaged as “superstitious.” Such beliefs may also connect to more recent new religious or “new age” movements with antiinstitutional, nonmaterialistic, and nonrational features’ (512).

[ii] The religious belief index was created by adding up responses towards the five religious beliefs and the paranormal belief index was created by adding up responses towards the eleven paranormal beliefs. For each individual in the sample, a value of 1 was assigned for each phenomenon they did not believe in (‘yes’ responses) and a value of 2 for each phenomenon they did believe in (‘no responses’). ‘Don’t know’ responses were assigned a value of 1.5. The indices ranged from 5-10 for the religious beliefs and 11-22 for the paranormal beliefs. Both indices were then divided into two categories. For the religious belief index, scores of 5–7.5 were given the value of 1 and scores of 8-10 were given the value of 2. For the paranormal belief index, scores of 11-16.5 were given the value of 1 and scores of 17-22 were given the value of 2. For more information, and to see this analysis undertaken for beliefs in the United States, see Rice (2003: 103-104).

Posted in Historical studies, Measuring religion, Religious beliefs, Research note, Survey news, Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The 1957 Youth Research Council Survey of Young People’s Religion and Lifestyles

Posted on April 22, 2016 by Siobhan McAndrew

It’s my pleasure to announce the publication online of a survey dataset, the 1957 Youth Research Council Survey of Young People’s Religion and Lifestyles (SN 7933). This is a project on which I’ve worked for some time, to digitise and make more widely available a large-scale survey of English youth fielded almost 60 years ago.

This project was originally of BRIN inspiration: Clive Field serves as a trustee on the Pastoral Research Centre Trust, a social research institute established and directed by the demographer and religious sociologist Tony Spencer. Clive suggested this project as one where digitisation would help preserve a valuable and high-quality data source both for wider use by sociologists of religion, and for the longer term. He summarised the data source as follows in his 1987 work on religious data sources:

‘[A] major study… conducted in January and February 1957 by the Roman Catholic Young Christian Worker movement with technical assistance from the [Newman Demographic Survey]. Interviews were held with 8,196 persons aged fifteen to twenty-four living in randomly selected streets of twenty-eight London boroughs and thirty English provincial towns and cities with a population in excess of forty thousand. The full questionnaire, which was given to all non-Anglican respondents and to thirty per cent of the five thousand Church of England adherents, covered socio-demographic characteristics, belief in god, Christ heaven and hell, attendance at Sunday school or catechism, public worship and Holy Communion, and confirmation. Proper weighting (to correct for the over-representation of Catholics and fifteen to nineteen year olds) and analysis of the data was never completed on account of shortages both of time and money, and the only significant publication to have arisen from the project was a special double issue of New Life’ (Field 1987: 263).

The survey was conducted jointly by the Young Christian Workers (YCW) and the Newman Demographic Survey (NDS) under a joint committee, namely the Youth Research Council. The YCW interest lay in gathering data for the YCW’s international congress in Rome. It had an activist mission: its motto then and now was ‘See, Judge, Act’. National associations were asked by the YCW headquarters in Brussels to report on young workers in their countries. Frank Lane (1926-1993), then a full-time organiser for the YCW and later to become its chief administrator in England, contacted the Newman Demographic Survey for advice.

Tony Spencer established both the Newman Demographic Survey, in 1953, and the PRC as a legacy organisation in 1964. Inconsistency of funding and programmatic independence caused difficulties for the NDS, as detailed on the PRC website. Spencer managed much of the work of the NDS and PRC alongside a civil service career, military service, and then an academic career at Queen’s University Belfast. He also gave service to the wider community as founder of Lagan College, the first integrated school in Belfast, established in 1981. More on the founding of Lagan College can be learned here.

The YRC 1957 study was a particularly attractive project for many reasons. Commercial polling had come to Britain in the 1930s via Gallup, and government surveys were in their early stages in the 1950s. Among academic studies, the Glass mobility study of 1949, the Family Expenditure Survey of 1961, and British Election Study from 1963 were the first major examples. So it hails from the earlier years of survey research in Britain, and having this dataset available to the scholarly community helps turn this period from one of historical interest to one of social scientific interest. What are apparently the ‘relics of history’ are amenable to standard analytic tools and arguably of contemporary interest.

Even in the US, where the quantitative study of religion is firmly established, the earliest survey data available on religion are Gallup polling data from 1939. Notable early US studies include Gerhard Lenski’s sample of 656 Detroit residents in 1958, reported in his 1961 classic, The Religious Factor, and the first large-scale surveys of American religiosity launched in 1963 by Charles Glock and Rodney Stark.

The detail it provides on young English Catholics is also important. It is now largely forgotten that Irish immigrants were once seen as a social and cultural threat, and it may be that analysis of these data will help shed light on the successful integration of a distinct religious minority.

Further, it is of good quality for a study of its time and comparable quality would be very expensive nowadays when young people are hard-to-reach by survey researchers. There is lots of evidence in the archives of care and thought given to sampling and questionnaire design, with further details in the survey’s Technical Report. Expert advice was sought from survey researchers in government and at Gallup, and also from the Director of Mass Observation. Of the towns and boroughs which were selected for the stratified sample, a 2 per cent sample was taken of those aged 15-24.

The survey was also fascinating in terms of how it was produced. There was almost no funding available – £200 provided by the YCW in 1956, worth about £4500 now. That had to cover the printing of questionnaires and tabulation of the responses for computer analysis as well as the analysis itself. The survey was fielded by volunteers from the Young Christian Workers, mostly young people in their teens and early 20s, with little free time outside work. The survey design, coding up of responses and analysis of the headline results depended very much on the NDS and its advisers working in an entirely voluntary capacity, in the interests of gathering data on youth religiosity and particularly Catholic religiosity at a time of high immigration from Ireland in particular. A similar study nowadays – face-to-face, aiming for good coverage of minority communities – would require funding of several hundreds of thousands of pounds, according to one reviewer of the project.

More importantly, the dataset provides an important insight into youth lifestyle and attitudes to religion in late industrial society. This period is now slipping farther back in British memory, and yet is still part of our present: the majority of that cohort is still alive. Accordingly, the survey is both history and social science, informing us of the youth of the Silent Generation, which is now enjoying retirement or still working, still volunteering and politically-active, and caring for dependents. The target population is now aged 74 to 83. Their social attitudes are borne of memories of wartime and post-war austerity, strong trade unions and a large manufacturing sector, almost full employment in their formative years, and for a lucky few, the provision of free university education. While the late 1950s are commonly thought of as the age of beatniks and rock’n’roll, there is actually little evidence of widespread cultural change – that apparently awaited the 1960s – although 1957 was arguably the first year when television dominated the radio. In providing additional data on what young people were doing on Sundays, and the societies and clubs they belonged to, the survey also tells us of youth leisure and civic life at the time.

For completion of the digitisation project, I was very lucky to be awarded what was, coincidentally, a similar amount of funding by the Nuffield Foundation to that originally provided by the YCW. The practical side was interesting in that there were not many exemplars; very helpful advice on data capture was provided by economists Andrew Newell and Tim Leunig.

