Papal Visit – Final Reckoning

Posted on March 6, 2011 by Clive D. Field

A significant amount of controversy surrounded the run-up to the state and pastoral visit of Pope Benedict XVI to Scotland and England on 16-19 September 2010, although, in retrospect, the visit was deemed by many to have been a success. Police estimates suggest that 500,000 people saw the pontiff during these four days, either at the events or along the popemobile routes.

One of the factors exercising voters and secularist organizations at the time was the likely cost of the visit, especially to the public purse. A large majority of the adult population in ComRes and Populus polls were opposed to taxpayer funding of the Pope’s tour, even though it was partly categorized as an official state visit. See our reports on these surveys at http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/?p=524 and http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/?p=562

The arguments about the cost of the visit were compounded by rumour and speculation, by the apparent lack of firm estimates, and by less than full transparency on the part of the Government and the Roman Catholic Church.

Only now, almost six months after the Pope flew back to Rome, are we beginning to get some financial clarity, greatly assisted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)’s recent release of some key documents.

These comprise the ‘contractual’ agreement between FCO, acting as budget holder for the visit, and the Church and a final statement of FCO non-policing expenditure on the visit (significantly, the draft budget was not divulged).

These papers can be viewed, under the reference DEP2011-0309.ZIP, in the deposited papers database section of the House of Commons Library website at:

http://deposits.parliament.uk./

The costs of the visit, as presented by FCO, essentially divide into three main components: a) costs incurred by FCO on behalf of Government; b) costs initially incurred by FCO but rechargeable to the Church, and to be refunded by the Church before 1 March 2011; and c) costs incurred directly by the Church.

Category a) costs are now known to have come to £6,981,000, split between seven Government Departments (including the Department for International Development, a fact which sparked some furore when it belatedly came to light on 3 February). This total was actually lower than anticipated, so each Department will get back £600,000 of the £1,850,000 which it had to pre-pay FCO.

The most expensive single Government item was £3,031,000 for the provision of media centre facilities at all the venues (some 3,000 media representatives were accredited). Other big-ticket (six-figure) items were:

  • £1,674,000 towards the beatification mass for John Henry Newman at Cofton Park, Birmingham and the follow-on meeting at Oscott College (19 September)
  • £484,000 for the event at St Mary’s University College, Twickenham (17 September)
  • £328,000 for the prayer vigil in Hyde Park, London (18 September)
  • £312,000 for live news feeds
  • £284,000 for the events in Westminster Hall and Westminster Abbey (17 September)
  • £264,000 for the mass at Bellahouston Park, Glasgow (16 September)
  • £147,000 for public liability insurance
  • £103,000 for pre-visit venue location and research costs

Category b) costs came to £6,347,000, of which £4,431,000 was incurred in connection with the beatification mass at Cofton Park and £1,180,000 for the Hyde Park vigil. The Church also paid £385,000 towards the St Mary’s event and picked up the webstreaming costs of £115,000, besides contributing to five other budget-lines.

Category c) costs were estimated by FCO at £3,800,000, and this figure has not been contradicted by the Church.

Category b) and c) costs combined therefore amount to about £10,100,000, well above the Church’s original estimate of its own expenditure of £7,000,000, but reasonably close to its final pre-visit forecast of between £9,000,000 and £10,000,000.

A statement recently issued by Papal Visit Ltd., the company set up by the Roman Catholic bishops’ conferences of England and Wales and Scotland, said that it had already raised £7,500,000 towards this £10,100,000.

The outstanding £2,600,000 will be taken up and underwritten by the dioceses, which will need to find the money by October 2012.

Unfortunately, some costs were not recorded centrally by FCO and are thus omitted from the foregoing analysis. According to the written statement by Henry Bellingham, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to the House of Commons on 16 February, these exclusions appear to be:

  • policing costs
  • security services costs
  • local authorities costs
  • Whitehall Government Department staffing costs
  • Scottish Government costs

These exclusions prompted the National Secular Society (NSS), which has been an implacable critic of the visit throughout, to issue a press release on 25 February, accusing FCO of publishing figures which ‘just don’t add up’, and providing some of the missing data itself. This statement can be read at:

http://www.secularism.org.uk/pope-visit-figures-just-dont-add.html

Policing and local authority costs were said by FCO to have been ‘met within existing budgets’, but some more exact figures have emerged, for example £293,000 actually spent by Edinburgh City Council and £82,000 by Birmingham City Council.

Expenditure on policing has been especially disputed. Shortly before the papal visit, the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, who was co-ordinating policing arrangements, put forward an estimate of between £1,000,000 and £1,500,000 for police costs. This was dismissed by NSS at the time as ‘total nonsense’.

Certainly, the initial (May 2010) estimate for the Metropolitan Police, for the two days which the Pope spent in London, was £1,800,000, including opportunity costs. Actual costs for three police forces are known: Lothian and Borders Police £543,000, Strathclyde Police £649,000, and West Midlands Police £280,000.

The cost of the papal visit to the security services is never likely to be revealed.

The Scottish Government has disclosed that it spent £800,000 on the visit.

Factoring in everything, and making guestimates for the continuingly unknown elements, the 2010 papal visit must have cost a minimum of £25,000,000, of which the state paid three-fifths (nationally and locally) and the Church two-fifths.

This is obviously a substantial sum, albeit only one-quarter of the ‘true cost’ of £100,000,000 which NSS was claiming in July 2010. Nor is it known how this compares with the cost of other (more secular) state visits.

BRIN would naturally be pleased to hear from any of its readers who have concrete and verifiable information which could refine this picture of the cost of the papal visit.

Posted in News from religious organisations, Official data, Religion in public debate, Research note | Tagged , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Searchlight on Religion

Posted on March 5, 2011 by Clive D. Field

A major new source of public opinion data on religion and inter-faith relations has just become available in the form of a Populus poll for Searchlight Educational Trust.

The survey is of unusual importance in terms of the number of questions asked and the large size of the sample (5,054 adults aged 18 and over interviewed online in England on 28-31 January 2011).

The Trust is a registered charity formed in 1992 that works with communities to build responses to racism and hatred, dispel myths and develop greater understanding. It has just established the Together project to explore and tackle the rise of right-wing nationalism and extremism in Britain and Western Europe.

Only a small proportion of the poll’s statistics have been included in Searchlight’s Fear & HOPE report, based on the survey, which concluded that ‘there is not a progressive majority in society and … that there is a deep resentment to immigration, as well as scepticism towards multiculturalism.’

‘There is a widespread fear of the “Other”, particularly Muslims, and there is an appetite for a new right-wing political party that has none of the fascist trappings of the British National Party or the violence of the English Defence League. With a clear correlation between economic pessimism and negative views to immigration, the situation is likely to get worse over the next few years.’

At the same time, ‘there are also many positive findings from the report. Young people are more hopeful about the future and more open to living in an ethnically diverse society. The vast majority … reject political violence and view white anti-Muslim extremists as bad as Muslim extremists and there is overwhelming support for a positive campaign against extremism.’

The document is available, in a somewhat curious format, at:

http://www.fearandhope.org.uk/project-report/

For this post BRIN has ignored the report and drawn upon, but cannot claim to have summarized adequately, the 128 computer tables extending to 395 pages. These provide topline responses, the only ones used here, together with disaggregations by gender, age, socio-economic group, region, employment sector, ethnicity, religion, and a sixfold segmentation by identity ‘tribes’. These tables can be accessed at:

http://populuslimited.com/uploads/download_pdf-310111-Searchlight-Fear-and-Hope-survey.pdf

Two clusters of questions are briefly considered here, those which sought to enumerate the nation’s general verdict on and participation in religion, and those which assessed attitudes to and engagement with people from the various faith traditions in Britain.

RELIGION IN GENERAL

35% of adults professed no religious affiliation, while 54% were Christians and 7% non-Christians (table 7).

23% said that religion was important to them, with 55% disagreeing and 22% neutral (table 76).

Just 7% said religion was the most important element in their personal identity. This compared with 35% for nationality, 24% for country of birth, 16% for the city, town or village in which they lived, 7% for ethnicity, 6% for their immediate neighbourhood, and 5% for the country of residence, where different from that of birth (table 32). Religion was the second most important influence on identity for 8% (table 33) and the third most important for 10% (table 34).

55% never attended a place of worship in their local community. 8% claimed to go at least once a week, 5% at least once a fortnight, 6% at least once a month, and 26% less than once a month (table 63).

Only 23% thought that, by and large, religion is a force for good in the UK. 42% disagreed and 35% expressed no opinion (table 77).

68% agreed that religion should not influence laws and policies in Britain, with 16% disagreeing and 16% neutral (table 75).

On a scale of 1 (= do not trust at all) to 5 (= trust fully), the mean respect score for local religious leaders was 2.95. This was lower than for the respondent’s general practitioner (3.98), the local headteacher (3.44), women’s institute (3.43), the local scout/girl guide leader (3.41), the local branch of service organizations (3.31), and leaders of local clubs (3.15).

But it was higher than for the local chamber of commerce (2.81), a local trade union (2.72), the local mayor (2.62), the local MP (2.58), local councillors (2.57), and the local council (2.54). See tables 38-51.

INTER-FAITH RELATIONS

62% considered religious abuse to be as serious as racial abuse, but 38% viewed the latter as more serious (table 115).

28% thought religious abuse to be more widespread in Britain than racial abuse. 72% said the reverse (table 116).

71% assessed religious abuse to be on the increase in Britain, 29% disagreeing (table 117). 64% said that racial abuse was growing (table 118).