On beginning the project, it also seemed that there was a certain amount of data loss – to damp and some boxes of forms were lost so that about half the London boroughs are not represented. The IBM punchcards were also lost over the years. 5832 responses survive.

An example of an original form is given below (click on the images for enlarged versions). Many written-in answers had been coded by the original coding team, notably one Mrs Jane Platts, whose work in coding occupations was stellar. The closed responses had also been ringed by the interviewer, and again back at the NDS offices where checks were made for consistency. The excellent Digital Divide Data took receipt of the set of scanned images and recorded responses in an Excel spreadsheet for further processing.

YCW-example-1 YCW-example-2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This spreadsheet then required further cleaning and checking (and the written-in responses to religious questions remains to be done). The published dataset, available in both SPSS and Stata formats, includes the close-form variables; written-in responses to questions on how time was spent last Sunday, associational memberships and occupation; a number of derived variables; full variable labelling; and has the different types of missingness identified. The Technical Report explains further.

Finally, I created poststratification weights using 1951 Census data together with Spencer’s own estimates of the 15-24 Catholic population of England.

In further posts I will give some examples of individual responses to particular questions to help give a flavour of religious attitudes at the time. There is also the potential for interesting qualitative work drawing on the written-in responses, marginalia and survey paradata.

For now, thanks are due the Nuffield Foundation for funding digitisation costs (SGS/37651). Some of this work was also completed while I was Marston Research Fellow at the University of Manchester, supported by the Marston Family Trust, for which I am extremely grateful; this dataset will inform further work on youth socialisation. The UK Data Service, particularly Louise Bolger and Karen Dennison, were very helpful in advising on preparing the dataset for publication.

For their technical and practical help in digitising the survey, and agreement for granting of copyright clearance for publication online, thanks are also due to:

Phil Callaghan, National President, Young Christian Workers England and Wales

Chhuon Chipon, Digital Divide Data, Cambodia

Martin Cooney, Servicepoint UK, Manchester

James Duff, Conservation Team Leader, John Rylands University Library

Kate Duncan, Digital Divide Data, New York

Clive Field OBE, Director of British Religion in Numbers and Honorary Research Fellow of the Universities of Birmingham and Manchester

Anthony Heath, Professor of Sociology, University of Oxford

Michael Hornsby-Smith, Emeritus Professor of Sociology, University of Surrey

Johanna Juselius, former graduate student in Social Change, University of Manchester

Tim Leunig, then Associate Professor in Economic History, London School of Economics

Tessa Liburd, graduate student in Sociology, University of Manchester

Andrew Newell, Lecturer in Economics, University of Sussex

Paul Norman, Lecturer in Human Geography, University of Leeds

David Voas, Director of British Religion in Numbers and Head of Department of Social Science at UCL Institute of Education

Particular thanks are due to Tony Spencer, whose extraordinary efforts led to the fielding and then preservation of the survey. In turn, in the report of the survey’s headline results made in 1958, he paid tribute to the numerous volunteers who knocked on doors interviewing respondents:

‘to the National Organisers and Regional Leaders who spent weeks travelling the country, preparing street lists by day and briefing interviewers in the evenings: to the Y.C.W. Headquarters Staff who administered and maintained the momentum of the work: and above all to the many hundreds of members of the Y.C.W. and of the Legion of Mary, Knights of St. Columba, the Cell, the Children of Mary, youth clubs, teachers and training colleges and University students, who spent night after night and several week-ends, in wet or cold weather, calling at every house in a particular street, doing one or two interviews and then going on to the next listed street, perhaps some way away, and returning another day to call again at houses where everyone, or all of the young people of the household were found to be out’ (Spencer 1958: 8-9).

References

Barley, Lynda, Field, Clive D., Kosmin, Barry A., and Nielsen, Jorgen S (1987), Reviews of United Kingdom Statistical Sources XX: Religion (Pergamon Press, Oxford).

Spencer, A.E.C.W. (1958), ‘Youth and Religion’, New Life, Vol. 14, pp. 1-59.

The full technical report is available here:  http://doc.ukdataservice.ac.uk/doc/7933/mrdoc/pdf/7933uguide.pdf

In terms of papers analysing data from the survey:

Siobhan McAndrew and Lindsay Richards, ‘Nothing to Do in the Affluent Society’ (Working Paper) examines youth leisure and associational memberships in terms of religious affiliation. Further work is underway with Stephen Bullivant looking specifically at religious practice and belief.

Posted in Attitudes towards Religion, church attendance, Historical studies, Measuring religion, Religion and Social Capital | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

ComRes on Religion and Other News

Posted on January 24, 2015 by Clive D. Field

 

ComRes on religion

Exactly half the whole population (and 71% of those professing no religion) now denies that religion is a force for good in the world, according to a ComRes poll for ITV News on 16-18 January 2015, for which 2,036 adults were interviewed online. Only 24% overall agreed with the proposition with 26% undecided. Christianity was viewed somewhat more positively, a plurality (39%) agreeing that it is a force for good in the world (peaking at 55% of over-65s and 63% of Christians), against 30% who disagreed (including 53% of religious nones) and 31% who did not know. However, although 44% judged that religious leaders in Britain should not get involved in political debates (compared with 34% who thought they should), in practice there was majority support for some specific recent interventions: 65% approved of the criticisms made by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York of the behaviour of shoppers in the Black Friday sales; 63% of their charge that Britain has become dominated by consumerism and selfishness; and 50% of religious leaders speaking out about economic inequality. Data tables are at:   

http://comres.co.uk/polls/ITV_News_Index_Religion_20th_January_2015.pdf

British Cohort Study

On 27 April 2014 BRIN included in one of its regular weekly round-ups of religious statistical news an item on ‘When we’re 42’. This contained a preliminary (topline) analysis of a short religion module which had formed part of the latest wave of the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS), which has been following the lives of babies born in Britain one week in 1970. Information was gathered by TNS BMRB between May 2012 and April 2013 from 9,841 members of the cohort at the age of 42, by a combination of face-to-face interview and self-completion questionnaire, the religion questions appearing on the self-completion form.  