60% believed that people should be able to say what they wanted about religion, however critical or offensive it might be. 40% thought there should be restrictions on what individuals could say about religion, and that they should be prosecuted if necessary (table 119). Significantly more, 58%, were in favour of limitations on freedom of speech when it came to race (table 120).

44% regarded Muslims as completely different to themselves in terms of habits, customs and values. Just 5% said the same about Christians, 19% about Jews, 28% about Hindus, and 29% about Sikhs (tables 78-83).

42% said that they interacted with Sikhs less than monthly or never, 39% with Jews, 36% with Hindus, 28% with Muslims, and 5% with Christians. There were a lot of don’t knows for this question (tables 84-89).

59% did not know any Sikhs well as friends and family members, work colleagues, children’s friends or neighbours. 55% said the same about Jews, 53% about Hindus, 41% about Muslims, and 8% about Christians (tables 90-95).

32% argued that Muslims created a lot of problems in the UK. Far fewer said this about other faith groups: 7% about Hindus, 6% about Sikhs, 5% about Christians, and 3% about Jews (tables 96-101).

49% contended that Muslims created a lot of problems in the world. Again, this was much less often said about other faith communities: 15% about Jews, 12% about Christians, 10% about Hindus, and 9% about Sikhs (tables 102-107).

25% viewed Islam as a dangerous religion which incites violence. 21% considered that violence or terrorism on the part of some Muslims is unsurprising given the actions of the West in the Muslim world and the hostility towards Muslims in Britain.

49% thought that such violence or terrorism was unsurprising on account of the activities and statements of a few Muslim extremists. 6% dismissed accusations of violence or terrorism by Muslims as something got up by the media (table 126).

On hearing reports of violent clashes between English nationalist extremists and Muslim extremists, 26% would sympathize with the former who were standing up for their country and 6% for the Muslims who were standing up for their faith. 68% would view both groups as bad as each other (table 127).

43% indicated that they would support a campaign to stop the building of a new mosque in their locality, against 19% who would oppose such a campaign, with 38% neutral (table 124).

In the event of such a campaign turning violent or threatening to do so, by the action of either of the disputing parties, 81% would condemn such violence but 19% would continue to support one side or the other (table 125).

Interviewees were asked to react to the possibility of a new political party which would defend the English, create an English Parliament, control immigration, challenge Islamic extremism, restrict the construction of mosques, and make it compulsory for all public buildings to fly the St George’s flag or Union Jack. 21% said that they would definitely support such a party and a further 27% that they would consider backing it (table 122).

Quizzed about a new organization which would campaign against religious and racial extremism, and promote better relations between different ethnic and religious groups, 20% said that they would definitely and another 48% that they might possibly support it (table 123).

Hopefully, this gallop through a veritable mountain of statistics will give BRIN readers some insight into the range of questions posed in this Populus/Searchlight survey, and some sense of the research potential of the dataset.

Posted in church attendance, Religion in public debate, Survey news | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

National Well-Being

Posted on March 4, 2011 by Clive D. Field

At the request of the Coalition Government, the Office for National Statistics is working to develop new statistical measures of national well-being, covering quality of life and environmental and sustainability issues, as well as the traditional economic performance of the country.

To guide this process, the National Statistician has launched a debate and public consultation on national well-being. It will run until 15 April 2011. Views are sought on a variety of topics, among them the extent to which spirituality and religion matter to people and whether they should be reflected in national measures of well-being.

Input to this dialogue can be made in various ways, including by completing the consultation questionnaire and returning it by email or post, by contributing to a virtual debate website, or by attending workshops. Full details of how to get involved are available at:

http://www.ons.gov.uk/well-being

No faith leaders or faith experts seem to have been appointed to the membership of the Measuring National Well-Being Advisory Forum, which is mainly drawn from the ranks of government, business and academe. Nor, apparently, is the consultation attracting much attention in the faith media.

The BRIN source database – http://www.brin.ac.uk/sources – can be used to identify previous quantitative research into the religious aspects of well-being. Use keyword search terms such as ‘well being’, ‘well-being’ and ‘wellbeing’.

Posted in Measuring religion, Official data, Religion in public debate | Tagged , | 1 Comment

Future of the Global Muslim Population

Posted on January 28, 2011 by Clive D. Field

The long-awaited Pew report on The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030 was eventually published yesterday by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life.

The Forum, based in Washington DC, is a non-partisan organization delivering timely and impartial information on issues at the intersection of religion and public affairs. It is an initiative of the Pew Research Center, financed by the Pew Charitable Trusts.

This report on Muslim population is part of the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures project, jointly funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts and the John Templeton Foundation.

The next documents in the series will be on the number of Christians (to be published later this year) and (in 2012) projections for the future growth of Christianity and other world faiths and of the religiously unaffiliated.

The study of Muslim populations covers 232 countries and territories (including the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man), so it is obviously not going to be possible to summarize it succinctly here. Rather, we shall concentrate on the UK data.

Estimates (the medium of three scenarios) of the number of self-identifying Muslims are provided for 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020 and 2030.

Projected figures for each country derive from the application of the well-established cohort-component method to the best available data on fertility, mortality and migration rates, and on related factors such as education, economic well-being and birth control.

The principal sources of the UK information are stated in Appendix B as: ‘1990 estimate based on World Religion Database; 2000 estimate based on 2001 Census; 2010, 2020 and 2030 projections carried out by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis based on the 2001 Census’ (p. 202).

The Institute referred to is located in Laxenburg, Austria, and a number of scholars from it are listed in Appendix C as consultants in respect of the UK: Bilal Barakat, Anne Goujon, Samir KC, Vegard Skirbekk and Marcin Stonawski. Other advisers on the UK were Erik Kaufmann (England) and Erling Lundevaller (Sweden).

The overall size of the UK Muslim population is estimated at 1,172,000 in 1990 (equivalent to 2.0% of all citizens) and 1,590,000 in 2000 (2.7%). The former figure seems somewhat high but is not drastically out of line with other estimates (largely ethnically-derived), while the latter is from the 2001 census, the first in Britain to include a question on religious profession.

The Pew estimate for 2010 is 2,869,000 (4.6% of the UK population). This has been arrived at through the cohort-component method (p. 174). As BRIN noted when this figure was given a preliminary airing by Pew on 16 September last (http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/?p=598), it seems a little inflated.

A subsequent BRIN calculation based on the Integrated Household Survey for 2009-10, which interviewed 442,000 individuals in Britain, suggested that there are roughly 2,520,000 Muslims at present (see http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/?p=603).

For a more definitive answer, we shall obviously have to await the results from this year’s census, which will be taken on 27 March, and will again run a (voluntary) question about religious affiliation.

Clearly, if Pew’s 2010 figure is somewhat inflated, this will presumably have impacted on its projections for 2020 and 2030, which could be unduly high. They are, respectively, 4,231,000 (6.5% of the population) and 5,567,000 (8.2%).

The projected UK percentage for 2030 is lower than for France (10.3%), Belgium (10.2%), Sweden (9.9%), Austria (9.3%) and the Western European average (8.6%), but higher than in Switzerland (8.1%), The Netherlands (7.8%), Germany (7.1%), Italy (5.4%) and Spain (3.7%).  

The anticipated rise in the number of UK Muslims between 2010 and 2030 is thus 94%, compared with 145% between 1990 and 2010. Despite this lessening in the rate of growth, the projected UK increase for 2010-30 is still almost three times the global and European figures (35% and 32% respectively).

One of the factors behind the expansion in the Muslim community relative to the non-Muslim population is the higher fertility of the former (3.0 children per woman in the UK in 2005-10) than the latter (1.8).

Although Muslim fertility is declining, and the gap on non-Muslims is narrowing, it is still expected to be 0.8 children per woman in 2025-30 compared with 1.2 in 2005-10.

Greater fertility is linked to the younger age profile of Muslims, meaning that they are disproportionately already in or entering the prime reproductive years (ages 15-29).

Another reason for Muslim growth in the UK is net migration. The net inflow of Muslim immigrants in 2010 is estimated by Pew at 64,000, representing 28% of all immigrants to the UK in the year. There were 70,000 in Spain, 66,000 in France and 60,000 in Italy.

However, the five-year projected Muslim net migration into the UK is set to fall, according to Pew, from 312,000 in 2010-15 to 274,000 in 2025-30.  

No allowance seems to have been made for conversions to Islam, about which we made a post recently (http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/?p=813). Pew’s working hypothesis is that ‘future conversions into Islam will roughly equal conversions away from Islam’ (p. 166).

Needless to say, projections such as these could be overturned in the event of unanticipated changes in national or global social, economic or political conditions. Therefore, they should be treated with some discretion.

The 221-page report is available in both hypertext and PDF formats, alongside an interactive map and sortable data tables, thereby providing a truly flexible online resource. All these components can be accessed by following the links at the executive summary page:

http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1872/muslim-population-projections-worldwide-fast-growth

To view the report alone as a PDF file, go to:

http://features.pewforum.org/FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDF.pdf

Pew’s research will inevitably fuel the debates about immigration and Islamophobia in the UK. Early off the starting-block is the article in today’s Daily Mail which claims that by 2030 ‘Britain would have more Muslims than Kuwait and close to the number found in America, even though five times as many people live there’. See:

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1351251/Number-British-Muslims-double-5-5m-20-years.html

Posted in Historical studies, Measuring religion, News from religious organisations, Religion in public debate | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Roman Catholic Schools in England and Wales

Posted on January 11, 2011 by Clive D. Field

As we noted three months ago (http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/?p=650), the Catholic Education Service for England and Wales (CESEW) has sometimes been accused of excessive secrecy in guarding its statistical data.