A much fuller (27-page) analysis of the module, incorporating various cross-tabulations, was published on 21 January 2015 as Centre for Longitudinal Studies Working Paper 2015/1: David Voas, The Mysteries of Religion and the Lifecourse. It will also appear in a forthcoming issue of the journal Longitudinal and Life Course Studies but meanwhile can be accessed via the link at: 

http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/page.aspx?&sitesectionid=939&sitesectiontitle=Recent+working+papers

The press release for the report led on the substantial gender differences which were found in the two religious beliefs which were enquired into, an emphasis which was then reflected in the media coverage, although the phenomenon is hardly novel and, as Voas comments, still lacks a clear resolution. Perhaps of greater interest are his methodological conclusions and observations arising from the research, with a plea to avoid over-reliance on single-item measures of religiosity. This is exemplified in the sevenfold religious typology proposed by the author in table 8, based on pooling BCS data about religious identity, religious attendance, and belief in God and life after death, and which demonstrates that religiosity is far from being a black and white matter. The table is reproduced below: 

Label Description

%
Non-religious Does not have a religion and believes in neither God nor life after death

28
Nominally religious Identifies with a religion but believes in neither God nor life after death

7
Unorthodox non-religious Does not have a religion or does not attend services, believes in God or life after death but not both

21
Unorthodox religious Has a religion and attends services at least occasionally, believes in God but not life after death (or vice versa)

5
Non-identifying believers Does not have a religion but believes in God and life after death

10
Non-practising religious Has a religion and believes in God and life after death but does not attend services

14
Actively religious Has a religion and believes in God and life after death and attends services

15

Religious affiliation

Lord Ashcroft’s latest themed political opinion poll was published on 14 January 2015, this time on public attitudes to the National Health Service. Fieldwork was conducted online between 14 and 24 November 2014 among adults aged 18 and over, and, as usual, there was a background question asked about religious affiliation: ‘which of the following religious groups do you consider yourself to be a member of?’ Summary weighted findings appear below, with comparisons from previous years, from which it will be seen that Christian disaffiliation and profession of no faith are proceeding relatively rapidly. The full results (with breaks by gender, age, social grade, region, employment sector, working status, educational attainment, and voting intention) can be found in table 149 of the data tables at: 

http://lordashcroftpolls.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/NHS-poll-Full-data-tables.pdf 

% down

11/2011 All

11/2012 All

11/2013 All

11/2014 All

11/2014 18-24

11/2014 65+
Christian

56.4

55.0

52.6

53.7

32.4

72.1
Non-Christian

6.6

6.5

7.4

7.0

13.3

3.2
No religion

35.2

36.3

37.7

37.0

49.4

23.4
Refused

1.8

2.2

2.3

2.4

4.9

1.3
N =

5,000

20,066

8,053

20,011

2,402

4,201

Rating Pope Francis

Pope Francis was quick to condemn the Islamist outrages in Paris, but he subsequently raised more than a few eyebrows when he told journalists that there were limits to freedom of expression and that the faith of others should not be insulted, even cracking a joke in the process about punching anybody who foul-mouthed his own mother. The majority of Britons (51%) disagreed with the Pope’s (unguarded) statement (Londoners and UKIP voters most strongly, on 59%), against 36% who supported it, according to an online poll by YouGov among 1,747 Britons on 18-19 January 2015. Reviewing his pontificate more generally, 51% thought that the Pope is doing a good job, up by 15 points over two YouGov surveys undertaken during his first year in office in 2013, and very few (7%) suggested he is doing a bad job, as many as 42% being undecided. Almost one-quarter (23%) claimed they had a more positive view of the Catholic Church as a result of Pope Francis, albeit the plurality who hold a negative view of the Church is still as large as ever (36%, the same as in November 2013), the over-60s being most negative (48%). Nearly two-fifths (39%, 8 points up on November 2013) anticipated that the Pope would make the Church more liberal, notwithstanding there is as yet little tangible evidence that its teachings are about to be ‘modernized’ in any substantive way. A blog about the survey was published on 20 January 2015, with a link to the data tables, at: 

https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/01/20/pope-francis-approval-rise/

Immigration

A plurality (47%) of the British public believes that immigration has weakened Christian values in Britain, according to an online poll by Survation for the think-tank Bright Blue, for which 1,052 adults were interviewed between 12 and 16 September 2014 (although the results were only released on 19 January 2015). The proportion holding this view soared to 81% among UKIP voters and also constituted a majority for several other demographic sub-groups, including retired people (66%), the over-55s (62%), Conservative voters (56%), the lowest (DE) social grade (55%), men (54%), and married persons (53%). Just 19% of the whole sample disagreed with the proposition that immigration had weakened Christian values in Britain, while 25% neither agreed nor disagreed and 8% registered as don’t knows. On a related matter, and referring to a recent situation in real life, 66% of Britons favoured granting asylum in the UK to a woman from a strongly Muslim country who had been threatened with execution because of her Christian beliefs. Data tables are at: 

http://survation.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/GB-Population-tables.pdf

The same questions were also posed to a separate sample of 1,307 current Conservative voters between 12 and 30 September 2014, and these data tables are at: 

http://survation.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Conservative-Voters-tables.pdf

Anti-Semitism – Jewish perspectives

Anti-Semitism was again in the media spotlight during the past week, in the wake of the recent Islamist outrages in France, in one of which four Jews were murdered in an attack on a kosher supermarket. The heightened coverage of anti-Semitism is being underpinned by original empirical research. 

The Jewish Chronicle has published the second in its new series of Jewish topical issues polls, undertaken by Survation among a representative sample of 939 UK Jews (including secular and non-practising) aged 18 and over, who were interviewed by telephone on 19-20 January 2015. Notwithstanding greater efforts being made by the authorities to protect Jews, 58% claimed not to have noticed any increased police presence in their own areas during the past fortnight (against 40% who had), with Jewish over-55s most likely to have detected no improvement (70%). Asked whether the Government was doing all it could to combat anti-Semitism, only 33% answered in the affirmative, while 55% thought it should be doing more (rising to 61% of female Jews and 64% of under-35s). However, there was majority welcome (60%) from UK Jews for the letter which the Communities Minister had written to Muslim leaders calling for renewed efforts on their part to explain how Islam can be part of British identity. Data tables, with breaks by age, gender, and region, are at:  

http://survation.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Jewish-Issues-Poll-2.pdf

As well as summarizing the results of its own poll, the current issue of The Jewish Chronicle (23 January 2015, pp. 6-7, 35) also allocated space to continued discussion about the validity of the poll of Jews conducted online by the Campaign against Antisemitism (CAA) between 23 December 2014 and 11 January 2015, whose findings were rather alarmist (as featured in our last post on 18 January 2015). In The Jewish Chronicle, CAA chair Gideon Falter had an article strongly affirming the ‘bulletproof’ nature of his organization’s research, while distinguished academic (and Holocaust survivor) Michael Pinto-Duschinsky urged the newspaper’s readers ‘don’t trust these misleading figures’, backing up previous criticisms of them by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research. Meanwhile, Geoffrey Alderman, a regular columnist on The Jewish Chronicle, called for an end to ‘point-scoring’ about the CAA survey of Jews, although he was skating on somewhat thin ice himself since he had apparently made some use of the CAA data in an article he had written for The Spectator. 

Anti-Semitism – public opinion

A survey of public attitudes to Jews and the Holocaust was published by the European Jewish Congress on 21 January 2015. It was designed by 202 Strategies and undertaken by Survation among a sample of 504 UK adults aged 18-35 (48% of whom described themselves as not religious), who were interviewed online between 8 and 10 January 2015. A significant minority of respondents was found to have ambiguous, prejudiced, or ill-informed views on both topics, albeit some might consider a few of the questions to be a little leading. Although a majority (53%) acknowledged the existence of anti-Semitism in the UK, 23% denied it and 24% were undecided. Three-fifths had been taught about the Holocaust at school but fewer, 40%, regarded it as the most important event in European history over the last century, just 34% knew who Adolf Eichmann was, 31% underestimated the number of Jews who had perished in the Holocaust (with a further 21% unable to answer at all), and only 29% were aware of Holocaust Memorial Day. One in seven inclined to Holocaust denial in that they agreed ‘the evidence surrounding the Holocaust is not complete and I would need to see more proof to believe without a doubt that it occurred’. A similar proportion (15%) backed the introduction of a legal requirement for businesses owned by Jews to have a special form of identification (22% saying the same about Muslim businesses) and 15% wanted individual Jews to carry religious identification (13% wishing to see a similar obligation on Christians). One-quarter thought it very or somewhat likely that laws discriminating against Jews could be passed in Europe today, and 24% anticipated that another Holocaust might happen in Europe during their lifetime. Full data tables have not yet been released (and may not be, since 202 Strategies rather than Survation did the analysis), but a 16-page report is available at:   

http://www.eurojewcong.org/docs/UKpoll.pdf

The Conversation of 22 January 2015 contained a preliminary analysis by Tim Bale of a poll which he had commissioned from YouGov to gauge voter reactions to the prospect of a Jewish politician leading a political party and becoming Prime Minister. This is more than a distant scenario, given that Ed Miliband leads the Labour Party and might, after the May general election, become the first British Jewish Prime Minister since 1880, albeit – conceivably – at the head of a minority or coalition government. In fact, only one-third of all UK voters are aware of Miliband’s religious background, and even fewer of those intending to vote Labour than for the other parties. Even if they were aware, for the vast majority (83%) it would apparently make no difference to their electoral choice. However, 13% of UKIP voters would be less likely to vote for a party with a Jewish leader, twice the proportion of Conservative and LibDem voters who said this, and three times the number of Labour voters. UKIP voters were also least likely (48%) to see a Jewish prime minister as equally acceptable as one from another faith, compared with 62% of all voters and 72% of Labour voters. More generally, just 10% agreed that Jews have too much influence in the country, a reduction from 18% in 2004 (albeit UKIP supporters are still at 18%). Bale’s post, which is a spin-off from his forthcoming Oxford University Press book on the Labour Party under Miliband, can be read at: 

http://theconversation.com/british-voters-open-to-a-jewish-prime-minister-but-some-are-more-welcoming-than-others-36611

Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion

Among the 11 essays in the latest edition (Vol. 25, 2014) of Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, an annual published by Brill, are a couple which might interest BRIN readers, details of which are given below: 

  • pp. 2-16, Leslie Francis and Mandy Robbins, ‘Religious Identity, Mystical Experience, and Psychopathology: A Study among Secular, Christian, and Muslim Youth in England and Wales’ – a survey of the incidence of mystical experience and its association with psychoticism and neuroticism among 203 Muslim, 477 Christian, and 378 religiously unaffiliated young people aged 14-18 attending 12 schools in England and Wales 
  • pp. 78-108, Andrew Kam-Tuck Yip and Sarah-Jane Page, ‘Religious Faith and Heterosexuality: A Multi-Faith Exploration of Young Adults’ – a survey of the sexual values, attitudes, and behaviour of 515 self-defined heterosexual religious young adults aged 18-25 living in the UK

 

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Quantiphobia and Other News

Posted on December 21, 2014 by Clive D. Field

 

Quantiphobia

Quantiphobia – the fear or suspicion of statistics – surfaces among religious leaders from time to time, and, of course, has some biblical foundation in David’s alleged sin in numbering the Israelites (2 Sam. 24:1-25, 1 Chron. 21:1-30). It is particularly likely to manifest itself during periods when religious performance indicators are perceived as unhealthy, such as during the Edwardian era in Britain, when, according to one noted historian (Keith Robbins), there was ‘a crisis of Christendom’. Thus, Charles Booth, the pioneering religious sociologist, concluded his multi-volume assessment of religious forces in London in 1902 with the verdict: ‘Spiritual influences do not lend themselves readily to statistical treatment … The subject is one in which figures may easily be pressed too far, and if trusted too much are likely to be more than usually dangerous.’ And the Protestant leadership in the capital was so paranoid about declining church attendance in 1913 that it frustrated an attempt by the Daily News and Leader to replicate a census of churchgoing first taken in 1902-03, reminding the newspaper that: ‘The influence of the Church is often in inverse proportion to its numerical strength, as in the early days, under the Roman Emperors.’ (I have written up the story of this long forgotten episode as an article for forthcoming publication). 

Notwithstanding some pockets of church growth, few informed observers would deny that most branches of organized Christianity in Britain today are facing another crisis, with downturns in key metrics of religious belonging, behaving, and believing, and with the social significance of religion declining in the non-institutional arena, too, in a quantitatively measurable way. Statistics of the Churches, therefore, rarely present a good news story from their perspective these days, causing occasional voices to be raised against their use. The latest example is to be found in an article by Edward Dowler (Vicar of Clay Hill in the Diocese of London) on ‘Lies, Damned Lies, and the Gathering of Data’ which is published in the Church Times of 19/26 December 2014, p. 12 (only available online to subscribers). In it the author advises us to ‘be wary of an overemphasis on statistics at the expense of faithfulness to the gospel’. He is especially critical of the ‘data-driven approach’ which has characterized the Church of England in recent years, exemplified (he writes, in somewhat garbled fashion) by ‘the British Religion in Numbers project associated with Professor Linda Woodhead, and her surveys on the part played by religion in public life …’ In reality, the piece is a bit of a rant by Dowler against ‘the prevailing managerialist delusion of contemporary Western society’ and ‘a clear connection between collecting data and wielding economic power’. 

Of course, statistics should never be used in complete isolation, and they must be understood and interpreted within the context of relevant and rigorous qualitative evidence, where it exists, as well as against the historical background. And we should be on our guard against ‘bad statistics’, gathered in methodologically inadequate ways and presented without due regard to their limitations. But a plea for recourse solely to qualitative data (or none at all) can often degenerate into a reliance on the anecdotal and a tendency to generalize from the atypical, with the consequent potential to mislead. What is worse, it may result in self-delusion on the part of religious leaders, and being in denial of reality. Caution and moderation in the use of statistics would be wise counsel, yet Dowler goes beyond that, which is why, in the last resort, we are unpersuaded by his arguments. Doubtless his retort to BRIN would be, in the misquoted words of one of the principal characters in the Profumo scandal (who died last week), ‘well, he would say that, wouldn’t he?’      