This is notwithstanding the fact that Roman Catholic schools account for about one in ten of all maintained school places in England and Wales and receive 100% of their running costs and 90% of their capital funding from the state.

However, the CESEW has started the New Year on the front foot by releasing on 10 January two new quantitatively rich 40-page reports which, it is claimed, ‘demonstrate that Catholic schools are rated consistently better than other schools’ and ‘show just how well taxpayers’ money is spent when it is channelled into Catholic schools.’

This assessment seems likely to fan the flames of the often acrimonious debate about the principle and practice of faith schools, especially since the CESEW’s chairman (Malcolm McMahon, Bishop of Nottingham) has taken the opportunity of the new publications to attack the National Secular Society, teachers’ leaders and their ‘friends in Parliament’ who are campaigning for the abolition of faith schools.

The first document is the Digest of 2009 Census Data for Schools and Colleges, only the third in the series (the others being for 2007 and 2008), although the tradition of conducting an annual census of Catholic schools, teachers and pupils dates back to 1959. 94% of the Catholic schools in England and Wales made a return in 2009.

80% of the 2,289 Catholic schools in England and Wales in 2009 were primary, 17% secondary, 1% tertiary, and 2% all through. 94% were maintained and 6% independent. 96% were in England and 4% in Wales. Diocesan totals ranged from 18 in Wrexham to 252 in Birmingham.

74% of the 736,000 pupils in maintained Catholic schools and colleges were Catholic, falling to 65% in Wales, but only 41% of the 41,000 pupils in independent Catholic schools were Catholic. Proportions of Catholic teachers were lower: 57% of 44,000 in maintained schools and 40% of 5,000 in independent schools.

Pupil intakes appeared socially quite diverse. ‘The data shows that Catholic schools have similar proportions of children eligible for free school meals as schools nationally have, and are more ethnically mixed than schools nationally’.

The second report is entitled Value Added: the Distinctive Contribution of Catholic Schools and Colleges in England and has been written by Peter Irvine, retired HMI and education consultant. The data derive from Ofsted inspections in 2005-09 and test and examination results for Key Stages 1-5 in 2007-09.

Findings particularly highlighted by CESEW in its press release include the following (others may be picked up from the executive summary on pp. 6-8):

  • ‘In terms of overall effectiveness, Ofsted judged 73% of Catholic secondary schools to be outstanding or good, compared to 60% of schools nationally. For primary schools, 74% of Catholic schools were judged outstanding or good compared to 66% nationally.
  • In terms of the contextual value added measure, 58% of Catholic secondary schools had above average scores, compared to 39% of schools nationally.
  • The proportion of pupils gaining level 4 or above in Standard Assessment Tests (SATs) at age 11 was consistently around 5% higher in Catholic schools than in schools nationally.
  • At GCSE level, the proportion of students obtaining 5 or more GCSEs at A*-C (including English and Maths) was consistently at least 6% higher in Catholic schools than in schools nationally.’

The two reports, with accompanying press release, can be downloaded from:

http://www.cesew.org.uk/standardnews.asp?id=10080

Posted in News from religious organisations, Religion in public debate | Tagged , , , | 2 Comments

Not Ashamed – Christianity in Britain

Posted on December 21, 2010 by Clive D. Field

Some sections of British evangelical Christianity feel increasingly beleaguered in the face of what they perceive as the progressive marginalization of their faith, at the hands of the law, the media, government and employers.

Christian Concern is one organization seeking to redress the balance, underpinned by its e-mail subscription base of 27,000 supporters. On 1 December it formally launched its ‘Not Ashamed’ campaign, encouraging Christians to live out their faith in public.

Through its sister agency, the Christian Legal Centre, it has dealt with several high-profile cases on religious freedom, abortion and marriage and the family, defending Christians ‘who have stood for their beliefs and suffered the consequences’.

To coincide with the inauguration of ‘Not Ashamed’, Christian Concern commissioned ComRes to undertake a telephone survey into the public’s attitudes to the rights of Christians. Interviews were conducted with 1,006 adult Britons aged 18 and over on 26-29 November 2010.

Headline findings from the survey are contained in two press releases issued by Christian Concern on 5 and 20 December, which also provide useful background notes on the six legal cases which have informed the questions asked in the poll.

These press releases can be found at:

http://www.christianconcern.com/press-release/72-of-public-say-christians-should-be-able-to-refuse-to-act-against-their-conscience-w

http://www.christianconcern.com/our-concerns/employment/public-backs-protection-of-christian-conscience-at-work

The full data tables are at:

http://www.comres.co.uk/christianconcernpolldec10.aspx

The sample was evenly divided on the extent to which Britain can still be described as a Christian country, 50% thinking it can and 47% that it cannot. This represents a big shift since the NOP/New Society poll in March 1965, when the figures were 80% and 19% respectively.