Religion in the 2011 English and Welsh census

For some unexplained reason, the Office for National Statistics rereleased on 16 December 2014 Table QS210EW from the 2011 census of England and Wales, giving national totals for the six principal faith communities, as well as an analysis of the write-in answers for those who ticked the ‘other religion’ and ‘no religion’ boxes. The table will be found at: 

http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/sty-what-is-your-religion.html

Religion in colonial and Commonwealth censuses

Anthony Christopher explores ‘The “Religion” Question in British Colonial and Commonwealth Censuses, 1820s-2010s’ in Journal of Religious History, Vol. 38, No. 4, December 2014, pp. 579-96. The focus is on how investigation of religious affiliation in such censuses has developed, since being pioneered by the Australasian and North American colonies in the late 1820s, rather than on the presentation of results from them (which would have been difficult, given the diversity of approaches which are described). Nevertheless, drawing as it does on a range of primary and secondary sources, it is very useful to have all this information brought together in one place, seemingly for the first time, although its value would have been enhanced by inclusion of an appendix listing for each country or territory the dates for which religion data were collected. The article, which complements the author’s summary of the coverage of religion in the UK censuses (in Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. 65, No. 3, July 2014, pp. 601-19), can be accessed at: 

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9809.12107/abstract

News stories of 2014

For its end-of-year review, Opinium Research asked 2,001 members of its UK online panel on 9-12 December 2014 which of 30 events of 2014 they considered to be most memorable. Unsurprisingly, the Ebola outbreak (49%), the First World War poppy display at the Tower of London (44%), and the Scottish independence referendum (44%) occupied the top three spots. But Islamism had also made a big impression, with the rise of Islamic State in fourth place (41%) and the kidnapping of Nigerian schoolgirls by Boko Haram in eleventh (26%). The canonization of Popes John XXIII and John Paul II, by contrast, was relegated to twenty-seventh position, being deemed memorable by just 5% of all adults (equivalent to about half the Catholic population), albeit the proportion rose to 14% in London (with its concentration of immigrants). Data tables are at: 

http://ourinsight.opinium.co.uk/sites/ourinsight.opinium.co.uk/files/op5096_lansons_end_of_year_-_predictions_memorable.pdf

Values

Asked to select their three most important personal values from a list of twelve, just 8% of 1,317 UK residents chose religion in the latest Eurobarometer (wave 82.3), undertaken by face-to-face interview by TNS UK between 8 and 17 November 2014. As the table below indicates, this was tenth in the UK’s value rankings, although not as bad as in the European Union (EU) as a whole (where religion came bottom of the list). Apart from Malta and the Republic of Cyprus (both on 17%), religion was not deemed an important personal value in most EU countries, falling to 2% in three instances. Even fewer (3% in both the UK and the EU) viewed religion as one of the three values best representing the EU, although 12% in the UK and 9% in the EU were willing to concede that religion helped create a feeling of community among EU citizens. These questions have been posed in previous Eurobarometers, with very similar results. Topline data for the latest wave are at: 

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_anx_en.pdf

Important personal values (%)

UK

EU
Respect for human life

37

34
Peace

34

44
Human rights

34

40
Equality

28

20
Individual freedom

21

25
Rule of law

19

15
Tolerance

18

17
Respect for other cultures

18

9
Democracy

17

25
Religion

8

6
Solidarity for others

6

18
Self-fulfilment

6

9

Christmas traditions

The Salvation Army’s UK Territory issued a series of five (one national and four regional) press releases between 4 and 8 December 2014, lamenting the disappearance of British Christmas traditions, both secular and religious, based on the evidence of a survey of the public which it had commissioned. Among the vanishing traditions was attendance at midnight Mass or the Christmas Eve church service, which just 7% reported plans to attend in 2014. Nativity plays and carolling were also investigated, apparently. The press releases did not present an especially coherent overview of the research and have attracted minimal media attention. BRIN’s efforts to obtain from the Salvation Army further details of the survey’s methodology and findings have gone unanswered thus far, but we will keep trying. The national press release is at:

http://news.salvationarmy.org.uk/dont-let-shopping-get-way-christmas-says-salvation-army

Church Commissioners

The Church Commissioners are the eighth largest charitable donor in the world, and the second in the UK (after the Wellcome Trust, in second place globally), according to City AM’s World Charity Index 2014, published on 18 December 2014. In their last reported year the Commissioners made £208 million of charitable donations to support the Church of England. More information about the Index can be found at: 

http://www.cityam.com/205869/city-ams-world-charity-index-2014-whos-made-list-top-givers

 

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Quality of Religious Research

Posted on December 18, 2014 by Clive D. Field

 

Durham is the UK’s top-rated university for research in theology and religious studies, according to the results of the 2014 Research Excellence Framework or REF (successor to the Research Assessment Exercise, last held in 2008), which are published today (18 December 2014). The REF was undertaken by the UK’s four higher education funding councils by means of a series of peer-review panels (theology and religious studies being unit of assessment 33), with research quality assessed from the perspective of outputs (i.e. publications, accounting for 65% of the score), social, economic, and cultural impact (20%), and research environment (15%). The outcomes of the REF will inform the distribution of funding for higher education research from 2015/16. 

Quality was judged according to whether research was world-leading (4*), internationally excellent (3*), recognized internationally (2*), recognized nationally (1*), or unclassified (U). The 4* and 3* categories combined are likely to be commonly taken as an indicator of top-notch research, and, on this basis, 68% of UK research in theology and religious studies was so rated, 8% less than for all disciplines. Durham University headed the table for 4* and 3* research in theology and religious studies (at 85%), more than three times the score of the bottom ranked institutions, although it was pipped to the post by the University of Birmingham in terms of the proportion of its research in the subject which was 4*. 

The following table summarizes the overall quality profile for theology and religious studies for each of the 33 higher education institutions (just over one-fifth of the total) which submitted for this unit of assessment, but sub-profiles for outputs, impact, and environment and the distribution of the 413 full-time equivalent staff entered for this REF unit of assessment can also be viewed at: 

http://results.ref.ac.uk/(S(b301damae2a1plttxocljhf1))/Results/ByUoa/33 

%

3*/4*

4*

3*

2*

1*/U
Durham

85

50

35

14

1
Exeter

83

21

62

14

3
Leeds

82

33

49

18

0
Cambridge

80

34

46

19

1
Birmingham

79

51

28

17

4
University College London

78

37

41

22

0
Edinburgh

78

34

44

19

3
SOAS

78

29

49

20

2
King’s College London

76

39

37

18

6
Cardiff

76

33

43

21

3
Lancaster

75

42

33

23

2
Kent

75

38

37

23

2
Manchester

75

28

47

20

5
Nottingham

74

30

44

23

3
Oxford

72

34

38

24

4
Sheffield

72

21

51

28

0
Aberdeen

68

29

39

24

8
National average

68

28

40

27

5
Bristol

66

21

45

32

2
St Andrews

62

31

31

38

0
Heythrop College London

62

22

40

36

2
Wales Trinity St David

62

14

48

26

12
Glasgow

55

11

44

35

10
Open

53

18

35

47

0
Canterbury Christ Church

53

6

47

40

7
Liverpool Hope

46

9

37

38

16
Roehampton

43

16

27

45

12
Winchester

42

6

36

43

15
St Mary’s Twickenham

35

9

26

41

24
Chester

35

8

27

57

8
Leeds Trinity

34

0

34

32

34
Gloucestershire

33

3

30

52

15
Newman

26

0

26

28

46
York St John

25

2

23

57

18

By way of footnote, and nothing to do with the REF, some BRIN readers may be interested to know that this is the 700th post since the BRIN news blog started five years ago. It is the 49th for 2014, with 293 individual stories covered during the year.