The over-65s (66%) and Scots (57%) were among those most likely to consider Britain to be a Christian country. Dissentients were especially concentrated among the 18-24s (68%) and the C1 social group (54%).

In an implicit reference to the Shirley Chaplin vs Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Trust case, 73% of the whole sample (and 82% of the over-65s) agreed that people should have the legal right to wear Christian symbols such as a cross in their workplace. 24% disagreed, including 38% of 18-24s.

87% disagreed that health care workers should be threatened with the sack for offering to pray with patients, a question apparently prompted by the analogous cases of Olive Jones and Duke Amachree. Only 11% agreed with the proposition.

Opinion again split on the issue of whether would-be foster carers who hold that homosexual activity is morally wrong should be banned from fostering (an allusion to the case of Owen and Eunice Johns vs Derby City Council). 40% of respondents thought such foster carers should be banned, while 54% disagreed.

In a more summative question, 72% agreed that Christians should be able to refuse to act against their conscience without being penalized by their employer, with 22% in disagreement (including 31% of 18-24s).

Rather playing the Islamophobic card, 56% backed the statement that Muslims often enjoy greater freedom of speech and action than Christians in Britain today, the proportion reaching three-fifths among the over-55s, manual workers, Northerners and Scots. 36% disagreed, increasing to 48% of the 18-24s.

Christian Concern has glossed the survey as showing that ‘draconian and politically correct rules which discriminate against Christians living out their faith in the public square have been slammed by the public …’ And it reminded the Coalition Government of their reliance upon churches and Christian organizations to help deliver the Big Society.

In reality, this possibly over-interprets the poll findings, some of which could be read as delivering more mixed messages from the public about the importance of maintaining a Christian presence in the nation.

In particular, the youngest age cohorts seem to be more sceptical on this matter than others, reflecting the fact that, in separate investigations, they were least likely to profess Christianity or any religion (the Christian Concern survey did not enquire into religious affiliation).

Moreover, such support for the Christian viewpoint as was registered in this poll might have been qualified had the questions been put in a somewhat broader context, for example pitching the freedom of some Christians against equal opportunities for society as a whole.

Posted in News from religious organisations, Religion in public debate, Survey news | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Pastor Jones Unwelcome in the UK

Posted on December 15, 2010 by Clive D. Field

According to media reports, and its own Facebook page, the English Defence League (EDL), a right-wing group opposed to so-called Muslim extremism, has apparently withdrawn its acceptance of an offer by the American Terry Jones to speak at an EDL rally in Luton (a place of growing conflict between Islamists and right-wingers) on 5 February 2011.

Jones, pastor of the Dove World Outreach Center in Gainesville (Florida), originally came to global prominence in late summer through his advocacy of an ‘International Burn a Koran Day’, to coincide with the ninth anniversary of 9/11.

We reported at that time (http://www.brin.ac.uk/news/?p=560) on the British public’s views about whether the US government should let Jones proceed with his plans or not (although, in practice, the US authorities were powerless to stop him). 

On learning of Jones’s intention to address an EDL rally, and potentially inciting animosity to British Muslims, Home Secretary Theresa May had been actively looking into the possibility of denying him entry to this country.

Her action prompted The Sun newspaper to commission YouGov to ask a representative online sample of 1,810 adult Britons aged 18 and over on 13 and 14 December 2010 whether Jones should or should not be allowed to enter the UK.

55% of the whole sample thought that Jones should not be permitted entry. Women (59%) were more opposed than men (50%), while hostility to Jones increased steadily with age, from 38% of 18-24s to 64% of the over-60s.

Regionally, the variation was from 50% in London and Northern England to 63% in Scotland. Those who voted Labour or Liberal Democrat in this year’s general election were slightly more inclined to want Jones banned from the country than Conservatives.

32% overall considered that Jones should be admitted to the UK, with men (42%) markedly more in favour than women (22%). Other demographic differences were much smaller, even age (the over-60s, for example, being just 8% less in favour of Jones being allowed into the UK than the 18-24s).

However, the latter age cohort was evidently not very knowledgeable about the matter since 26% were ‘don’t knows’, twice the national average for this question.

These replies do not necessarily give us clues as to the motivation of respondents. Thus, it is impossible to know whether those who supported Jones’s entry to the UK were simply upholding a generic principle of freedom of expression or actually agreed with his views.

Similarly, those who wanted him kept out of the UK may have objected to his opinions about Islam or just been concerned about the threat of civil disorder, including retaliatory protests by Muslims, in the event of Jones being granted entry.