 

 

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The British Election Study 2015: Religious affiliation and attitudes

Posted on October 17, 2014 by Ben Clements

This second post, based on analysis of the British Election Study (BES) 2015, looks at selected attitudes of religious groups in Britain. Two waves of panel data (conducted in, respectively, February-March 2014 and April-June 2014) have so far been made available from the BES 2015 for wider analysis. The datasets and accompanying documentation can be found here. As with the first post, this post analyses data from wave 1 of the BES 2015 panel study. The analysis is based on a core sample size of 20,881 and the data are weighted accordingly. This post looks at party support and social attitudes. The party support questions concern how respondents’ voted in the 2005 and 2010 general elections and their current vote intention. The social attitude questions concern equal opportunities for different groups.

 

Party support

First, we can look at the pattern of voting for religious groups at the two most recent general elections, in 2005 and 2010. Data on which party a respondent voted for – Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat or some other party – are provided in Table 1. The top half of Table 1 shows reported voting behaviour in the 2005 election and the bottom half shows reported voting at the 2010 election. A parsimonious set of religious affiliation categories is used. Befitting, their historical linkages with the party, Anglicans were more likely to support the Conservatives at both recent elections, although the gap over Labour is more pronounced at the 2010 contest. For Catholics, historically seen as a key electoral constituency for the Labour Party, support for Labour was more pronounced at the 2005 contest, while their support for the two largest parties was much closer at the 2010 election. Other Christians, which includes those belonging to the Nonconformist churches and those identifying as Church of Scotland / Presbyterian, show a more balanced picture of Lab-Con party support at both elections, although with voting for Labour more common than supporting the Conservatives.

Those belonging to other religious traditions – another electoral constituency which has traditionally shown a greater propensity to vote for the Labour Party – show higher levels of support for Labour compared to the Conservatives, which was more apparent in 2005. Those with no religion show interesting variation at the two contests. In 2005, they were much more likely to have voted for Labour, but in 2010 the vote shares for Labour and the Conservatives are almost identical. At both elections, those with no religious affiliation register higher levels of support for the Lib Dems compared to all of the religious groups, which may reflect the more youthful demographic profile of the non-religious. The higher level of support for minor parties amongst other Christians partly reflects voting for the Scottish National Party amongst those identifying as Church of Scotland / Presbyterian.

 

Table 1: Voting in the 2005 and 2010 elections by religious affiliation

Anglican (%)

Catholic (%)

Other Christian (%)

Other religion (%)

No religion (%)
2005
Con

42.8

28.7

31.2

29.0

26.2
Lab

36.4

48.1

38.0

47.0

41.1
Lib Dem

16.7

15.7

16.4

17.1

23.5
Other party

4.2

7.5

14.4

7.0

9.2
2010
Con

47.7

34.4

33.0

29.0

29.9
Lab

26.2

39.1

33.7

38.9

29.8
Lib Dem

21.9

19.3

19.2

24.1

32.0
Other party

4.3

7.2

14.1

8.0

8.2

Source: BES 2015 Panel Study – Wave 1.

 

Are the patterns evident above reflected in the current vote intentions of the religious and non-religious? The following question was used in the BES 2015 to gauge current voting preferences: ‘And if there were a UK General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?’ Data are reported in Table 2, using the same sets of categories for party choice and religious affiliation. Anglicans are still more likely to report that they would vote for the Conservatives if a general election were to be held, although a fifth report they would vote for another party, which reflects some level of support for UKIP. Catholics show a strong propensity to support Labour again compared to the Conservatives. Those in the other Christian category show a slightly higher level of support for Labour. Those who belong to other religious traditions show strong support for Labour, at a slightly higher level that that registered amongst Catholics. Around half would vote for Labour and a quarter would support the Conservative Party. Amongst those with no religion, support is clearly higher for Labour, with about two-fifths declaring they would vote for them compared to just over a quarter who would support the Conservative Party. Across all groups, support for the Lib Dems is very low compared to the reported voting patterns at the 2005 and 2010 general elections – highest at about a tenth for those with no affiliation.

 

Table 2: Current vote intention by religious affiliation

Anglican (%)

Catholic (%)

Other Christian (%)

Other religion (%)

No religion (%)
Con

39.3

29.5

31.1

25.0

26.7
Lab

32.1

45.3

35.6

49.6

39.7
Lib Dem

7.5

5.1

8.1

7.1

10.5
Other party

21.1

20.2

25.2

18.3

23.2

Source: BES 2015 Panel Study – Wave 1.

 

Table 3 provides another look at current voting patterns based on affiliation, providing data for a more detailed set of religious traditions. Given recent party-political and electoral developments, it also provides separate vote share data for UKIP (whereas, in Tables 1 and 2, they were included as part of the other party category).

Given that some of these religious groups – both Christian and non-Christian – are very small in terms of the numbers belonging to them, the unweighted bases for the weighted data are also presented. Extra care should obviously be taken with the party vote share figures for those religious traditions with relatively few or very few cases in the sample (United Reformed Church, Free Presbyterian, Brethren, Sikhism, Buddhism, Hinduism).

The more detailed breakdown shows party support amongst some of the other Christian traditions and amongst different non-Christian faiths. Looking first at the Nonconformist churches, we can see that Methodists show somewhat higher support for the Conservatives than for Labour, while Baptists are more likely to favour the Labour Party, as are those who belong to the United Reformed Church. Those who identify as Church of Scotland / Presbyterian show greater support for Labour than for the Conservatives but a significant minority would vote for the SNP (captured in the other party category).

Amongst non-Christian religions, those belonging to Islam show very high support for Labour – at nearly three-quarters, this is highest across all of the groups in Table 3. Jews are more likely to support the Conservatives than Labour – a finding from other recent survey-based research – while adherents of all other faiths – in particular, Sikhism and Buddhism – show markedly higher levels of support for Labour. There is also a considerably higher propensity to vote Labour within the other category. Looking at intention to vote for UKIP, this is more prevalent amongst Anglicans than it is amongst Catholics

 

Table 3: Current vote intention by religious affiliation (full set of categories)

 

Con

Lab

Lib Dem

UKIP

Other

party

Unweighted base
Anglican (%)

39.3

32.1

7.5

18.3

2.9

4,884
Roman Catholic (%)

29.5

45.3

5.1

12.9

7.3

1,535
Presbyterian/Church of Scotland (%)

24.5

34.9

5.3

7.7

27.7

1,032
Methodist (%)

40.5

34.8

10.5

10.0

4.1

423
Baptist (%)

32.3

36.7

9.7

15.9

5.3

255
United Reformed Church (%)

27.2

35.8

12.3

7.5

16.3

73
Free Presbyterian (%)

21.7

47.8

4.3

17.4

8.7

25
Brethren (%)

15.4

53.8

0.0

30.8

0.0

11
Judaism (%)

46.3

29.9

5.4

11.6

6.2

134
Hinduism (%)

30.9

57.7

3.1

6.2

2.1

65
Islam (%)

14.9

73.0

7.3

0.8

3.6

153
Sikhism (%)

15.4

63.5

5.8

5.9

7.8

34
Buddhism (%)

24.7

38.4

6.8

13.5

17.6

73
Other (%)

23.7

42.9

8.4

11.3

13.7

572
None (%)

26.7

39.6

10.5

12.4

10.8

7,357

Source: BES 2015 Panel Study – Wave 1.