The full data table for the survey is available at: 

http://today.yougov.co.uk/sites/today.yougov.co.uk/files/YG-Archives-Pol-Sun-TerryJones-141210.pdf

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Clive Field on Attitudes to Islam and Muslim Attitudes in Britain

Posted on December 13, 2010 by Siobhan McAndrew

Last week, the Institute for Social Change (where BRIN is based) hosted a seminar by Clive Field, who co-directs this resource and blogs here assiduously. The title was “Muslim Opinions and Opinions of Muslims: British Experiences”. Clive provided a historical overview of Islam in Britain, followed by a “survey of surveys”, and culminating in an exploratory analysis of a survey of British Muslims sponsored by Harvard and Manchester.

The growing salience of Islam shows up in the number and subjects covered by surveys. Before the late 1980s, Islam and Muslims did not feature per se in national surveys; where diversity was considered it was qua ethnicity and nationality rather than religion. Imposing a survey ‘quality threshold’, Clive found that 15 surveys on Islam and/or Muslims were carried out over 1988-2000, 7 of them in 1990. However, 154 surveys were conducted between 2001 and 2010.

Clive then surveyed the headline findings emerging from such surveys, arguing that

‘[t]here is extensive negativity towards Muslims but no absolute level of Islamophobia, nor are views necessarily consistent between questions’.

More specifically, 9/11 and 7/7 spurred negative perceptions of Muslims’ integration, loyalty and radicalism. Knowledge of Islam and Muslims has improved somewhat but is still limited, and appears mostly to derive from (negative) media coverage). While direct social contact has grown, over one-half of non-Muslim Britons have no Muslim friends, and negative attitudes correlate with lack of knowledge and social distance. Double standards appear prevalent: Muslims are heavily criticised for failing to integrate, and yet little effort is made to bridge the gulf between the Muslim and majority communities.

Looking at surveys of Muslims, the first was conducted by Harris in 1989. It is expensive to survey minority communities and particularly those which are linguistically diverse. This means that such surveys often make methodological compromises, particularly with regard to sample size, which is typically 500 (which limits further breakdown by age or other category). Nevertheless Clive found 39 surveys of adequate quality conducted between 2001 and 2010.

The headline findings from these indicate that Muslims are much more religious than non-Muslims in Britain, and stricter on most aspects of morality. The overwhelming majority are attached to Britain, but there appears to be some ambivalence regarding a perceived clash between British and Muslim values, and a sense that Islamophobia is growing in British society.

Clive then provided an overview of findings from the Harvard-Manchester survey of Muslims, funded by the John Templeton Foundation, and conducted over February-March 2009. It was designed to complement the 2008 British Social Attitudes survey where the number of Muslim respondents was too small for analysis of responses. Ipsos MORI ran the survey, providing a questionnaire in English, Sylheti and Punjabi and sampling output areas that had a population that was at least 10% Muslim.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face with 480 British Muslims aged over 18. 85% were South Asian, and 55% aged 18-34 (namely a young demographic profile). There were significant rates of non-response to sensitive questions (for example, on sexual morality), while complex questions such as the position of Sharia attracted a high rate of ‘don’t knows’.

Regarding the questions themselves, seven in eight reported that religion was extremely or very important in daily life, compared with 15% in the BSA 2008 survey. 82% reported that religion was very important to their sense of identity (BSA 16%) versus 55% for ethnicity (BSA 29%). Two-thirds reported that they were very or moderately spiritual (BSA 34%). 84% endorsed a literalist view of scripture (BSA 10%) and 44% creationism (BSA 14%).

Weekly attendance at services was claimed by 30% of those aged 18-34 and 50% of those aged 35 and over (BSA 10%). Praying at least several times a day was claimed by 45% of those aged 18-34 and 60% of those aged 35 and over (BSA 5%). Two-thirds reported that they read the Qur’an at least weekly, compared with 11% of the BSA sample reporting that they read the Bible or equivalent holy book. 71% reported that they observe Ramadan fully, and 17% mostly.

Headscarves worn (by the respondent if female or close female relative if the respondent was male) by 58% of those aged 18-34, and 77% of those aged 35 and over.

Regarding religion and personal morality, 75% reported that there are absolutely clear guidelines about what is good or evil (BSA 37%). 60% of those aged 18-34, and 78% of those aged 35 and over, reported that pre-marital sex was always wrong (BSA 8%). 58% of those aged 18-34 and 74% of those aged 35 and over regard homosexual acts as always wrong (BSA 30%). 45% of those aged 18-34 and 58% of those of 35 and over oppose legal recognition of same-sex relationships (BSA 26%).

Regarding the position of Muslims on religion in politics and society, 60% agree that religion is a private matter which should be kept out of public debates on socio-political issues (compared with 71% in the BSA). 54% disagree that it is proper for religious leaders to influence voting of individuals (BSA 73%). 45% report that religion is very or somewhat important in making decisions on politics (BSA 19%).