Note: Percentages sum across the rows.

 

Social issues

As well as shedding some light on the association between religious belonging and party support, the BES 2015 panel study asked questions on equal opportunities for ethnic minorities, women and gays and lesbians. The latter two issues are particularly relevant for religious groups given the various reforms made in relation to same-sex equality under recent governments – most recently, the legalisation of same-sex marriage – and also given debates over the role and status of women within, for example, the Anglicans Church, centring on the issue of women bishops. The questions asked were worded as follows:

 

Please say whether you think these things have gone too far or have not gone far enough in Britain.

Attempts to give equal opportunities to ethnic minorities.

Attempts to give equal opportunities to women.

Attempts to give equal opportunities to gays and lesbians.

 

It is worth noting that earlier BES studies asked equivalent questions (equal opportunities for women – asked on the BES surveys from 1974 to 1997, except in 1983; equal opportunities for gays and lesbians and ethnic minorities – asked on the BES surveys from 1987-1997). The pattern of responses for contemporary views based on affiliation is shown in Table 4. What is clear is that all groups are more likely to think that equal opportunities have not gone too far (or not nearly too far) for women compared to the other groups, with around a third or higher adopting this view across all categories of affiliation. In relation to equal opportunities for ethnic minorities, the view that they have not gone far enough is less prevalent across all groups; it is highest for those belonging to other religions, followed by those with no religion. Over two-fifths of Catholics and other Christians, and nearly half of Anglicans, think that equal opportunities have gone too far for ethnic minorities in Britain.

In relation to gays and lesbians, around three-tenths of those with no affiliation think that equal opportunities have not gone far enough (or nearly far enough), with such views less common amongst those with a religious identity. Views that equal opportunities for gays and lesbians have gone too far – perhaps with the recent debate and legalisation of same-sex marriage salient in the minds of some respondents – are higher amongst all religious adherents: for example, such views are twice as likely amongst other Christians as they are amongst those with no religion.

 

Table 4: Attitudes towards equal opportunities by religious affiliation

Anglican (%)

Catholic (%)

Other Christian (%)

Other religion (%)

No religion (%)
Ethnic minorities
Not gone nearly far enough or not gone far enough

10.3

15.1

13.9

26.4

19.5
About right

35.8

36.1

36.9

33.1

37.3
Gone too far or gone much too far

47.4

41.8

43.1

28.4

35.1
Don’t know

6.4

6.9

6.2

12.1

8.2
Women
Not gone nearly far enough or not gone far enough

34.8

36.6

36.0

34.2

37.9
About right

49.2

44.7

43.7

40.1

45.1
Gone too far or gone much too far

12.2

14.4

16.3

15.5

11.2
Don’t know

3.7

4.3

4.0

10.2

5.7
Gays and lesbians
Not gone nearly far enough or not gone far enough

16.0

20.3

14.1

19.6

30.2
About right

42.4

40.5

39.3

32.9

43.0
Gone too far or gone much too far

35.3

32.2

39.9

32.3

19.6
Don’t know

6.2

7.0

6.6

15.2

7.2

Source: BES 2015 Panel Study – Wave 1.

 

Summary

The BES 2015 data, as with previous studies in this series, allow for analysis of the political and social opinions of religious groups across different issues. The past (2005 and 2010 elections) and present (current voting intention) patterns of electoral support provide some recent evidence, at first sight, for the traditional associations between religious groups and particular parties. That is, Anglicans still tend to favour the Conservatives over Labour; Catholics show higher levels of support for Labour; and non-Christian religious minorities also are much more likely to favour Labour, with support highest amongst Muslims. Reflecting the clear decline in the party’s public standing since entering into coalition government, levels of support for the Lib Dems have fallen to very low levels across all groups compared their (higher) reported vote share at recent general elections.

In relation to social attitudes, there is greater variation in the views of the religious and non-religious in relation to equal opportunities for ethnic minorities and gays and lesbians, but considerably more agreement in relation to equal opportunities for women, an issue which for the Church of England has been particularly divisive, most recently in relation to the debate over women bishops.

 

Reference

Fieldhouse, E., J. Green., G. Evans., H. Schmitt, and C. van der Eijk (2014) British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 1.

Posted in Measuring religion, Religion and Politics, Religion in public debate, Research note, Survey news | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The British Election Study 2015: Religious affiliation

Posted on October 16, 2014 by Ben Clements

This post analyses the contemporary social make-up of religious belonging in Britain using data released as part of the latest British Election Study (BES), focusing on the 2015 general election. Two waves of panel data (conducted in, respectively, February-March 2014 and April-June 2014) have so far been made available for wider analysis. They can be found here. This post uses wave 1 from the BES 2015 panel study to look at the social bases of religious affiliation in Britain, looking at how religious is distributed across various socio-demographic factors (sex, age, country and region). The analysis is based on the core sample (n=20,881) from wave 1 of the BES 2015 Panel Study, and the data are weighted accordingly. Although the data released so far have not contained measures of other aspects of religion, such as attendance, given the BES’s longevity (it started in the early-1960s) and the extensive range of questions on political and social issues, the current data – and future releases as part of the 2015 study – clearly represent an important resource for scholars of religion in Britain.

It is useful to look at the overall distribution for religious affiliation, which is given in Table 1. The question wording was as follows: ‘Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?’ The most common response is that of not belonging to any religion, at 44.7%. Next, those who identify as Church of England or Anglican constitute 31.1%, followed by 9.1% who identify as Catholic. Very small proportions say they belong to other Christian traditions or denominations, such as one of the Nonconformist churches or as Church of Scotland/Presbyterian. Similarly, very small proportions report that they identify with a non-Christian faith, including Judaism, Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism and Buddhism, or some other religion.

 

Table 1: Religious affiliation

 

%
Church of England/Anglican/Episcopal

31.1
Roman Catholic

9.1
Presbyterian/Church of Scotland

3.1
Methodist

2.5
Baptist

1.3
United Reformed Church

0.5
Free Presbyterian

0.1
Brethren

0.1
Judaism

0.8
Hinduism

0.6
Islam

1.6
Sikhism

0.3
Buddhism

0.4
Other

3.7
None

44.7

Source: BES 2015 Panel Study – Wave 1.

 

Table 2 provides a summary of the data reported already but based on five categories – combining (i) those in the various Christian groups (apart from Anglicans and Catholics) and (ii) those belonging to non-Christian faiths or who responded ‘other’. It also shows the earlier data on religious affiliation from other BES surveys, covering the period from 1963 to 2015. For this period, covering over fifty years, the major features are: the decline in levels of Anglican affiliation, the steady proportions who identify as Roman Catholic, the decline in the proportions belonging to other Christian traditions, the increase in those affiliated to minority non-Christian faiths and the growth in what are often termed the ‘religious nones’. Of course, religious belonging can be affected by the question wording asked and response options available on any particular survey, and the BES questions on affiliation have not been consistently-worded over time.

 

Table 2: Religious affiliation, 1963-2015

1963 (%)

(Feb.) 1974 (%)

1987 (%)

2001 (%)

2015 (%)
Anglican

64.5

41.5

41.4

32.5

31.1
Roman Catholic

8.6

9.0

9.8

10.8

9.1
Other Christian

23.1

12.9

14.7

6.9

7.6
Other religion

0.6

2.7

2.4

7.7

7.5
None

3.2

33.8

31.8

42.1

44.7

Source: BES cross-section surveys; BES 2015 Panel Study – Wave 1.

 

It is a common finding from sociological work on religion that women are more likely to have a religious identity and to be more involved or engaged with their faith. This is apparent, in relation to belonging, for the data presented in Table 3, which shows the religious composition of men and women. While similar proportions of men and women fall within the other Christian and other religion categories (and women are slightly more likely to be Catholic), a clear difference is in the proportions who report they are Anglican – 27.7% for men and 34.3% for women. Accordingly, men are more likely to declare that they do not belong to a religion, a nearly half (48.6%) compared to just over two-fifths of women (40.0%)

 

Table 3: Religious affiliation by sex

Male (%)

Female (%)
Anglican

27.7

34.3
Roman Catholic

8.5

9.7
Other Christian

7.6

7.5
Other religion

7.5

7.5
None

48.6

41.0

Source: BES 2015 Panel Study – Wave 1.

 

Next, how does religious belonging vary by age? Table 4 presents the religious composition of seven different age groups (ranging from those aged 18-24 to those aged 75 and older). Several aspects of the data are worthy of note. First, identification as an Anglican increases steadily across age groups, lowest at just 14.2% for those aged 18-24 years and highest at half of those aged 75+ (at 52.1%). There is also a greater tendency to identify with other Christian traditions amongst the older age groups – highest at 11.6% and 10.4%, respectively, for the 65-74 and 75+ groups. Belonging to a non-Christian faith is more likely amongst younger age groups – particularly those between 18-34 years of age. The pattern in the data for having no religious affiliation is the reverse of that seen for Anglicans: that is, there is a steady decrease in the proportion with no religion as we move up the age range. Well over half of those aged 44 and under report having no affiliation, which falls to lower than three-tenths amongst those aged 65 and older.

 

Table 4: Religious affiliation by age group

18-24 (%)

25-34 (%)

35-44 (%)

45-54 (%)

55-64 (%)

65-74 (%)

75+

(%)
Anglican

14.2

19.4

23.6

32.8

39.4

46.4

52.1
Roman Catholic

8.5

8.7

9.4

9.6

9.8

8.6

7.4
Other Christian

4.0

5.6

5.3

6.7

9.4

11.6

10.4
Other religion

11.0

10.9

8.8

6.3

5.1

5.1

5.2
None

61.4

55.3

52.9

44.7

28.3

28.3

4.9

Source: BES 2015 Panel Study – Wave 1.

 

Another way at looking at the association between religious affiliation and age is to look at the mean (average) age within each religious group, data on which are presented in Table 5. It is clear that the average age of religious affiliates is highest for Anglicans (53.7 years) and other Christians (52.4 years). It is lowest for those with no religion (43.3 years) and those who belong to non-Christian faiths (42.2 years). The average age of Catholics is 47.6 years, in between the other groups.

 

Table 5: Mean age by religious group

Mean age
Anglican

53.7
Roman Catholic

47.6
Other Christian

52.4
Other religion

42.2
None

43.3

Source: BES 2015 Panel Study – Wave 1.

 

The differing religious complexion of the different nations of Britain is still apparent in the data shown in Table 6. Anglicans are much more prevalent in England and Wales than in Scotland, where the other Christian category is much more common (many of whom would identify as Church of Scotland/Presbyterian). Identifying as Roman Catholic is more prevalent in Scotland and England than in Wales. Those in England and Wales are also somewhat more likely to belong to a non-Christian religion. Levels of non-affiliation are clearly higher in Wales and Scotland.

 

Table 6: Religious affiliation by country

England

(%)

Wales

(%)

Scotland

(%)
Anglican

34.0

27.7

4.5
Roman Catholic

9.1

5.9

11.5
Other Christian

5.4

8.1

28.6
Other religion

7.8

6.5

4.7
None

43.7

51.8

50.6

Source: BES 2015 Panel Study – Wave 1.

 

Finally, Table 7 provides a breakdown of religious affiliation in the different (Government Office) regions of England. Again, historical patterns of migration and settlement by religious communities are apparent. Higher proportions of Catholics are found in the North West, North East and in London. London is also distinct from other regions in having the lowest proportion of Anglicans (24.7%), the highest proportion belonging to other religions (21.4%, followed by the West Midlands at 8.1%) and the lowest proportion with no affiliation (35.3%).

 

Table 7: Religious affiliation by English region

Anglican

Catholic

Other Christian

Other religion

No religion
North East (%)

35.1

11.9

6.1

2.9

44.0
North West (%)

33.6

14.7

5.4

5.4

41.0
Yorkshire and the Humber (%)

37.5

6.5

6.4

5.8

43.8
East Midlands (%)

35.2

5.7

5.4

5.6

48.1
West Midlands (%)

35.2

6.7

5.4

8.1

44.6
East of England (%)

34.4

7.9

5.1

6.0

46.5
London (%)

24.7

13.8

4.8

21.4

35.3
South East (%)

35.3

7.1

5.4

5.0

47.2
South West (%)

39.7

5.4

5.3

4.1

45.5

Source: BES 2015 Panel Study – Wave 1.

Note: Percentages sum across the rows.

 

 

Summary

These new data on religious affiliation from the BES 2015 shed some light on the social basis of religious affiliation in contemporary British society. There are clear differences in levels of religious affiliation (and non-affiliation) based on sex, age, and region. Demographically, women and those in older age groups are more likely to be Anglican, while men and younger people are more likely to report having no religion. Younger people are also more likely to identify with a non-Christian religion. Religious belonging also varies by nation and region, reflecting historical patterns of migration, settlement and denominational fault-lines. Non-religion is somewhat higher in Scotland and Wales while, within England, London is particularly distinctive in terms of its religious complexion.

 

NB: A second note, to accompany this one, will look at the social and political attitudes of religious groups using the same data from the BES 2015.

 

Reference

Fieldhouse, E., J. Green., G. Evans., H. Schmitt, and C. van der Eijk (2014) British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 1.

Posted in Measuring religion, Research note, Survey news | Tagged , , , , , | 5 Comments