With regard to religious diversity, two-thirds acknowledge basic truths in many religions, compared with 74% of respondents to the 2008 BSA survey. 38% agree, while 32% disagree, that Britain is deeply divided along religious lines (compared with 52% and 16% in the BSA).

With regard to national identity, 58% reported that they “very strongly” belong to Britain and 29% “fairly strongly”. 57% support a greater role for Sharia courts. 22% of those aged 18-34 and 14% of those aged 35 and over reported experiencing Islamophobia during the two years before the survey period. However, 87% reported that they were broadly satisfied with their lives as a whole (BSA 83%). These findings are interesting and deserve further research (although the sample size will prohibit very detailed breakdowns). Clive also called for further, methodologically-enhanced survey research to build the evidence base, and provided some thoughts on prospects for integration and accommodation.

When discussion was opened to the floor, seminar participants were keen to probe how far negative attitudes among non-Muslims to Muslims were driven by generalised prejudice rather than something specific to Islam; how far they reflected antipathy to the tenets of Islam but not Muslims themselves; and how far they reflected antipathy to the highly religious and religiously-distinctive. The reliability of media-commissioned opinion polls seeking to create stories as well as reflect public attitudes was also discussed more deeply. It was a lively discussion, indicating appetite and scope for further research.

Clive has published on Islamophobia elsewhere:

C. Field (2007), ‘Islamophobia in contemporary Britain: the evidence of the opinion polls, 1988-2006’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 18: 447-77.

C. Field (forthcoming), ‘Young British Muslims since 9/11: a composite attitudinal profile’, Religion, State and Society.

C. Field (forthcoming), ‘Revisiting Islamophobia in contemporary Britain: opinion poll findings for 2007-10’, Islamophobia in Western Europe and North America, ed. Marc Helbling, London: Routledge.

Accordingly, he is not planning to develop an academic article from this research but is happy for the slidepack to be available here at BRIN. For the full set of slides presented at the seminar, please visit this link: http://www.brin.ac.uk/figures/muslims-attitudes-and-attitudes-towards-muslims/

 
 

 

 

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Senior Staff Recruitment in Faith Schools

Posted on October 25, 2010 by Clive D. Field

Recruitment to senior staff posts in Anglican and – especially – Catholic faith schools continues to be more problematical than average according to the sixteenth annual report on The State of the Labour Market for Senior Staff in Schools in England and Wales, prepared for the National Association of Head Teachers by John Howson and Almut Sprigade of Education Data Surveys at TSL Education Ltd.

The document analyses the outcomes for 1,499 posts on the Leadership scale (head teachers, deputy head teachers and assistant head teachers) advertised by publicly-funded schools in England and Wales between September 2009 and April 2010. Results are presented for each level of post separately for secondary, primary and special schools, and also by type of control of school (including Church of England and Roman Catholic).

Although the authors note ‘some signs of possible improvement’ in 2009-10, they remain critical of the persistent failure, over the past decade, of some dioceses to give adequate attention to the issue of succession planning for school leadership and imply that these shortcomings have not been exposed to the ‘intense public scrutiny’ to which local authorities would have been subject. The failure is particularly manifest in the high proportion of faith school posts which have to be readvertised.

For detailed figures and commentary, see:

http://www.naht.org.uk/welcome/resources/key-topics/leadership/unfilled-posts-leave-profession-on-knife-edge/

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How Fair is Britain?

Posted on October 12, 2010 by Clive D. Field

Section 12 of the Equality Act 2006 endowed the newly-formed Equality and Human Rights Commission with a responsibility to monitor the progress that society is making towards becoming more equal, and to report on it every three years.

The first such triennial review was published yesterday as How Fair is Britain? Equality, Human Rights and Good Relations in 2010. This alone runs to 750 pages but is supplemented by a raft of specially-commissioned research reports and by submissions in response to a call for evidence. All this documentation can be freely accessed at:

http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/key-projects/triennial-review/

Religion (as measured by religious affiliation) is one of the key equality variables to be monitored, although religious data are not necessarily available for all equality indicators which are covered by the review.

Most of the information used derives from secondary analysis of existing datasets, including, in the case of religion, the Population Census, Annual Population Survey, Labour Force Survey, Citizenship Survey, Health Survey for England, and Wealth and Assets Survey.

There is only occasional new primary data, such as the National Foundation for Educational Research’s online survey of 1,758 English schoolteachers’ attitudes towards religious and other forms of equality in January-February 2010. There is a separate report for this at:

http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/triennial_review/triennial_review_nfer_teachervoice_omnibus.doc

Overall, the review found a Britain far less prejudiced on race and homosexuality than twenty years ago. However, numerous inequalities remain. Specifically, Muslims are shown to experience much disadvantage, in terms of lower educational qualifications, higher unemployment, lower pay, poorer health, and above-average imprisonment.

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